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The ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation integrates the existing literatures on displace-
ment and health by examining the enduring eﬀects of job dislocations that are in-
duced by employment shocks. A joint estimation of hourly wage rates and weekly
hours illuminates the disparities in these economic outcomes that exist between
those who have reestablished themselves in the workplace subsequent to a layoﬀ
and those who have returned to work following the onset of a disability relative
to those with uninterrupted job histories. As an extension of these ideas, em-
ployment transitions and workplace adjustments are modeled to capture spousal
reactions to these shocks. Multiple indicators of health from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation and Social Security Administrative beneﬁts records are
incorporated into the analyses of those with impairments that prompted job loss.
These measures allow knowledge to be gleaned regarding the qualitative diﬀerences
in the lasting impacts of job cessation resulting from medically diagnosed illnesses
as compared to estimates uncovered using survey data sources alone. By consider-
ing time durations following these periods of separation in light of these indicators
of well-being, a more comprehensive understanding of the long-run repercussions
of employee-employer separation is acquired.
The second and third chapters, representing joint work with John M. Abowd
and Kevin L. McKinney, address the research and data preparation that are partof a larger Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of the Census project. We
examine the manner in which changes in the composition of the labor force impact
productivity by exploiting measures of human capital, or skill. The BLS has
previously employed a multifactor productivity model based upon a Jorgensonian
price of labor to explore changes in the index of labor composition within industry
division and year by gender. We choose instead to utilize a Beckerian price of labor
that incorporates skill to examine this index. For this purpose, human capital is
derived from the estimation of a wage equation that includes both person and ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects. This technique enables us to characterize how diﬀerences in labor
force composition aﬀect labor quality within and between industry divisions over
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xiiChapter 1
Are the Lasting Eﬀects of
Employee-Employer Separations induced
by Layoﬀ and Disability Similar?
Exploring Job Displacements using
Survey and Administrative Data
1.1 Introduction
Studies that explore the lingering impacts of mass layoﬀ have extensively docu-
mented the persistence of ﬁrm-side shocks that result in permanent job loss. As
an inaugural researcher in this area, Ruhm (1991) noted the insuﬃcient knowledge
of the adjustment period subsequent to employer-initiated displacing events and
endeavored to address this issue. His discovery of substantial earnings losses that
are sustained for years beyond the date of dislocation propagated a proliferation
of papers, each with intriguing insights about the duration and magnitude of the
lasting scars of job separations.1However, the development of these concepts has
remained narrowly focused on layoﬀs and consistently has excluded any considera-
tion of the lasting eﬀects of analogous shocks to individual workers, such as onsets
of serious illness or disability, that cause employer-employee matches to conclude.
My study corrects for this oversight by comparing the enduring detrimental
1These papers include articles authored by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993); Stevens (1997); Fairlie and Kletzer (1998); and Kletzer (1998). Fallick
(1996) surveys advancements in this literature.
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impacts of past ﬁrm and individual shocks and, in doing so, presents a unique
opportunity to unify the ideas found within the literatures on displacement and
health. By linking economic outcomes to latent impairments that initiated past
job dislocations, this paper supplements the more traditional health studies that
have generally aimed to explore the role of contemporaneous well-being on labor
force decisions.2 Evidence of workers scarred by an unanticipated layoﬀ is abun-
dant, but the severity is unparalleled to the repercussions experienced by those
who have parted from their employer as the result of a disabling condition. This
is because those returning to work following a displacing health shock may be eco-
nomically disadvantaged not only by the abrupt job termination, but also by the
compounding factors relating to any health problems that persist subsequent to
their reemployment.
Within the context of the family, the implications of job loss are not limited
to the aﬀected worker alone. Individuals within a household exhibit compensat-
ing labor force behaviors in the aftermath of another member’s unemployment or
illness.3 Results are not consistent across these studies, however. I additionally
investigate spousal reactions to dislocations in order to determine the manner in
which layoﬀ and poor health inﬂuence married couples as a unit. The diﬀerential
behaviors of workers and their nondisplaced spouses who are impacted by these
two types of events provide an improved understanding of the strengths of shocks
to the demand and supply of workers.
For this purpose, I consider the lasting eﬀects of job separations using multiple
2See Currie and Madrian (1999) for a review of health papers of this sort that
utilize data from developed countries. Thomas (2001) provides an excellent survey
of studies of this nature that utilize clinical indicators of health status.
3See Charles (1999), Coile (2004), Parsons (1977), and Stephens (2001) for
relevant papers on the added worker eﬀect.3
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and integrated
beneﬁts records from the Social Security Administration (SSA). The SIPP has the
advantage of providing longitudinal information on demographic and job charac-
teristics, including reasons for work cessation, without restricting the sample to
those who are more advanced in age, as is the case with the Health and Retire-
ment Study. The populations examined include individuals whose positions are
eliminated as part of layoﬀs and those who are induced to leave their places of
employment as the result of work-limiting conditions.4 A subset of the employed
who are highly attached to the labor force is additionally analyzed using evidence
of workplace exits from the records of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
applicants. Since it is plausible that a worker may experience an episode of ill
health that shocks her out of work but is not severe enough to meet the impressive
standards of SSA for acceptance into either program, the purpose of the inclusion
of administrative indicators of health exits is not to strictly assess the validity
of the survey measures. Instead, they are presented to provide an understanding
the qualitative diﬀerences in the lasting eﬀects of acute traumas that have been
medically diagnosed as distinguished from the results uncovered using survey data
sources alone.
I ﬁrst review motivating papers to provide background knowledge of the studies
that contributed to the development of this topic. Discussed are articles in which
4Work-limiting conditions in this study refer to ill health, disability, and other
medical impairments that prevent or restrict an individual from participating in
activities that are required for gainful employment. Temporary ailments are not
considered to be severe enough to suﬃciently impede an individual’s abilities for
any great duration and are thus not counted among these aﬄictions. Within the
context of this study, people with work-limiting conditions will be referred to as
being of ill health, disabled, or impaired despite an awareness of the conceptual
diﬀerences implied by these terms.4
health status and spells out of the work force are individually linked to labor
behaviors in order to outline the parallels between these bodies of work. I then
present a model to explore the convergence of these pieces. I do this by examining
the lasting impacts that displacements resulting from layoﬀ and ill health have
upon wages and hours in the years following the events by using deﬁnitions of
wellness from multiple sources. These ideas are then extended within the context
of the dynamics of a married couple to determine how spousal job loss inﬂuences
the economic outcomes, including the duration of employee-employer matches, of
nondisplaced partners.
My research reveals that behaviors during the ensuing adjustment period vary
by the reason for the unanticipated exit, the number of years that have passed
since the event occurred, and the demographic characteristics of the worker that
include gender, race, and education. While individuals with a layoﬀ or disability in
their past appear to be economically burdened by displacements, those who were
unexpectedly forced to part with their employers because of layoﬀ experience rapid
improvements to their hourly wage rates while spending more time in the oﬃce
than do their nondisplaced counterparts. Those with debilitating health shocks
that induced a job separation have reemployment wages and hours that are simul-
taneously and negatively impacted, which results in ﬁnancial losses that endure
far longer. I ﬁnd that estimates from the administrative measures of health mirror
the qualities of those that utilize self-reports of functional limitations, although
the magnitude of the impact is more detrimental for those who have applied for
SSDI beneﬁts. This result is most exacerbated in the spousal analyses, as women
with husbands who have applied for administrative beneﬁts appear to be transi-
tioning to new positions that provide less pay and allow them to sharply reduce5
their workweeks.
1.2 Motivating Studies
Among the articles that have attempted to address the realization of past condi-
tions in current labor market outcomes is a piece authored by Chirikos and Nestel
(1985). Using the National Longitudinal Surveys of Older Men in 1976 and Mature
Women in 1977, Chirikos and Nestel construct four variables from a retrospective
history of self-reported health status: continuously good, improving, deteriorating,
and continuously poor health over the previous ten years.5 To study the relation-
ship between well-being and income, they estimate a two-equation model for four
sex-race groups. A fascinating result of their procedure is that a history of poor
health, whether continual or changing, reduces current economic welfare. This is
true for both individuals who have household resources available to them and for
those who exhibit increased eﬀorts to devote more time to current employment.
It is possible that Chirikos and Nestel unknowingly were reporting on the lasting
impacts that periods of forced job withdrawal- rather than strictly ill health- have
upon labor outcomes in the long run.
An interesting piece that stratiﬁes those suﬀering from ailments in order to
emphasize the import of disease severity in deriving results is by Smith (1999).
Longitudinal survey data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and Asset
and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old survey (AHEAD) enable him to consider
the manner in which unanticipated changes in well-being impact an individual.
Without allowing for his estimates to be contaminated by those who are impaired
5In categorizing people as having one of four types of health histories, Chirikos
and Nestel use self-reported impairments, a rating of perceived health, and the
existence of conditions that include those which prohibit employment.6
to a diﬀering degree, Smith is able to deduce that severe health shocks produce
a 15% decrease in the probability of continued employment, a reduction in own
earnings of $2,639, and cause impaired individuals to work four fewer hours per
week in the subsequent period. For minor shocks, Smith ﬁnds a 5% decrease in
the probability of remaining in the work force, a $1,638 decline in job income,
and a reduction of time at work by just over one hour following the event.6 The
probability of staying at work falls by only 6% after a period of at least three years,
and so Smith additionally ﬁnds that the eﬀects of a major health problem endure,
but do diminish with time.
Identifying those with more detrimental conditions is clearly key in ensuring
that results are not clouded by mixture with the population of individuals with
transient ailments. In reviewing breast cancer survivors, Bradley, Bednarke, and
Neumark (2001) are able to focus their attention on whether and how substantial
health shocks continue to impact a woman’s labor market outcomes following re-
covery. Wave 1 of the HRS provides information on the amount of time that has
elapsed since a diagnosis of breast cancer. A probit model reveals that women
with histories of this disease are 9% less likely to be working than those without.
Conditional on employment, women who have survived three or more years since
their diagnosis work approximately 4 more hours and earn 23% more than the
noncancer control group; those who have survived two years or fewer do not work
a diﬀerent number of hours nor do they earn more. Without utilizing information
about whether the women diagnosed with breast cancer parted with their places
of employment or were on leave, it is diﬃcult to surmise whether the estimates
of Bradley, Bednarke, and Neumark represent outcomes stemming from actual
6The ﬁndings mentioned in this review are from the HRS sample and are for
impairments that occurred in the previous two years.7
employee-employer separations.
Research has documented that layoﬀs result in lasting eﬀects on economic pros-
perity, but such work has as of yet not been applied to the framework of forced
medical exits from the labor market. Ruhm (1991) considers whether workers in
the former context suﬀer from persistent negative eﬀects related to job displace-
ments which leave them scarred. He explains that “dislocated individuals are
deﬁned as scarred if they continue to earn less or to be unemployed more than
their nondisplaced counterparts, even after the conclusion of a several-year ad-
justment period.” Using data from heads of households from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics for the 1969-1982 waves, Ruhm partitions the years of the sur-
vey to examine histories of employment around ﬁve base years. He desires to draw
conclusions for those permanently displaced in mass layoﬀs or plant closures, and
does so by estimating three sets of OLS wage regressions and tobit unemployment
models in an attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Ruhm’s results re-
veal that while current unemployment has a minimal impact on future joblessness,
wage eﬀects from separation are large in magnitude and persist through time. In
the year following separation, weekly earnings of displaced workers are 16% lower
than those of the nondisplaced, and they remain 14% lower four years later.
Ruhm’s work is extended by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) using a 5%
sample of longitudinally integrated employer-employee administrative data from
the state of Pennsylvania for the years 1974-1986. These data enable the authors
to separately analyze the within and between eﬀects of displacement on high-
tenure individuals. They ﬁnd that those terminated from positions in distressed
ﬁrms experience lasting earnings losses that average 25% per year. The authors
also determine that these losses are not highly dependent upon worker gender8
and age, they are signiﬁcant even for those who are able to obtain subsequent
work in ﬁrms with similar characteristics, and they arise even prior to the point
of separation. Similar ﬁndings are uncovered by multiple sources, indicating that
they are nationally representative and not just particular to a singular state. 7
The scope of my research is not limited to the earnings losses of those who
have personally suﬀered layoﬀ or disability. Much remains to be learned about
the manner in which these diﬀerent events aﬀect a spouse, particularly because
available papers on these topics present results that appear to be highly dependant
upon the implemented methods and data.
Within the context of a married couple, a study by Parsons (1977) ﬁnds using
the Productive Americans Survey that the responses of spouses of inﬁrm individ-
uals vary by gender: men work fewer hours, whereas women work more following
the realization of this type of shock. Haurin (1989) discovers small and statistically
insigniﬁcant responses of women to the changing health quality of their husbands.
Severe impairments, however, are found to notably aﬀect spouses. Consistent with
this, Coile (2004) uses the HRS to explore the added worker eﬀect and ﬁnds that
when husbands suﬀer a severe health trauma, women decrease labor supply. This
is clear evidence of wives choosing to substitute time in the home for hours spent
at work when their spouses are recovering. Charles (1999) also employs the HRS
and determines, contrary to Coile, that women work more while men reduce labor
supply subsequent to the disability of a spouse. Similar behaviors are apparent in a
paper by Stephens (2001), who focuses instead on wives’ labor supply reactions to
husbands’ layoﬀs. He ﬁnds that women are able to replace 25% of their husbands’
lost income by becoming more present in the work force over the course of several
7Fallick (1996) provides a review.9
years.
Despite noted advancements in studies that incorporate measures of health and
that explore displacing events, the apparent isolation of research in these areas has
resulted in a nebulous concept of the manner in which previous disability-related
dislocations might aﬀect workers and their spouses. This paper shifts the focus of
both bodies of literature in order to appropriately address the diﬀerential lasting
impacts of forced separations that are caused by ﬁrm and individual shocks. The
plights of the reemployed can clearly be examined within a structured framework
that permits such a comparison.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Own Job Displacements
The lasting economic consequences of layoﬀs and disability-related job dislocations
of individual i employed at job j in time t are determined by jointly estimating a
regression of the logarithm of the real hourly wage rate, Wijt, and the logarithm
of weekly hours, Rijt, conditional on employment as deﬁned by
Wijt = X
0
iβW1 + X
0
ijβW2 + X
0
itβW3 + (1.1)
X
m=1
γWLmL
m
it +
X
m=1
γWHmH
m
it + θi + ϕij + εijt,
Rijt = Wijtδ + X
0
iβR1 + X
0
ijβR2 + X
0
itβR3 + (1.2)
X
m=1
γRLmL
m
it +
X
m=1
γRHmH
m
it + αi + χij + ηijt.
These equations are comprised of a vector, Xi, of time-invariant observable charac-
teristics of the worker that include race, gender, education groups, and ethnicity.
Static employee-employer match characteristics, Xij, are union status, industry10
division, and type of employment. Time-varying worker characteristics, Xit, con-
sist of marital status, number of children in the household, gender interacted with
martial status and number of children in the household, census regional division of
residence, and a piecewise-linear spline of changing work force experience. Controls
for SIPP panel year are additionally incorporated into the model.8
Within this system, I estimate the persistent losses associated with employer-
employee displacements in order to measure the quantities that the two populations
of interest work and earn as compared to those with continuous employment. For
this purpose, I integrate the approaches of Chirikos and Nestel (1985) with those
of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993). I assume that the timing of a layoﬀ or
the onset of a suﬃciently severe chronic condition that causes a worker to separate
from her employer is a largely unanticipated event. Yearly indicator variables, Lm
and H m, denote the time duration since either a layoﬀ or ill-health separation
occurred. These enable the parsing of the lingering impacts of these exogenous
shocks by capturing the eﬀect of a displacement that occurred m years in the
past, where m = 1,2,3,4,5, and more than 5 years ago. Layoﬀ and disability
coeﬃcients, γ·Lm and γ·Hm, capture the enduring eﬀects of dislocation.
Hours are also regressed upon the logarithm of the real hourly wage rate, which
is endogenous, and so in order to obtain consistent estimations of the coeﬃcients
in this model, cross-equation correlations of the heterogeneity terms must be per-
mitted. The individual random eﬀects in the jointly estimated model are normally
distributed as 


θi
αi


 ∼ N


0,



σ2
θ
σθα σ2
α





,
8Experience, industry division, and type of employment are excluded in the
hours equation.11
and the job heterogeneity terms are distributed as bivariate normal random vari-
ables 


ϕij
χij


 ∼ N


0,



σ2
ϕ
σϕχ σ2
χ





.
The time-varying residuals are independently and identically distributed normal
random variables given by
εijt ∼ N
 
0,σ
2
ε

,
and
ηijt ∼ N
 
0,σ
2
η

.
1.3.2 Spousal Job Displacements
The manner in which an exogenous shock to one’s partner induces changes in the
economic behaviors of the other member in the couple is next addressed. Spousal
compensation for the unanticipated job loss is manifested by job transitions, as
well as by changes in hourly wage rates and hours spent at work. I compare the
duration of the current spell of employment for those married workers with spouses
who have been displaced because of a layoﬀ or a disabling condition with the length
of employee-employer attachments of those married workers who are employed but
do not have spouses who have experienced either type of forced separation by using
the proportional hazard given by
lnh(tij) = T(tij)γ + X
0
iβZ1 + X
0
itβZ2 + X
0
ijβZ3 +
X
m=1
γZLmL
m
it +
X
m=1
γZHmH
m
it + νi.
This proportional hazard enables me to model the transition rate out of employ-
ment and relate this to previous job dislocations the spouses of the married workers12
have endured. It is associated with the survivor function
S(tij) = exp

−
Z tij
0
h(τ)dτ

and probability density function
fE(tij) = h(tij)S(tij).
I assume that the separations induced by the layoﬀ or disability of the spouse
of a worker are exogenous events. Coeﬃcients of the indicator variables that are
denoted by Lm and Hm provide knowledge of the lasting impact that spousal sep-
arations relating to layoﬀ and ill-health have upon the economic outcomes of their
partners. These indicator variables capture the eﬀect of spousal displacements
that occurred m years in the past, where m = 1,2, and more than 3 years ago.
The probability of a married worker with a spouse who has suﬀered a job sepa-
ration remaining with a job relative to this probability for an otherwise identical
individual is obtained through estimates of γZLm and γZHm. These coeﬃcients are
interacted with gender to capture the lasting impacts of the spouse of the worker
experiencing unemployment caused by layoﬀ or ill health.
Additional regressors in the hazard include T(tij), a piecewise-linear spline of
the months of current employment for married worker i at job j ; Xi, a vector
that is composed of gender, race, education groups, and ethnicity; Xit, a vector of
time-varying characteristics that include the number of children in the household
and the interaction of gender with the number of children in the household; Xij, a
vector of static employee-employer match characteristics consisting of union status,
industry division, and type of employment; and ﬁnally piecewise-linear splines of
age, labor force experience, and calendar time. SIPP panel year variables are also
included in the speciﬁcation. Heterogeneity is controlled for in the hazard model13
by including the random eﬀect νi that is independently and identically distributed
as N(0,σ2
ν).
To explore the quantities that the employees with spouses who have experienced
a separation work and earn as compared to before the displacement of their marital
partners, I proceed to jointly estimate a regression of the logarithm of the real
hourly wage rate and a regression of the logarithm of weekly hours conditional
on employment that is consistent with equations (1.2) and (1.2) above. In this
speciﬁcation, the shock indicators are those of the worker’s spouse instead of the
worker herself.
1.3.3 Likelihood Functions
I simplify the notation in equations (1.2) and (1.2) in order to consider the form
of the likelihood I am estimating. I allow the logarithm of the real wage rate to be
represented by
Wijt = X
0
WβW + θi + ϕij + εijt
= X
0
WβW + ξijt,
and the estimation of the logarithm of weekly hours conditional on employment
by
Rijt = X
0
RβR + αi + χij + ηijt.
The likelihood function of the joint model of hours and the wage rate is the product
of the marginal probability of wages and the probability of hours conditional on14
wages:
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where Ji is the total number of jobs each worker holds during the panel, Tij is the
number of time periods each employee-job match endures,
Ti =
Ji X
j=1
Tij
is the total number of time periods each worker is employed at all jobs,
~ Wi =
n
{Wijt}
Tij
t=1
oJi
j=1
is the vector of wages over all jobs and time periods for individual i, Σξξ is the
covariance matrix of the Ti-vector of residuals for the hourly wage equation, and
|Σξξ| is its determinant. The random person eﬀects are identiﬁed by the monthly
observations of each individual, while the random job match eﬀects are identiﬁed
by repeated observations associated with that particular job.
For married couples, I allow the proportional hazard function to be represented
by
lnh(tij) = X
0
ZβZ + νi.15
The likelihood of the hazard is then given by
P(tij|βz,σ
2
ν) =
Z
ν
fE(tij|βZ,ν)fν(ν|σ
2
ν)dν
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o
dν,
where Ji is the total number of jobs for that individual and
Dij =

 
 
1, if the employment spell ends
0, if the employment spell is censored
.
Each spell of employment consists of a period of uninterrupted job attachment
during which time the worker receives monthly pay. These spells can terminate
due to the layoﬀ of an individual, a severe health event that causes the employee
to part ways with the employer, or the decision of a worker to transition into a
new employment situation or to enter into non-employment. The random person
eﬀect is identiﬁed by the existence of multiple job spells for each worker.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Survey of Income and Program Participation
The Survey of Income and Program Participation covers the population of nonin-
stitutionalized civilians residing in America. It is a multipanel, longitudinal survey
conducted by the U. S. Census Bureau, with each panel spanning between 2.5 and
4 years. Between 14,000 and 36,700 households are selected to be interviewed in
each panel of the survey. Household members who are at least 15 years old are
interviewed once every four months for the duration of the panel about their em-
ployment, program participation, and income. Topical modules supplement the
core wave questionnaires by providing more detailed information about past labor16
force participation, demographic characteristics, disability, and additional sources
of income. In this way, the SIPP serves to measure the economic situations of
Americans. This study makes use of the 1990-1993 panels in which the possi-
ble reasons for work cessation include layoﬀ and a means to derive knowledge of
health-related separations.
While the Health and Retirement Study has been used in a number of papers
to explore the implications of disability, the construction of the baseline HRS
sample restricts the age of those examined to heads of households aged 51-61 and
their spouses. An increasing number of younger workers are becoming impaired,
however, and it is only with a longitudinal data set such as the SIPP that it is
possible to model the behavior of younger cohorts who have experienced exogenous
health shocks that have resulted in separations from the work force. With such
a sample, it is also possible to derive estimates without concerns that the results
might easily be confused by retirement behaviors.
Construction of Indicators of Exogenous Separation
The longitudinal structure of the SIPP panels enables the creation of indicators
that are representative of the number of years that have passed since an exogenous
shock induced the dissolution of an employee-employer pairing. The Employment
History topical module contains detailed questions about former positions. Re-
spondents are able to specify the month and year in which they ended an earlier
job and whether the main reason they stopped working for this employer is related
to either health or layoﬀ. Furthermore, a second set of questions probes into peri-
ods lasting at least 6 months that the individual has spent out of the work force.
Own illness or disability are listed among the reasons for these gaps in employment17
along with the years that span these absences. Potentially, one indicator of past
separation due to layoﬀ and up to two indictors of past separation due to poor
health can be obtained from this topical module along with the timing of these
events.
In the Labor Force and Recipiency core wave questionnaires, those whose work
has terminated during the reference period are asked to specify a reason. In
this manner, evidence of contemporary separations is collected as time progresses
through the longitudinal SIPP panels. The possible explanations for job cessation
include being laid oﬀ, choosing to retire, being discharged, having been at a tem-
porary job that ended, accepting another job opportunity, and quitting for some
other reason. This last option is used in combination with an indicator of wellness
to determine when an exogenous health shock has forced a worker to separate from
her place of employment.
Care is taken to ensure that exits are in fact exogenous shocks to the employed
individual. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notiﬁcation (WARN) Act,
eﬀective beginning in February 1989, requires that employers of 100 or more em-
ployees provide 60 days of advanced notice of mass layoﬀs and plant closures so that
workers can prepare for the impending dislocation. Thus, a layoﬀ is not included
in the list of exit dates if the worker smoothly transitions between jobs during
the course of the panel or if she is recalled.9 Similarly, since severe impairments
9A smooth work transition occurs when employment is overlapping and contin-
uous or when the individual has found reemployment within four days of the date
of job termination. Stinson (2003) at the U. S. Census Bureau performed extensive
research using name matching software to create an internal use SIPP jobs ﬁle that
corrects the job identiﬁers across waves. Since displacements are deﬁned as events
that result in the permanent conclusion of a job match, a worker who was rehired
following a layoﬀ by her previous employer is not ﬂagged as having been separated
from this position even if the individual has indicated within the survey that she
was laid oﬀ.18
would likely impact all jobs held if a sudden health shock occurred, an ill-health
exit date is deleted when it is apparent that a smooth transition between jobs has
occurred. This measure should further improve the quality of the indicators of
disability dislocations.
The wellness variable is acquired from several sources to ensure that it is accu-
rately representative of the individual’s perceived current status, with information
from the topical modules supplementing the core wave ﬁles. The Work Disability
History topical module, the Functional Limitations and Disability topical module,
the Medical Expenses and Work Disability topical module, and the Labor Force
and Recipiency core wave ﬁles all contain questions about disabling conditions.
If a respondent claims that her health or condition limits the kind or amount of
work that can be done;10 if she has a physical, mental, or other health condition
which limits the kind or amount of work that can be done;11 if she claims to have
been employed when a work-limiting disability began;12 or if her health condi-
tion prevents her from working at a job or business,13 then a wave-level disability
variable is ﬂagged. Temporary illnesses that are revealed by follow-up questions
to non-permanent job separations are not included in this measure, regardless of
duration.
Relying on self-reported measures as true indicators of work-limiting disabilities
is somewhat problematic due to the fact that the associated measurement error is
likely nonrandom. For example, the use of medical facilities tends to increase with
10Work Disability, Functional Limitations and Disability, and Medical Expenses
and Work Disability topical modules.
11All sources.
12Work Disability topical module.
13Functional Limitations and Disability, and Medical Expenses and Work Dis-
ability topical modules.19
income despite the fact that those who are in higher wage brackets tend to also be
of better health. As a result, this group is more educated about various illnesses
they might have and are more likely to report them (Currie and Madrian 1999).
In addition, unemployed individuals may be inclined to exaggerate poorer health
status in an attempt to justify their lack of work (Butler, Burkhauser, Mitchell,
and Pincus 1987).
To further complicate these matters is the issue of the interpretation of ques-
tions regarding health status or condition. Respondents who indicate that they
have a health problem or that they are limited in the kind or amount of work
they can perform may suﬀer from disability, disease, illness, substance abuse, brief
ailments, or psychological impairments. On the other hand, some disabilities may
not hinder one’s capacity to accomplish assigned tasks in the current place of work,
but may restrict the choice set of occupations available. These diﬀering categories
of workers may be induced to answer survey questions regarding disability status
identically, while the dissimilarities of the base issues could confuse the derived
results of a focused study.
1.4.2 Social Security Administrative Records
Ideally, a measure based on clinical evaluations of health status is desired. This is
because such an indicator enables the researcher to separate acute, but ephemeral
medical conditions that have few long-lasting economic consequences from illnesses
that continually plague a person, having a cumulative eﬀect that are detrimental
to future economic outcomes. The Social Security Administration has provided
beneﬁts data from the 831 Disability and Master Beneﬁciary Records for the 1990-
1993 panels of the SIPP that allow such a distinction to be made. In addition,20
an exact match earnings ﬁle for these panels, known as the Summary Earnings
Records, is available from which knowledge of Social Security Disability Insurance
program eligibility is derived.
831 Disability
The 831 Disability (F831) master ﬁle contains data on the Disability Determina-
tion Services’ (DDS) decisions regarding applications and subsequent appeals for
disability beneﬁts under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Titles II
and XVI detail the Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) programs, respectively. Eligibility requires that a person
be unable to perform any kind of substantial gainful work14 because of a physical
or mental impairment (or a combination of impairments). These conditions must
be expected either to last a continuous period of at least 12 months or to eventu-
ally result in death. Applicants must be able to verify that they are not gainfully
employed and also must have a complete medical evaluation so that the primary
diagnosis codes for their ailments can be appropriately supplied to the DDS for
review.
Only F831 records with dates of decision for awards beginning in 1989 are avail-
able, but these have initial dates of application, appeal, and disability onset that
can be from years prior. To correct the left censoring of F831, historic information
from the Social Security Administration’s Master Beneﬁciary Records (MBR) are
integrated into this study.
14Substantial gainful activity is deﬁned as employment in which earnings average
more than a ﬁxed monthly amount. In 2005, this total is $830.21
Social Security Disability Income Title II allows for the Social Security Dis-
ability Income program by outlining federal old-age, survivors, and disability in-
surance (OASDI) beneﬁts. SSDI provides federal disability insurance beneﬁts for
workers who have become disabled or blind before the age of retirement after hav-
ing contributed to the Social Security Trust Fund. Upon the retirement, disability,
or death of a fully insured worker, spouses with disabilities and dependent children
of the primary beneﬁciary are also eligible for disability beneﬁts.
Fully insured workers have recent covered work, which translates into having
been employed for 20 of the last 40 quarters, or half of the previous 10 years.
Exceptions to this requirement are made for those who become disabled early in
their job histories. If impaired before 31, the amount of time in the work force
should be half of the time since age 21. In addition to being fully insured and
having the necessary medical documentation of the work-limiting condition, to
qualify for DI beneﬁts the applicant must also be disability insured. This means
she must have worked for about one-fourth of the time elapsing after age 21 and
up to the year of disability.
A waiting period of ﬁve months15 must elapse before SSDI beneﬁts are admin-
istered according to the guidelines of this program. The philosophy behind this
required delay is that it discourages individuals who do not have long-term dis-
abilities from receiving payments from multiple sources during the early months of
their conditions. Often with transitory illnesses, private disability plans and em-
ployer sick pay provide suﬃcient resources until the worker becomes able-bodied
and is capable of resuming employment. SSDI is intended to assist only those with
grave illnesses or conditions and the waiting period induces only these people to
15The 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act reduced the waiting period
for beneﬁts from six months to ﬁve.22
apply.
Supplemental Security Income The Supplemental Security Income program
was established under Title XVI of the Social Security Act and is a federally
administered cash assistance program that is ﬁnanced by general tax revenues.
SSI aids individuals who are at least 65 years of age, blind, or disabled and who
demonstrate suﬃcient income and resource limitations.
SSI and SSDI have essentially the same set of disability requirements 16 that
must be satisﬁed in order to receive income resulting from disability, but those
seeking beneﬁts from the former source must also satisfy a family means-test of
income. A person can be eligible for SSI beneﬁts even if she has never worked or
paid taxes under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act, which is not the case
with SSDI. If, on the other hand, the person is fully insured and disability insured
with inadequate assets, it is possible for her to simultaneously receive income
from both sources. Due to the diﬃculty involved in determining eligibility for SSI
combined with the knowledge that any fully insured worker with limited resources
would apply for both types of beneﬁts from SSA, the study of hours and wages is
restricted to those with Title II eligibility.
Master Beneﬁciary Records
The Master Beneﬁciary Records are used by SSA to administer OASDI payments.
In the case of disability insurance, the primary beneﬁciary17 is listed along with
16The applicant must exhibit no substantial gainful employment and must pro-
vide evidence of compromising medical conditions that are anticipated to either
result in death or persist at least a period of one year.
17The primary beneﬁciary is the worker upon whose earnings the beneﬁt enti-
tlement exists.23
an array of dates of disability onset, the corresponding dates of ﬁling and decision,
and the outcome of the adjudication process. Any individuals who have applied
for beneﬁts have a record generated when the application is decided as an award,
a disallowance, an abatement, or is withdrawn. An advantage of the use of this
ﬁle is that a history of onset dates of disabling conditions are revealed along with
dates of entitlement to disability payments.18
Summary Earnings Records
Sample-limiting restrictions will be imposed on the SIPP panels to include only
those who would be eligible to apply for SSDI beneﬁts when including health
variables extracted from the beneﬁts records in the estimations. Since a goal
of this paper is to utilize not only survey data, but also beneﬁts data from the
Social Security Administration, it will be important to select a group of individuals
who would be capable of applying for SSDI beneﬁts upon the onset of a serious
condition.
The Summary Earnings Records are topcoded at the taxable maximum each
year, and contain yearly information on earnings from 1951 onward. Estimates
of total quarters worked for the period between 1937 and 1952 exist on this ﬁle,
as well. Covered quarters of work are recorded from 1951 until 1977, whereafter
they are imputed by SSA based upon earnings thresholds. This history enables
the yearly derivation of the number of quarters of coverage so that the calculation
of fully insured and disability insured status for each individual is possible.19 Since
18The date of entitlement to disability is the month and year in which the indi-
vidual is ﬁrst entitled to disability beneﬁts. The date may be retroactively set up
to 12 months before the date of ﬁling because it is meant to accurately reﬂect the
date that DI beneﬁts should have started.
19Essentially, this calculation is reduced to the following: if the individual is24
only those workers who meet the set of standards outlined by the Social Security
Administration are candidates to receive disability beneﬁts, limiting the SIPP
panels to individuals who are both fully and disability insured provides a restricted
sample that can be used to compare the quality of the demographic measures with
those found within administrative data sources.
Creating this subset serves a dual purpose. Primarily, the adverse health of
these covered workers should be evident in both the demographic survey and ben-
eﬁts records for suﬃciently severe maladies, such as ailments that would induce a
worker to unexpectedly part ways with her employer. Additionally, this reduced
population of workers now consists purely of a highly attached work force. This is
key in analyzing exogenous separations, as researchers have traditionally consid-
ered displaced workers as those with at least three years of tenure (Fallick 1996).
By reducing the sample to employed individuals with suﬃcient quarters of cover-
age to be considered both fully and disability insured, I introduce an alternative
deﬁnition of highly attached workers.
SSDI Applicants
It is necessary to remark upon active workers who have records of medically diag-
nosed ailments in the beneﬁts records. Essentially, only three means exist by which
an individual stops receiving DI beneﬁts: death, recovery (including those who vol-
untarily return to work and those who reluctantly do so after the termination of
their payments following a medical review), and transference to the retirement
program. Within the 1990-1993 SIPP panels, it was less common for individuals
less than 32 years of age, then she needs to have worked half of the time that has
elapsed since age 21; if the individual is 32 or older, then she needs to have worked
one-fourth the time that has elapsed since age 21 and one-half of the previous ten
years.25
to become well and choose to leave the DI rolls.20 Mainly for this reason, those
who are employed in the SIPP and who have evidence of impairments acquired
from either the F831 or MBR are most likely to be rejected applicants.21
Statistics on the percentage of applications that are rejected vary. Social Se-
curity Administration (2003) statistics indicate that in the early 1990s, between
43.8% and 47.7% of those who ﬁled claims received awards. However, these are
crude rates that were not calculated using edited data, may contain duplicate
cases, and are additionally based on the number of applicants in the same year as
the awards.22 The Social Security Advisory Board (1998) presents more detailed
estimates of award rates: 32% of initial applications, and 15% of the 50% that are
reconsidered by DDS are added to the DI rolls. Of the 25% of individuals who
pursue their denied claims, only a small fraction are eventually granted beneﬁts
by an administrative law judge, an appeals council, or by federal court decisions.
Reﬁling, appealing a rejected application, or otherwise continuing to engage in
the disability determination process requires that the individual remain absent
from the labor force. As such, the workers with evidence of health events in the
restricted SSA sample are those who have resigned themselves to the idea that
despite their own beliefs about the severity of their impairments, the DDS is of
the opinion that they are capable of gainful employment.
20The creation of a program under the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
Improvement Act of 1999 was phased in over a 3-year period to encourage those
receiving SSDI and SSI to become self-suﬃcient. Prior to this, and within the
scope of this study, workers on the disability rolls who considered taking a trial
period to test out their ability to partake in gainful activities risked losing their
beneﬁts indeﬁnitely.
21Imposed age restrictions exclude workers who might have once received beneﬁts
but were transferred to the retirement program when they turned 65.
22A casual perusal of the F831 reveals that it is frequently the case that applica-
tions are approved that were ﬁled in a year that diﬀers from the year of the award.26
Precise dates of disability onset from the beneﬁts records are used to establish
an alternate set of indicators of health-related shocks out of employment. The
timing of the onset of a grave disability that results in the dissolution of a job is
speciﬁed by a medical doctor on applications for SSDI. When missing, I choose to
use the ﬁling date in its place, followed by the date of decision less 4.5 months,
which is the average duration of DDS deliberation in the panels. From these dates,
administrative veriﬁcation of the existence of functional limitations is derived.
Only shocks occurring after the earliest date of impairment from F831 and MBR
records that do not have another reason speciﬁed in the SIPP for the job cessation
become SSA health shocks. Of those with a primary diagnosis code for their
disability on the MBR, 80.4% have a physical impairment, 16.3% have a mental
illness, and 3.3% suﬀer from mental retardation.
1.4.3 Methodology
The data sources previously detailed are integrated into the models I have pre-
sented. Each is estimated using both the layoﬀ and disability separation indi-
cators representing the time that has elapsed since the exogenous displacement
shock occurred. All known displacements will be tracked in the joint hours and
wage model following Stevens (1997). The 1990-1993 SIPP panels are combined for
this purpose. The SIPP topical modules and core wave ﬁles provide the necessary
information regarding the reason for job termination.
The models are then estimated using responses about layoﬀ displacement from
the demographic survey and the timing of disability onset acquired from integrated
SSA beneﬁts data ﬁles. In the examination of their own displacements, only those
workers who would be eligible to apply for SSDI beneﬁts if a disabling condition27
were to occur during their current period of employment will be included. It is as-
sumed that with this set of individual workers, anyone who truly becomes disabled
would indeed be induced to apply for beneﬁts and a record of this action would
appear in the administrative data. In making this restriction for the comparison
of survey health indicators with those found in administrative ﬁles, I limit the
sample to those who are highly attached to the work force which is consistent with
previous research that examines the lingering impacts of separations.
In exploring spousal reactions to a job dislocation within a couple, a similar
methodology is followed. However, because it is necessary to consider the marginal
workers who may have entered the labor force, in utilizing health measures from
the administrative data sources, the sample is restricted to those workers with
spouses who are eligible to apply for SSDI beneﬁts. This permits a comparison
of the administrative and survey measures of health when the spouse is disabled.
Thus, the subset of workers included in the estimation are not themselves highly
attached, but their spouses are.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Own Job Displacements
The joint model speciﬁcation is evaluated with two samples, the ﬁrst of which is
the group of all workers in the stacked 1990-1993 SIPP panels. This collection
of individuals is referred to as the unrestricted sample. The second is the set of
workers who have both a veriﬁed Social Security Number assigned to their SIPP
identiﬁcation number and who are deemed eligible to apply for Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance should a debilitating condition occur in the given month. These28
people are more highly attached to the labor force and thus comprise the restricted
sample.23 Within this limited sample, both demographic and administrative health
measures are utilized to determine whether the reason for leaving a position is re-
lated to an exogenous health shock. Layoﬀ information is derived solely from the
SIPP.
Summary statistics concerning worker and job characteristics are presented in
Table 1.1 for the two samples. The unrestricted subset consists of 34,906 individ-
uals and 62,507 employee-employer matches while 28,164 people and 50,833 jobs
comprise the restricted survey sample. The two groups do not diﬀer greatly in their
population means. The highly attached work force has a slightly larger number
of individuals who have attended some college courses, marginally fewer children,
and 1% fewer people have health insurance coverage under another’s plan. Addi-
tionally, the hourly wage rate is $0.20 greater than that of the average worker in
the full sample.
The timing of exogenous shocks is outlined in Table 1.2 for layoﬀ, SIPP health,
and SSA health shocks. Layoﬀs are the most common type of displacing event. Dis-
locations derived from survey-based measures of health are the next most frequent
in the data. These measures are summarized only for those who are employed.
Characteristic of these statistics is a dampening in the percentage of displacements
over the years.
In comparing the incidence of the two types of health shocks, Table 1.3 exhibits
for the restricted sample the percentages of ever-reported health limitations in the
23Excluded from both sets of workers are household workers, armed forces per-
sonnel, unemployed military personnel, those with job spans lasting less than one
day, those with allocated responses, those younger than 21 or older than 60, those
with weekly hours less than or equal to zero or a real hourly wage of less than
$0.10, and those who are not original sample members.29
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Table 1.2: Summary of the Timing of Exogenous Shocks
Unrestricted Sample Restricted Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago 0.0741 17.8172 0.0759 18.0652
1-2 Years Ago 0.0295 11.5011 0.0304 11.7188
2-3 Years Ago 0.0265 10.9277 0.0275 11.1486
3-4 Years Ago 0.0179 9.0210 0.0187 9.2509
4-5 Years Ago 0.0112 7.1657 0.0117 7.3477
5+ Years Ago 0.0376 12.9370 0.0393 13.2593
Own Exogenous SIPP Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago 0.0222 10.0207 0.0214 9.8689
1-2 Years Ago 0.0050 4.8144 0.0048 4.7311
2-3 Years Ago 0.0038 4.2031 0.0037 4.1665
3-4 Years Ago 0.0028 3.5978 0.0026 3.5010
4-5 Years Ago 0.0019 2.9837 0.0018 2.8545
5+ Years Ago 0.0063 5.3646 0.0059 5.2340
Own Exogenous SSA Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago - - 0.0088 6.3859
1-2 Years Ago - - 0.0012 2.3155
2-3 Years Ago - - 0.0008 1.9047
3-4 Years Ago - - 0.0004 1.3935
4-5 Years Ago - - 0.0003 1.2489
5+ Years Ago - - 0.0015 2.6331
SIPP and SSA data along with the mean weekly hours and hourly wage rates for
these cells. Those without any history of an ailment from either source (94.41%)
have the highest mean weekly hours and hourly wage rates. Curiously, 0.63% have
contacted the Social Security Administration to report their health limitations
without claiming to have any such diﬃculties in the SIPP. The mean wage rate
of these individuals is $4 less than that of those who never claimed either type of
health problem. Those with consitent reports of past illness (1.27% of the sample)
work 3.53 fewer hours each week on average and earn an hourly rate that is $5.76
less than those whose SIPP and SSA records indicate that they are healthy.
Trends in the means of the hourly wage rate and weekly hours in Table 1.4
are similar in the restricted and unrestricted samples, but the magnitudes of these
values are moderately larger in the subset of more highly attached workers. Fig-
ures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the manner in which these statistics reveal the enduring31
Table 1.3: Ever-Reported Health Limitations in the SIPP and SSA Data
SSA Health
SIPP Health No Yes
No Percentage 94.41% 0.63%
Mean Weekly Hours 38.97 38.27
Mean Hourly Wage Rate $15.46 $11.46
Yes Percentage 3.69% 1.27%
Mean Weekly Hours 37.52 35.44
Mean Hourly Wage Rate $10.80 $9.70
implications of job displacements, a theme that will appear again later in ana-
lyzing the joint model speciﬁcation. Highly attached employees who have never
experienced a displacement approximately earn a wage rate of $15.50 and work
just under 39 hours each week. After reemployment following a ﬁrm shock, the
average wage rate is $13.72 and weekly hours rise. Those with ailment-related job
separations are economically harder hit by displacements: new positions within
the ﬁrst twelve months of their recovery are on average found at a the lower rate
of around $10.50. After one year, these wages fall even further. This may be evi-
dence that those whose job searches were more lengthy eventually chose to accept
low oﬀers.24 Hours of those with impairments plummet over the years, eventually
dropping to 30.56 by the end of the ﬁfth year since the initial date of exit according
to SSA health measures.
Table 1.5 presents Pearson correlation coeﬃcients for the health shocks based
upon survey measures of disability and those derived from medial records obtained
from the Social Security Administration. The correlation coeﬃcients of these mea-
sures range from 33.6% to 43.7%. While these are lower than one might expect,
they are consistent with the ﬁndings of Baker, Stabile, and Deri (2004). In match-
24Stevens (1997) and Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) also ﬁnd a depression in the
wage rate after a few years have passed since an event of dislocation.32
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ing the 1994 Canadian National Population Health Survey to the Ontario Health
Insurance Plan data in order to validate the self-reported health measures in the
survey data with diagnosis and treatment information from the public health care
system, the authors found that the correlation coeﬃcients for only three of the
thirteen conditions studied was above 50%. Even for serious medical conditions
such as cancer, strokes, and back problems, correlations were 46.9%, 47.9%, and
23.1%, respectively.
Understandably, not all people who experience the sudden onset of work-
limiting disabilities who are concurrently eligible for SSDI would choose to ap-
ply for beneﬁts unless they expected their condition to result in either death or a
spell of at least twelve months out of the work force. While the survey measures
of health are more sensitive to errors of justiﬁcation and measurement, they are
also likely tracking events that while substantial, are not severe enough to impede
eventual recovery. Only dire ailments should induce an unhealthy individual to
go through the lengthy process of submitting an application for review by the
Disability Determinations Services, as this action requires at least a ﬁve month
commitment to labor force inactivity which is a considerable risk for those who
believe they are unlikely to be awarded DI beneﬁts.
Another reason why the SIPP- and SSA-based measures are not more highly
correlated could be related to the issue of timing. People may have chronic con-
ditions that they would readily report in the survey, but only years after a par-
ticularly severe health episode might such a report appear in the administrative
records. Thoughts of one’s future economic situation may only arise after a period
of improved and stabilized health. This delay in the original date of disability onset
and the date of ﬁling may contribute to the inconsistencies in these measures.36
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Collapsed Model
Table 1.6 ﬁrst presents the estimated coeﬃcients from the overall model after col-
lapsing the yearly separation indicators into a single measure of whether a worker’s
history includes an exit induced by the ﬁrm or the individual.25 Members of both
aﬀected groups have hourly wages and weekly hours that signiﬁcantly diﬀer from
those of their employed counterparts who have not endured job separations, as
seen in Figures 1.3 and 1.4. Reemployment subsequent to layoﬀ increases weekly
hours 4.1% above the hours of those with continuing employment in the full SIPP
sample, whereas high attachment workers spend 3.1% more time on the job. This
partially alleviates the economic burden of earning a wage that is diminished by
7.9% and 9.2% for these subsets, respectively. These actions contrast sharply with
the behaviors of those who have been forced to separate from an employer because
of a disabling condition. For recovering workers in the restricted sample, weekly
hours are reduced 6.8% and the hourly wage rate is 21.3% less than that of the
base population.
Worker behaviors subsequent to these exogenous occurrences are summarized
by event type as follows: those with ﬁrm-induced job terminations in their past
consistently work more hours at a lower hourly wage rate once with a new employer,
whereas those who parted from their job because of reasons relating to personal
disability work fewer hours while earning a wage rate that is by comparison even
more negatively impacted. The full and highly attached samples of workers provide
similar estimates of these shocks, and these patterns are reﬂected when using both
the SIPP measures of a limiting health condition and those derived from SSA data
25This is equivalent to allowing the summation index, m, to only take on the
value 1 in equations (1.1) and (1.2).38
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sources.
Expanded Model
I next introduce the full model described by equations (1.2) and (1.2), extending
the model to include detailed information regarding the number of years that have
elapsed since the date of the shock in order to more precisely compare the periods
of adjustment following these separations. Table 1.10 presents the estimated coef-
ﬁcients from Tables 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 as percent eﬀects for ease of interpretation,
while Figures 1.5 and 1.6 graphically depict the results.26 Broad patterns emerge
that are consistent with the results of the collapsed model in Table 1.6.
Those with layoﬀs in their past demonstrate increased hours at work regardless
of the number of years that have passed since the date of the event.27 Individ-
uals in the unrestricted sample with a job history that includes a layoﬀ spend
approximately 2% more hours at work in the ﬁrst two years back. This level of
productivity improves to 5.6% more hours on the job after ﬁve years have passed
since the displacement occurred. Those in the restricted sample who experienced
this same event steadily increase their hours at work by around 0.5 percentage
points over each of the next several years. In doing so, in ﬁve years they shift from
working 1.2% to 3.9% more hours than those with continuous employment.
It may be the case that those who previously were laid oﬀ are attempting to
exhibit a greater degree of productivity to their new employers in order to avoid
26The percent eﬀect on the hourly wage and weekly hours of a worker is calcu-
lated by exponentiating the estimated coeﬃcient of interest and subtracting one
from this value: eδ − 1.
27Layoﬀ estimates do not substantially diﬀer when using SIPP and SSA variables
in the restricted sample because these indicators remain constant across models.
For this reason, only the results of the restricted SIPP sample will be compared
to those from the full sample.42
Table 1.7: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Person and Job Heterogeneity
for the Unrestricted Sample
SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2334 *** -0.0762 ***
(0.0080) (0.0057)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1424 *** -0.0596 ***
(0.0082) (0.0052)
2-3 Years Ago -0.1208 *** -0.0481 ***
(0.0086) (0.0056)
3-4 Years Ago -0.1029 *** -0.0362 ***
(0.0098) (0.0056)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0866 *** -0.0025
(0.0123) (0.0067)
5+ Years Ago -0.0478 *** 0.0237 **
(0.0134) (0.0072)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0800 *** 0.0170 ***
(0.0046) (0.0030)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0708 *** 0.0192 ***
(0.0045) (0.0028)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0463 *** 0.0340 ***
(0.0047) (0.0029)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0308 *** 0.0387 ***
(0.0049) (0.0029)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0339 *** 0.0435 ***
(0.0055) (0.0031)
5+ Years Ago -0.0067 0.0548 ***
(0.0057) (0.0033)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3175 0.1798
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3155 0.2225
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4997
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3587 0.4146
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2576
Number of Workers 34,906
Number of Jobs 62,507
ln-L -192,588.85
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.43
Table 1.8: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Person and Job Heterogeneity
for the Restricted Sample
SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2177 *** -0.0580 ***
(0.0095) (0.0066)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1248 *** -0.0563 ***
(0.0094) (0.0059)
2-3 Years Ago -0.1022 *** -0.0292 ***
(0.0095) (0.0066)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0982 *** -0.0423 ***
(0.0109) (0.0066)
4-5 Years Ago -0.1183 *** -0.0278 **
(0.0138) (0.0086)
5+ Years Ago -0.0660 *** -0.0041
(0.0160) (0.0093)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0861 *** 0.0120 ***
(0.0049) (0.0030)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0788 *** 0.0143 ***
(0.0047) (0.0028)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0587 *** 0.0260 ***
(0.0049) (0.0028)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0404 *** 0.0326 ***
(0.0051) (0.0029)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0402 *** 0.0349 ***
(0.0058) (0.0031)
5+ Years Ago -0.0158 ** 0.0385 ***
(0.0060) (0.0033)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3140 0.1756
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3053 0.2025
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4836
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3507 0.4103
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2611
Number of Workers 28,164
Number of Jobs 50,833
ln-L -131,119.91
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.44
Table 1.9: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Person and Job Heterogeneity
for the Restricted Sample
SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2428 *** -0.0766 ***
(0.0169) (0.0105)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1484 *** -0.0874 ***
(0.0166) (0.0081)
2-3 Years Ago -0.1784 *** -0.0472 **
(0.0170) (0.0169)
3-4 Years Ago -0.1380 *** -0.0983 ***
(0.0199) (0.0171)
4-5 Years Ago -0.2372 *** -0.0731 ***
(0.0258) (0.0200)
5+ Years Ago -0.0864 * -0.0432
(0.0402) (0.0229)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0890 *** 0.0116 ***
(0.0049) (0.0029)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0813 *** 0.0139 ***
(0.0047) (0.0028)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0609 *** 0.0256 ***
(0.0049) (0.0028)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0423 *** 0.0321 ***
(0.0051) (0.0028)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0418 *** 0.0345 ***
(0.0058) (0.0031)
5+ Years Ago -0.0172 ** 0.0381 ***
(0.0060) (0.0032)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3140 0.1756
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3076 0.2028
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4861
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3508 0.4102
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2609
Number of Workers 28,164
Number of Jobs 50,833
ln-L -131,224.56
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.45
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being the marginal workers chosen by the ﬁrm should a reduction of its work force
become necessary. However, upon reviewing the coeﬃcient estimates of the wage
equation it becomes apparent that this is not the sole possible explanation for this
behavior. These employees may also be adjusting the length of their work weeks
because their hourly wage rates in the ﬁrst year since the displacement are only
92% of their values as compared to before they were laid oﬀ. As time progresses
beyond the actual year of separation, the wage rates for this category of workers
improve by around 1 to 2 percentage points each year so that those with the oldest
shocks are also those who are the least negatively impacted.
The unrestricted and restricted samples exhibit the same post-layoﬀ trends,
but those in the high attachment sample have hourly wage rates that are roughly
1 percentage point less each year than those in the unrestricted sample. One
explanation for this is that workers who comprise the sample eligible to apply for
SSDI may have a stronger desire to form more immediate job attachments when a
job relationship is severed. Instead of considering as many competing wage oﬀers
as those in the unrestricted sample, these individuals may have chosen to accept a
lower hourly wage rate rather than remain among the unemployed. On the other
hand, it may be that new employment has been found in a new occupation or
industry, and the loss of speciﬁc human capital is revealed through the dampened
wages. The degree of impact observed in the coeﬃcients of Tables 1.7-1.9 is less
severe than the ﬁndings of Stevens (1997), in particular beyond the ﬁrst year, and
my estimates reveal a more rapid decline in the persistence of the shocks.
Those who have reestablished themselves in the workplace after a spell of failing
health similarly experience lingering detrimental eﬀects from their time out of
the work force. However, in addition to having diminished wage rates, the fact49
that the shock was internal also reduces the hours of these individuals. Within
the ﬁrst year of the exogenous health event for the unrestricted sample, weekly
hours fall by 7.3%. This impact is -5.6% when utilizing survey measures in the
limited sample in that same time frame. The impact on hours only appears to
truly begin to diminish in the fourth year since the date of the health setback
for those in the subset of highly attached workers, while the complete sample
demonstrates monotone improvements throughout. After more than ﬁve years
since the onset of the impairment, the full sample indicates that those with latent
health problems begin to compensate for their losses by working 2.4% more than
the control population of workers. The limited sample does not recover as readily,
but after ﬁve years have passed, this group appears to be indistinguishable from
those with continuous employment in terms of the amount of time spent at work.
Monetary losses that are associated with reentry into the work force subsequent
to a disabling incident are substantial. A worker in the unrestricted sample who is
back at work within one year of an illness has a wage rate that is 79.2% of its former
value. After an additional year of recovery, this improves to 86.7%, and after ﬁve
years more have passed, wages are only 4.7% below the rates of those who have not
experienced such dislocations. For the restricted group, the most severe impact
to wages is similarly found for those back at work within the ﬁrst year. These
individuals earn 80.4% of their predisplacement hourly wages when using the SIPP
health measures. After a second year passes, the losses associated with these rates
have been nearly halved to -11.7%. Thereafter, the survey health indicators show
that the wage rate for the restricted group remains around 90%. After ﬁve years,
wages are 93.6% of their values as compared to before they experienced a health
shock.50
For each speciﬁcation, eﬀects are more severe for those with a past health
ailment than they are for those who have been laid oﬀ. In contrast with those who
have returned to work following a layoﬀ, the eﬀects on those who have previously
endured an illness remain substantial even after ﬁve years or more have passed.
Being highly attached to the work force seems to be to the beneﬁt of those with
impairments within four years of the date of the onset of disability.
Of the health measures used, SSA indicators reveal the most negative conse-
quences for those with a job separation induced by disability. Estimates reveal
less presence at work than those derived from survey measures: by comparison
within the ﬁrst three years, weekly hours are 2 to 3 percentage points lower for
rejected SSDI applicants. Thereafter, weekly hours dramatically plummet to -9.4%
as compared to -4.1% using SIPP indicators. The wage rates of reemployed SSDI
applicants are consistently less than those who claim to have work limiting condi-
tions. Three years after the onset of a disability, their wage losses fall to 83.7% of
their base value before improving to 87.1% in the following year. After ﬁve years,
wages remain depressed by 8.3%.
The group of highly attached workers have wage rates that are diﬀerentially
impacted as compared to the full sample within the ﬁrst few years after the dis-
placing event depending on the impetus for the exit: being fully and disability
insured lessens the negative eﬀects of poor health, whereas it seemingly worsens
those of layoﬀ. Using administrative measures, penalties from ill health are found
to be signiﬁcant and lasting, with greatly depressed wage rates and weekly hours.
These behaviors, combined as they are, greatly amplify earnings losses for this
class of workers. It is interesting to note that the survey variables do appear to
follow the same trends but do not capture the severity of the traumas because the51
results incorporate those with more mild impairments.
Simulated Earnings Losses
To quantify the impact of these setbacks, I consider the plight of a newly reem-
ployed worker who experienced her ﬁrst employment shock in the previous year
and who does not suﬀer from any additional separations in the next six years.
Using the restricted sample as a base for this comparison, I know from the sum-
mary statistics in Table 1.1 that the average employed individual in the restricted
sample earned a wage rate of $15.26 and worked 38.89 weekly hours, resulting
in a yearly salary of $30,860.28 For each type of shock, Table 1.11 simulates the
estimated yearly salaries of workers who experience a layoﬀ or ill health event that
forces them to part from their jobs. Along with these values are the calculated
diﬀerences from the average earnings of an otherwise identical worker who has not
endured any exogenous shocks.29
Figure 1.7 demonstrates that in the case of a layoﬀ, the simulated worker earns
$2,204 less in the year immediately following the displacing event, but is able to
regain some of her losses through improvements to her hourly wage and weekly
hours over the next several years. By the completion of her sixth year back,
her yearly salary is $709 more than it would have been without the separation.
Cumulatively over this period, she is $4,819 less wealthy.
If this were a health setback instead, the worker would ﬁnd herself in an even
more disadvantaged economic situation. Either health measure indicates that the
disparity in annual earnings is still larger in magnitude for those who experienced
28Annual salaries are based upon 52 weeks of employment.
29Actual earnings losses within the ﬁrst year following a displacing event are
conservative in Table 1.11 because they do not allow for gaps between jobs during
the transitioning period.52
Table 1.11: Simulation of Earnings upon Reentry into the Workforce Following an
Exogenous Separation
Own Exogenous Shock- Layoﬀ
Year Hourly Wage Weekly Hours Yearly Salary Diﬀerence
1 $14.00 39.36 $28,656 -$2,204
2 $14.10 39.45 $28,932 -$1,928
3 $14.39 39.91 $29,867 -$993
4 $14.66 40.18 $30,620 -$240
5 $14.66 40.27 $30,697 -$163
6 $15.02 40.42 $31,569 $709
Total -$4,819
Own Exogenous Shock- SIPP Health Measures
Year Hourly Wage Weekly Hours Yearly Salary Diﬀerence
1 $12.27 36.70 $23,424 -$7,436
2 $13.47 36.76 $25,748 -$5,112
3 $13.78 37.77 $27,060 -$3,800
4 $13.83 37.28 $26,815 -$4,045
5 $13.56 37.82 $26,665 -$4,195
6 $14.29 38.89 $28,889 -$1,971
Total -$26,559
Own Exogenous Shock- SSA Health Measures
Year Hourly Wage Weekly Hours Yearly Salary Diﬀerence
1 $11.97 36.02 $22,422 -$8,438
2 $13.16 35.64 $24,378 -$6,482
3 $12.77 37.10 $24,627 -$6,233
4 $13.29 35.25 $24,365 -$6,495
5 $12.04 36.15 $22,627 -$8,233
6 $14.00 38.89 $28,306 -$2,554
Total -$38,434
Note: Values are compared with the averages for the restricted sample: an hourly wage of $15.26 and weekly
hours of 38.89, which result in a yearly salary of $30,860.53
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poor health six years ago than after only just the ﬁrst year following a layoﬀ.
Furthermore, the total decrease in earnings over all six years for a layoﬀ is still less
than just the ﬁrst-year losses immediately after recovery from an illness.
Using SIPP and SSA health measures, $7,436 and $8,438 are the respective
losses in the initial year which dwindle to $1,971 and $2,554 after completion of
the sixth year. The lasting impact of disabling conditions is signiﬁcant and severe,
with salaries remaining just above $4,000 in the third through ﬁfth years following
reentry into the workplace using SIPP-based measures and earnings losses decreas-
ing to $6,233 in the third year but spiking to $8,233 in the ﬁfth when utilizing SSA
measures. In all, disability that induces an employee-employer separation results
in damages of $26,559 or $38,434 to a worker’s cumulative income following six
years of uninterrupted work depending on whether demographic or administrative
records are the basis for the information regarding the health shock.
Demographic Characteristics
Broad categories of education, gender, and race seemingly have important roles
in the plight of the displaced as they reenter the work force. A paper by Stevens
(1997) remarks upon the signiﬁcance of the role of education in wage reductions
following layoﬀ. She ﬁnds that those with graduate schooling are better able to
manage the associated losses than are people who have enrolled in some post-
secondary education. Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) have independently explored the
wage rates and hours of men and women after this type of event, conﬁrming that
adjustment behaviors also vary by gender. Analyzing a population of workers
dislocated from high-technology positions, a case study by Ong (1991) uncovers
that the post-displacement earnings of blacks and Hispanics are more severely hit55
by abrupt job terminations than are the salaries of whites. I reexamine these
ﬁndings and extend them below to include the analogous displacing health shocks.
Education Considering the lasting impacts of employee-employer separation by
two education groups enables an examination of the manner in which the level of
schooling aﬀects future labor outcomes. Tables 1.12 and 1.13 present the estimated
coeﬃcients, while Table 1.14 presents the percent eﬀects from the joint model that
interacts the occurrences of job separation with two education groups: those with
a high school degree or less and those with more than a high school degree. This
partition enables an exploration of the theory that the recovery periods following
job separations may diﬀer by education.
Those with more than a high school diploma who have been laid oﬀ exhibit
behaviors that diﬀer from those of their counterparts who are less educated in two
noteworthy manners. The ﬁrst of these is that their hourly wages are harder hit,
but only moderately so, as seen in Figure 1.8. This agrees with Stevens (1997), who
ﬁnds that groups with 13-15 years of schooling have greater monetary losses than
those with only a high school diploma who have returned to work following a layoﬀ.
The second is that upon reestablishing themselves at a new place of employment,
those with more schooling immediately begin exerting more observable eﬀort on
the job. Figure 1.9 exhibits the manner in which employees with more than a high
school education who suﬀered a layoﬀ spend a between 3.3% and 5.3% more weekly
hours on the job each year they are back, whereas those with less schooling do not
signiﬁcantly alter their behavior in the ﬁrst few years following a layoﬀ. Only after
four years have passed do less educated workers begin to work 1.8% more hours.
After ﬁve years, this has risen to 3.5%, which is comparable to the level of exertion56
Table 1.12: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours by Education Level for the Re-
stricted Sample (SIPP Health Measures)
Restricted SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
≤ HS HS + ≤ HS HS +
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.1953 *** -0.2490 *** -0.0561 *** -0.0567 ***
(0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0092) (0.0099)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1010 *** -0.1621 *** -0.0744 *** -0.0366 ***
(0.0137) (0.0142) (0.0079) (0.0090)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0464 *** -0.1749 *** -0.0404 *** -0.0172
(0.0136) (0.0144) (0.0093) (0.0098)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0685 *** -0.1376 *** -0.0754 *** -0.0035
(0.0154) (0.0167) (0.0093) (0.0099)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0858 *** -0.1608 *** -0.0334 ** -0.0281 *
(0.0194) (0.0215) (0.0122) (0.0136)
5+ Years Ago -0.0556 ** -0.0813 ** 0.0060 -0.0256
(0.0211) (0.0300) (0.0125) (0.0157)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0793 *** -0.0934 *** -0.0073 0.0365 ***
(0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0049) (0.0039)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0705 *** -0.0878 *** 0.0011 0.0322 ***
(0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0047) (0.0037)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0565 *** -0.0604 *** 0.0063 0.0519 ***
(0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0048) (0.0037)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0399 *** -0.0398 *** 0.0178 *** 0.0518 ***
(0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0050) (0.0037)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0320 *** -0.0502 *** 0.0270 *** 0.0447 ***
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0053) (0.0041)
5+ Years Ago -0.0089 -0.0241 ** 0.0348 *** 0.0412 ***
(0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0057) (0.0041)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3140 0.1756
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3052 0.2021
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4853
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3508 0.4103
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2609
Number of Workers 28,164
Number of Jobs 50,833
ln-L -131,051.88
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.57
Table 1.13: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours by Education Level for the Re-
stricted Sample (SSA Health Measures)
Restricted SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
≤ HS HS + ≤ HS HS +
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2455 *** -0.2243 *** -0.0841 *** -0.0755 ***
(0.0217) (0.0328) (0.0134) (0.0218)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1138 *** -0.1951 *** -0.1995 *** 0.0353 *
(0.0235) (0.0278) (0.0115) (0.0138)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0303 -0.3191 *** -0.0961 *** 0.0105
(0.0379) (0.0288) (0.0225) (0.0363)
3-4 Years Ago -0.1616 *** -0.1797 *** -0.1536 ** -0.0437
(0.0346) (0.0392) (0.0532) (0.0316)
4-5 Years Ago -0.2822 *** -0.2588 *** -0.0676 -0.0719
(0.0480) (0.0395) (0.0559) (0.0392)
5+ Years Ago -0.0643 -0.1583 -0.0352 -0.0495
(0.0670) (0.0925) (0.0534) (0.0410)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0818 *** -0.0973 *** -0.0076 0.0361 ***
(0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0049) (0.0039)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0730 *** -0.0911 *** 0.0006 0.0320 ***
(0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0047) (0.0037)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0585 *** -0.0637 *** 0.0057 0.0518 ***
(0.0068) (0.0072) (0.0048) (0.0037)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0419 *** -0.0426 *** 0.0175 *** 0.0514 ***
(0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0050) (0.0036)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0335 *** -0.0527 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0443 ***
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0053) (0.0040)
5+ Years Ago -0.0101 -0.0265 ** 0.0344 *** 0.0408 ***
(0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0057) (0.0040)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3139 0.1756
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3074 0.2025
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4874
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3508 0.4103
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2608
Number of Workers 28,164
Number of Jobs 50,833
ln-L -131,125.37
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.58
Table 1.14: Percent Eﬀect of Exogenous Health and Layoﬀ Shocks on Hourly Wage
and Weekly Hours by Education Level- Signiﬁcant Values Only
Restricted SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
≤ HS HS + ≤ HS HS +
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.1774 -0.2204 -0.0546 -0.0551
1-2 Years Ago -0.0961 -0.1496 -0.0717 -0.0359
2-3 Years Ago -0.0453 -0.1605 -0.0396 -
3-4 Years Ago -0.0662 -0.1286 -0.0726 -
4-5 Years Ago -0.0822 -0.1485 -0.0328 -0.0277
5+ Years Ago -0.0541 -0.0781 - -
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0762 -0.0892 - 0.0372
1-2 Years Ago -0.0681 -0.0841 - 0.0327
2-3 Years Ago -0.0549 -0.0586 - 0.0533
3-4 Years Ago -0.0391 -0.0390 0.0180 0.0532
4-5 Years Ago -0.0315 -0.0490 0.0274 0.0457
5+ Years Ago - -0.0238 0.0354 0.0421
Restricted SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
≤ HS HS + ≤ HS HS +
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2177 -0.2009 -0.0807 -0.0727
1-2 Years Ago -0.1076 -0.1772 -0.1809 0.0359
2-3 Years Ago - -0.2732 -0.0916 -
3-4 Years Ago -0.1492 -0.1645 -0.1424 -
4-5 Years Ago -0.2459 -0.2280 - -
5+ Years Ago - - - -
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0785 -0.0927 - 0.0368
1-2 Years Ago -0.0704 -0.0871 - 0.0325
2-3 Years Ago -0.0568 -0.0617 - 0.0532
3-4 Years Ago -0.0410 -0.0417 0.0177 0.0527
4-5 Years Ago -0.0329 -0.0513 0.0270 0.0453
5+ Years Ago - -0.0262 0.0350 0.0416
Note: The percent eﬀect on the hourly wage and weekly hours of a worker is calculated by exponentiating the
estimated coeﬃcient of interest and subtracting one from this value: eδ-1.59
of the more highly educated.
During the ﬁrst couple of years back at work, those with disabling conditions
and advanced schooling begin to make up for some of their economic losses by
improving their weekly hours at work. They are able to do so more rapidly than
those with less education. During the third year after the episode of poor health
that led to the termination of their job, workers with at most a secondary education
in the restricted SIPP-based sample work 92.7% of their predisplacement weekly
hours, while SSA measures indicate this is 85.8%. For the better educated, the
estimated coeﬃcients do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from zero which implies that these
workers are have not adjusted their hours from what they would have been absent
an illness.
Contrasting with the observed patterns of behavior manifested in the weekly
hours of reemployed individuals, the less educated are the ones who are better
able to mitigate wage losses over time. For neither education group is this a
steady improvement. In fact, after four years the wage rates are again hovering
around their values from one year after the date of the displacement: 91.8% and
85.2% for those with less and more education, respectively, according to SIPP
indicators. The model that utilizes the administrative measures of impairment-
related separations provides the grimmest interpretation of how these workers fare
following an exogenous shock, as no indications of relief are apparent. As an
example of this, three years after the date of dislocation wage losses for those with
at least a secondary school education are 14.9% as compared to the rates of those
with continuous employment. One year later, monetary losses have fallen to 24.6%
for this category of workers. The survey data depict more mild transitions over
this period, with the less educated experiencing reductions in their wage rates of60
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1.6 percentage points in that time span.
The level of schooling plays an important role in determining the severity of
the lasting eﬀects of job dislocations. Most notably, survey measures show that
those with more education who return to work following an unanticipated exit
almost consistently earn a lower wage rate regardless of whether the source of the
forced separation was a layoﬀ or disability. 30 Those with at most a high school
degree, however, do not spend as many hours at work as do those who enrolled
in advanced courses. For the health separations, this behavior may be associated
with the fact that those with more schooling may be less inclined to have jobs
that are physically taxing. A health event that forces a worker with a higher level
of aptitude to part with her employer may be a larger disturbance, and the more
greatly reduced wage rates may be indicative of these workers establishing new
job matches that are less demanding. Additionally, better educated workers may
generally have more speciﬁc human capital that is less transferable across positions.
The disparity in wages by education is most apparent within the collection of
workers who have experienced an episode of ill health, particularly when referencing
results that incorporate SIPP measures. As time passes since the date of the
health shock, those with a high school diploma or less exhibit more marked signs
of recovery from these monetary losses, particularly when referencing the results
of SIPP indicators. This gap is less apparent in the restricted SSA-based sample,
which may be indicative of more equivalent knowledge of impairments across these
groups (Currie and Madrian 1999).
30In the year of the displacement, those with less education have wages that
are 78.2% of their potential rate, whereas those the more highly educated earn
79.9% of this value. This pattern is again reﬂected in the fourth year since the job
separation.63
Gender Following a layoﬀ, Tables 1.15, 1.16, and 1.17 indicate that employed
females work more each week than males with a similar history. Men do not
signiﬁcantly alter their hours until a few years have passed since the layoﬀ. The
amount of increased exertion for men is 3.5% ﬁve years or more after the shock,
which is consistent with Kletzer and Fairlie (2003). The percent of increased weekly
hours for women when referencing the results for the complete sample increases
from 4% to 7.9% above the hours nondisplaced employees by the end of the third
year before tapering oﬀ to 5.9% four years following a layoﬀ.
It is curious that women spend more time than do their male counterparts at
work subsequent to a layoﬀ given that post-layoﬀ wage rates for men and women are
not dissimilarly impacted, as illustrated by Figure 1.10. In nearly each of the ﬁrst
three years, females appear to earn only marginally less than do male workers with
this type of job interruption. Within a year of the layoﬀ event, men have wage
rates that are 92.2% of predisplacement rates, while women earn 91.2%. Three
years after they were laid oﬀ, women have regained some ground as compared to
men, as both have wage rates that are only 3.9% less. My ﬁndings for men agree
with Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) until around the third year of displacement when
my SIPP sample exhibits greater recovery.
In considering forced health exits, it seems that women are not as aﬀected by
this type of event as are their male counterparts. Figure 1.11 shows that weekly
hours in the ﬁrst four years after an incidence of dislocation induced by ill health
steadily improve from 93% to 98.2% for women. SIPP measures of health ailments
show that weekly hours decrease from 93.2% to 92.7% over this same period for
men, while women experience improvements from 95.4% to hours that do not
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those of workers who have not been forced to part with a64
Table 1.15: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours by Gender for the Restricted
Sample (SIPP Health Measures)
Restricted SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Men Women Men Women
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2521 *** -0.1867 *** -0.0701 *** -0.0473 ***
(0.0133) (0.0142) (0.0092) (0.0099)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1532 *** -0.1005 *** -0.0730 *** -0.0425 ***
(0.0146) (0.0131) (0.0083) (0.0087)
2-3 Years Ago -0.1597 *** -0.0489 *** -0.0754 *** 0.0120
(0.0139) (0.0136) (0.0093) (0.0100)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0935 *** -0.0901 *** -0.0781 *** -0.0110
(0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0096) (0.0097)
4-5 Years Ago -0.1142 *** -0.1089 *** -0.0774 *** 0.0093
(0.0237) (0.0184) (0.0151) (0.0118)
5+ Years Ago -0.1167 *** -0.0306 -0.0451 * 0.0296 *
(0.0332) (0.0204) (0.0191) (0.0123)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0810 *** -0.0918 *** -0.0010 0.0398 ***
(0.0058) (0.0091) (0.0036) (0.0065)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0773 *** -0.0794 *** -0.0026 0.0497 ***
(0.0055) (0.0092) (0.0033) (0.0064)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0525 *** -0.0666 *** 0.0063 0.0663 ***
(0.0057) (0.0094) (0.0033) (0.0065)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0398 *** -0.0396 *** 0.0112 *** 0.0761 ***
(0.0061) (0.0097) (0.0033) (0.0066)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0566 *** -0.0141 0.0273 *** 0.0571 ***
(0.0071) (0.0103) (0.0038) (0.0068)
5+ Years Ago -0.0374 *** 0.0189 0.0343 *** 0.0547 ***
(0.0073) (0.0106) (0.0039) (0.0070)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3139 0.1756
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3054 0.2021
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4844
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3507 0.4103
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2608
Number of Workers 28,164
Number of Jobs 50,833
ln-L -131,025.70
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.65
Table 1.16: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours by Gender for the Restricted
Sample (SSA Health Measures)
Restricted SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Men Women Men Women
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2734 *** -0.2364 *** -0.0974 *** -0.0508 *
(0.0217) (0.0300) (0.0149) (0.0230)
1-2 Years Ago -0.2147 *** -0.0802 ** -0.0977 *** -0.0939 ***
(0.0238) (0.0294) (0.0123) (0.0125)
2-3 Years Ago -0.3013 *** -0.0267 -0.0550 * -0.0542
(0.0217) (0.0411) (0.0229) (0.0309)
3-4 Years Ago -0.1417 *** -0.1475 *** -0.1304 *** -0.0574
(0.0366) (0.0433) (0.0232) (0.0489)
4-5 Years Ago -0.3203 *** -0.2125 *** -0.1507 ** -0.0125
(0.0586) (0.0451) (0.0469) (0.0510)
5+ Years Ago -0.1487 -0.0678 -0.1251 ** 0.0185
(0.0850) (0.0590) (0.0393) (0.0502)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0861 *** -0.0921 *** -0.0018 0.0396 ***
(0.0058) (0.0091) (0.0035) (0.0065)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0816 *** -0.0796 *** -0.0034 0.0498 ***
(0.0055) (0.0092) (0.0032) (0.0065)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0565 *** -0.0667 *** 0.0055 0.0663 ***
(0.0057) (0.0093) (0.0033) (0.0065)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0432 *** -0.0397 *** 0.0104 ** 0.0761 ***
(0.0061) (0.0097) (0.0033) (0.0066)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0596 *** -0.0139 0.0264 *** 0.0571 ***
(0.0071) (0.0103) (0.0038) (0.0068)
5+ Years Ago -0.0401 *** 0.0190 0.0335 *** 0.0547 ***
(0.0073) (0.0106) (0.0038) (0.0070)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3139 0.1756
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3077 0.2025
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4867
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3507 0.4103
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2607
Number of Workers 28,164
Number of Jobs 50,833
ln-L -131,140.82
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.66
Table 1.17: Percent Eﬀect of Exogenous Health and Layoﬀ Shocks on Hourly Wage
and Weekly Hours by Gender- Signiﬁcant Values Only
Restricted SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Men Women Men Women
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2228 -0.1703 -0.0677 -0.0462
1-2 Years Ago -0.1420 -0.0956 -0.0704 -0.0416
2-3 Years Ago -0.1476 -0.0477 -0.0726 -
3-4 Years Ago -0.0893 -0.0862 -0.0751 -
4-5 Years Ago -0.1079 -0.1032 -0.0745 -
5+ Years Ago -0.1101 - -0.0441 0.0300
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0778 -0.0877 - 0.0406
1-2 Years Ago -0.0744 -0.0763 - 0.0510
2-3 Years Ago -0.0511 -0.0644 - 0.0685
3-4 Years Ago -0.0390 -0.0388 0.0113 0.0791
4-5 Years Ago -0.0550 - 0.0277 0.0588
5+ Years Ago -0.0367 - 0.0349 0.0562
Restricted SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Men Women Men Women
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2392 -0.2105 -0.0928 -0.0495
1-2 Years Ago -0.1932 -0.0771 -0.0931 -0.0896
2-3 Years Ago -0.2601 - -0.0535 -
3-4 Years Ago -0.1321 -0.1371 -0.1223 -
4-5 Years Ago -0.2741 -0.1914 -0.1399 -
5+ Years Ago - - -0.1176 -
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0825 -0.0880 - 0.0404
1-2 Years Ago -0.0784 -0.0765 - 0.0511
2-3 Years Ago -0.0549 -0.0645 - 0.0685
3-4 Years Ago -0.0423 -0.0389 0.0105 0.0791
4-5 Years Ago -0.0579 - 0.0268 0.0588
5+ Years Ago -0.0393 - 0.0341 0.0562
Note: The percent eﬀect on the hourly wage and weekly hours of a worker is calculated by exponentiating the
estimated coeﬃcient of interest and subtracting one from this value: eδ-1.67
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job because of illness. The SSA measures of disability provide the least optimistic
interpretation of recovery: men spend 9.3% fewer hours at work in the initial year
back, which falls another 3% after four years. For women with these measures,
5% to 9% fewer hours are worked in the ﬁrst two years after a health shock.
Thereafter, women appear to have recovered and are even more present at work
than the nondisplaced population, working 3% more hours after ﬁve years have
passed according to SIPP survey measures.
Overall, reductions to hourly wage rates are the most substantial when a match
was terminated because of reasons relating to ill health. Males are acutely bur-
dened within their ﬁrst year back, with wage rates that are 77.8% of their previous
values in the SIPP-based model. Women experience a 17% decrease in their wages
the year of the onset of a disabling condition, but this improves to a wage loss
of 9.6% after an additional year while men experience earnings that are 85.8% of
their predisplacement wage rate in the same period.
The restricted sample based upon the SIPP measures reﬂects a highly identical
pattern for men, while the recovery for women in the ﬁrst few years after the
date of the event is greater, rising to 90.4% of the wage rate after one year. The
measures from administrative beneﬁts records demonstrate a more troubling period
of recovery for both men and women. The impact on the hourly wage of men
ﬂuctuates, ranging from -13.2% of the predisplacement value the third year after
the event to around -27% in the surrounding years. The rate for women also
exhibits signs of a resurgence in the fourth year, where it remains 19.1% below
what it would have otherwise been. Convincing evidence of the severity of the
lasting eﬀects of a health shock upon the hourly wage rates exists for both genders.69
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Race In the case of weekly hours of those who have suﬀered a layoﬀ, Tables 1.18,
1.19, and 1.20 make it clear that a distinction between races exists, as nonwhites
do not as signiﬁcantly react to adjust their time spent at work. In the initial year
back at work after a layoﬀ, whites work 1.5% more hours each week than do the
nondisplaced. Five years later, this percentage for whites has gradually risen to
4.6%. However, it is only in the third year that nonwhites have weekly hours that
noticeably diﬀer their pre-shock value. During that period, they spend 3.8% more
time at work than do those with continuous employment.
A longer work week may be one way that whites who were laid oﬀ compensate
for having accepted new positions at lower hourly wage rates. Whites, who con-
sistently work more following a layoﬀ, experience wage rate losses that are similar
to nonwhites in the ﬁrst four years after the event. They earn 91.6% of their pre-
displacement wage rates within the ﬁrst year after a layoﬀ. Nonwhites are aﬀected
only slightly less over same time period, having a wage rate that is 92.9%. Dur-
ing the four years subsequent to a forced exist of this type, nonwhites and whites
consistently reduce the negative impacts from having been once laid oﬀ as their
wage rates improve 1-3 percentage points each year. The determination of Ong
(1991) that blacks, upon being rehired, have yearly earnings that are 96.9% those
of whites who have found new jobs is not ruled out by these ﬁndings. This is
because the cumulative impact on weekly wages for whites and nonwhites ranges
from no noticeable diﬀerence in the year of the event to between 1.7% to 3.9%
during the next two years.
For those with employer-employee separations induced by a disabling condition,
nonwhites suﬀer more in terms of the level of exertion on the job within the ﬁrst
year back than do whites. Whites work 5.3% less and nonwhites work 9.1% fewer71
Table 1.18: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours by Race for the Restricted Sample
(SIPP Health Measures)
Restricted SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2214 *** -0.1892 *** -0.0548 *** -0.0951 ***
(0.0101) (0.0327) (0.0069) (0.0229)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1210 *** -0.1471 *** -0.0659 *** -0.0071
(0.0103) (0.0286) (0.0063) (0.0181)
2-3 Years Ago -0.1079 *** -0.0703 -0.0373 *** 0.0112
(0.0102) (0.0441) (0.0070) (0.0258)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0999 *** -0.0884 * -0.0428 *** -0.0459
(0.0119) (0.0358) (0.0069) (0.0274)
4-5 Years Ago -0.1318 *** -0.0515 -0.0463 *** 0.0529
(0.0146) (0.0633) (0.0100) (0.0296)
5+ Years Ago -0.0789 *** -0.0076 -0.0237 * 0.0796 **
(0.0168) (0.0828) (0.0113) (0.0302)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0879 *** -0.0733 *** 0.0145 *** -0.0035
(0.0052) (0.0135) (0.0030) (0.0160)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0784 *** -0.0811 *** 0.0142 *** 0.0176
(0.0050) (0.0137) (0.0029) (0.0162)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0574 *** -0.0667 *** 0.0293 *** 0.0076
(0.0052) (0.0138) (0.0029) (0.0155)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0405 *** -0.0387 * 0.0322 *** 0.0374 *
(0.0055) (0.0150) (0.0029) (0.0159)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0301 *** -0.0974 *** 0.0392 *** 0.0115
(0.0061) (0.0168) (0.0032) (0.0163)
5+ Years Ago -0.0131 * -0.0271 0.0451 *** -0.0003
(0.0063) (0.0189) (0.0033) (0.0177)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3140 0.1755
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3053 0.2025
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4837
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3507 0.4103
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2611
Number of Workers 28,164
Number of Jobs 50,833
ln-L -131,055.23
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.72
Table 1.19: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours by Race for the Restricted Sample
(SSA Health Measures)
Restricted SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2346 *** -0.2712 *** -0.0635 *** -0.1908 ***
(0.0184) (0.0795) (0.0110) (0.0406)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1268 *** -0.2193 -0.1118 *** 0.0295
(0.0185) (0.1150) (0.0091) (0.0312)
2-3 Years Ago -0.1825 *** -0.1663 * -0.0583 ** -0.0165
(0.0183) (0.0841) (0.0184) (0.0409)
3-4 Years Ago -0.1342 *** -0.1487 -0.1049 *** -0.0515
(0.0218) (0.1654) (0.0185) (0.1380)
4-5 Years Ago -0.2641 *** -0.0661 -0.1223 *** 0.2463
(0.0293) (0.2563) (0.0249) (0.1691)
5+ Years Ago -0.1042 * 0.0527 -0.0902 *** 0.3183 **
(0.0434) (0.1610) (0.0258) (0.1188)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0913 *** -0.0735 *** 0.0141 *** -0.0039
(0.0052) (0.0136) (0.0030) (0.0161)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0814 *** -0.0812 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0170
(0.0050) (0.0138) (0.0029) (0.0163)
2-3 Years Ago -0.0601 *** -0.0666 *** 0.0288 *** 0.0076
(0.0052) (0.0139) (0.0029) (0.0156)
3-4 Years Ago -0.0430 *** -0.0383 * 0.0318 *** 0.0365 *
(0.0054) (0.0151) (0.0029) (0.0161)
4-5 Years Ago -0.0323 *** -0.0968 *** 0.0388 *** 0.0108
(0.0061) (0.0169) (0.0032) (0.0164)
5+ Years Ago -0.0150 * -0.0265 0.0446 *** -0.0011
(0.0063) (0.0190) (0.0033) (0.0178)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3139 0.1755
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3076 0.2028
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4863
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3508 0.4102
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2608
Number of Workers 28,164
Number of Jobs 50,833
ln-L -131,144.52
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.73
Table 1.20: Percent Eﬀect of Exogenous Health and Layoﬀ Shocks on Hourly Wage
and Weekly Hours by Race- Signiﬁcant Values Only
Restricted SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.1986 -0.1724 -0.0533 -0.0907
1-2 Years Ago -0.1140 -0.1368 -0.0638 -
2-3 Years Ago -0.1023 - -0.0366 -
3-4 Years Ago -0.0951 -0.0846 -0.0419 -
4-5 Years Ago -0.1235 - -0.0452 -
5+ Years Ago -0.0759 - -0.0234 0.0829
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0841 -0.0707 0.0146 -
1-2 Years Ago -0.0754 -0.0779 0.0143 -
2-3 Years Ago -0.0558 -0.0645 0.0297 -
3-4 Years Ago -0.0397 -0.0380 0.0327 0.0381
4-5 Years Ago -0.0297 -0.0928 0.0400 -
5+ Years Ago -0.0130 - 0.0461 -
Restricted SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite
Own Exogenous Health Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2091 -0.2375 -0.0615 -0.1737
1-2 Years Ago -0.1191 - -0.1058 -
2-3 Years Ago -0.1668 -0.1532 -0.0566 -
3-4 Years Ago -0.1256 - -0.0996 -
4-5 Years Ago -0.2321 - -0.1151 -
5+ Years Ago -0.0990 - -0.0863 0.3748
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0873 -0.0709 0.0142 -
1-2 Years Ago -0.0782 -0.0780 0.0139 -
2-3 Years Ago -0.0583 -0.0644 0.0292 -
3-4 Years Ago -0.0421 -0.0376 0.0323 0.0372
4-5 Years Ago -0.0318 -0.0923 0.0396 -
5+ Years Ago -0.0149 - 0.0456 -
Note: The percent eﬀect on the hourly wage and weekly hours of a worker is calculated by exponentiating the
estimated coeﬃcient of interest and subtracting one from this value: eδ-1.74
hours when using measures of health shocks derived from the demographic survey
data. When administrative measures are used in their place, these percentages
drop further to -6.2% and -17.4% for whites and nonwhites. The amount of time
spent at a job varies with the number of years since the dislocation. Nonwhites
are able to begin to work additional hours ﬁve years or more since the event,
improving their hours by 8.2% when using SIPP health measures and a surprising
37.5% above the number of hours for a worker without a health exit when SSA
measures are utilized. Whites exhibit recovery their weekly hours at work over the
years, but these are not as impressive as the improvements of nonwhites.
Reductions to hourly wage rates are substantial when a match was terminated
because of reasons relating to ill health. Whites are more acutely burdened than
nonwhites within their ﬁrst year back except in the sample using administrative
measures of disability. Wages are found to be 80.1% of their previous values for
whites when referencing the restricted SIPP shock indicators. By comparison,
nonwhite wages are around 82.8% of what they would otherwise have been. Using
measures of disability from the Social Security Administration, wage rates are
79.1% and 76.3% for whites and nonwhites within one year of the onset of a
disabling condition.
Both races begin to exhibit improvements to their wage rates after the ﬁrst
year since poor health caused a forced exit. The lingering eﬀects of a displacing
health condition upon the hourly wage rate of whites is apparent in Table 1.20,
as ﬁve years after the event earnings are around 92.4% in the subset based on
demographic indicators of health limitations and 90.1% for this sample based upon
the administrative evidence of poor health. The lasting impacts for nonwhites is
not signiﬁcant ﬁve years or more after the shock.75
This analysis of racial diﬀerences in reactions to displacement illustrate key dis-
parities in the weekly hours of those with past layoﬀs. Results also indicate that
while whites and nonwhites fare comparably within the year of the job separation,
thereafter nonwhites appear to recoup losses at a slower rate. A decomposition
in the racial gap in the post-displacement outcomes following Fairlie and Kletzer
(1998) would be beneﬁcial in further parsing the reasons behind these dissimilari-
ties.
1.5.2 Spousal Job Displacements
Only workers who were married for the duration of the panel and whose spouses
were also participants in the Survey of Income and Program Participation are
included in the proportional hazard and joint estimation of the wage rate and
weekly hours.31 Each model is examined using this full sample of paired couples
and a restricted sample. This examination focuses on the lingering impacts of
exogenous separations of the spouse rather than of the worker herself, and as such
the limited sample becomes one deﬁned by the eligibility of the spouse to apply for
disability insurance beneﬁts. This makes it possible to interpret results for spouses
who might not ordinarily have been in the labor force.
I begin by reviewing summary statistics for the married workers.32 Table 1.21
31Additional exclusions include household workers, armed forces personnel, un-
employed military personnel, those with job spans lasting less than one day, those
with allocated responses, those younger than 21 or older than 60, those with
spouses who are younger than 21 or older than 60, those with weekly hours less
than or equal to zero or a real hourly wage of less than $0.10, and those who are
not original sample members.
32The restricted sample is limited to those individuals with spouses who have a
Social Security Number associated with their SIPP internal identiﬁcation number.
Only those workers with spouses who are additionally eligible to apply for SSDI
beneﬁts in the given month are included in this sample.76
reveals that the unrestricted sample is composed of 7,671 individuals covering
12,398 jobs; the restricted spouse sample has 6,294 individuals with 10,089 jobs.
The full sample is 50.1% male, but restricting based on spousal eligibility for SSDI
increases the number of women in the sample to 53.3%. Married workers are more
educated than the overall population in Table 1.1, and those with spouses who are
highly attached to the work force on average have spent more time in school. Job
characteristics do not diﬀer greatly, with the mean hourly wage $0.24 less in the
restricted spouse sample.
The timing of the exogenous shocks are presented in Table 1.22, by sample,
type of event, and aﬀected spouse.33 More husbands have wives who have applied
for SSDI beneﬁts within the past two years, but women have nearly twice as many
partners with administrative records of ailments that date from more than two
years ago. Survey measures of impairments across genders are fairly similar, while
layoﬀs appear to impact men more frequently.
Tables 1.23 and 1.24 are of the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients for the survey
and administrative health shock indicators of wives and husbands of the employed.
Coeﬃcients range between 0.32 and 0.45 along the diagonal for men with displaced
wives and between 0.38 and 0.44 for women with spouses who have exited. The
correlations in Table 1.24 are greater than those presented in Table 1.5 for the
restricted sample of all workers, and indicate the higher reliability of the survey
33Excluded are household workers, armed forces personnel, unemployed military
personnel, those with job spans lasting less than one day, those with allocated
responses, those younger than 21 or older than 60, those with weekly hours equal
to zero or hourly wages in constant 2003 dollars of less than $0.10, and those who
are not original sample members. In the unrestricted sample, 85,483 male worker
observations and 80,455 female worker observations exist for all individuals over
all time periods; in the restricted spouse sample, 66,016 male and 71,184 female
worker observations exist.77
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Table 1.22: Summary of the Timing of Exogenous Shocks of Worker and Spouse
Unrestricted Married Sample Restricted Spouse Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
SIPP Layoﬀ Shock:
Of Wife
0-1 Year Ago 0.0637 16.7934 0.0636 16.7340
1-2 Years Ago 0.0243 10.5859 0.0258 10.8659
2+ Years Ago 0.0706 17.6193 0.0757 18.1401
Of Husband
0-1 Year Ago 0.0948 19.6793 0.0962 19.8135
1-2 Years Ago 0.0357 12.4636 0.0374 12.7556
2+ Years Ago 0.1128 21.2494 0.1137 21.3318
SIPP Health Shock:
Of Wife
0-1 Year Ago 0.0357 12.7610 0.0302 11.7338
1-2 Years Ago 0.0088 6.4069 0.0084 6.2555
2+ Years Ago 0.0207 9.7856 0.0200 9.5897
Of Husband
0-1 Year Ago 0.0286 11.1903 0.0306 11.5745
1-2 Years Ago 0.0067 5.4713 0.0068 5.5108
2+ Years Ago 0.0203 9.4835 0.0201 9.4395
SSA Health Shock:
Of Wife
0-1 Year Ago - - 0.0114 7.2731
1-2 Years Ago - - 0.0026 3.4920
2+ Years Ago - - 0.0026 3.4823
Of Husband
0-1 Year Ago - - 0.0098 6.6350
1-2 Years Ago - - 0.0014 2.5559
2+ Years Ago - - 0.0052 4.810579
Table 1.23: Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcients for SIPP-based Health Shocks of
Spouses of Married Male Workers
SIPP Health Shock of Wife
SSA Health Shock of Wife 0-1 Year Ago 1-2 Years Ago 2+ Years Ago
0-1 Year Ago 0.4483 0.1119 0.0766
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
1-2 Years Ago 0.0743 0.3687 0.0763
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
2+ Years Ago 0.0244 0.0249 0.3150
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Note: Correlation coeﬃcients are presented along with the p-values under the hypothesis that ρ=0. The restricted
sample of 66,016 observations is used.
Table 1.24: Pearson Correlation Coeﬃcients for SSA-based Health Shocks of
Spouses of Married Female Workers
SIPP Health Shock of Husband
SSA Health Shock of Husband 0-1 Year Ago 1-2 Years Ago 2+ Years Ago
0-1 Year Ago 0.4324 0.0209 0.0223
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001
1-2 Years Ago 0.0037 0.3772 -0.0054
0.3271 <.0001 0.1463
2+ Years Ago -0.0066 -0.0059 0.4417
0.0770 0.1138 <.0001
Note: Correlation coeﬃcients are presented along with the p-values under the hypothesis that ρ=0. The restricted
sample of 71,184 observations is used.
measures.
Proportional Hazard
Hazard ratios of the eﬀect of spousal shocks on the job spell duration of married
workers are presented in Table 1.25.34 These ratios represent the probability of
a married worker whose spouse experienced an exogenous health or layoﬀ shock
0-1 years ago, 1-2 years ago, and 2 or more years ago leaving a job relative to
this probability for an otherwise identical married worker with a spouse who has
34Hazard ratios are the exponentiation of the coeﬃcients from the hazard model.80
never experienced a shock. Employees with spouses without such events in their
work history comprise the baseline for this comparison. A hazard ratio greater
than one means that the event has a positive inﬂuence on the hazard of a job spell
concluding, whereas a ratio less than one means that the event has a negative eﬀect
on the termination of the job.
Married male workers do not appear to be greatly aﬀected by the layoﬀs of
their wives, while women with husbands who have suﬀered from a layoﬀ only
experience a 13% decrease in the hazard of their job ending two years after the
event. Disabling health shocks, however, have more interesting repercussions, as is
apparent in Figures 1.12 and 1.13. Women with husbands who experience disabling
health shocks have a 40.7% increase in the hazard of their current job ending when
referencing the results from the unrestricted sample. Two or more years after the
date of a husband’s job exit induced by ill health, the hazard of the wife’s job
ending is 76% that of the baseline worker’s hazard, which is a 24% reduction in
the hazard. These ﬁndings do not greatly diﬀer for the restricted sample with SIPP
health measures. However, the restricted subset that utilizes SSA-based measures
demonstrates a 46.5% increase in the hazard of a job ending within the ﬁrst year
of a husband’s health shock. This is consistent with a withdrawal from the labor
force. Coile (2004) discovered that women decrease their labor supply subsequent
to the unexpected and severe onset of a crippling ailment of their husbands, which
supports this conclusion.
The unrestricted sample shows that married men with wives who experienced
an unexpected disabling condition in the previous year have job hazards that are
47.8% more than those of the baseline married employee. The restricted spouse
sample that utilizes the SIPP measures of health indicates that this hazard is 32.1%81
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above that of the baseline worker, which doubles in the next year. It is apparent
that spouses who are married to individuals who experience a health exit are also
transitioning out of their jobs. This may be to unemployment so that they can
assist in nursing duties, or they may be accepting more ﬂexible positions. After
two years or more have passed since either type of displacing event, wives are more
attached to their jobs. Men in the restricted sample appear to be unaﬀected by
the layoﬀs of their wives according to this duration analysis. However, they are
more inclined to part with their employers in each of the ﬁrst two years following
an exogenous health shock to their wives.
This conﬁrms the results of Charles (1999) that husbands are less likely to
be employed when their spouses are disabled. He explains that women are more
inclined to work for pay in an identical situation. Because Charles’ estimations
do not attempt to parse the adjustment eﬀects of illness, his claims support the
conclusions I have made regarding the behaviors of wives two years or more after
their husbands’ health-related job separations. The observed reductions in the
hazard after a few years since either the onset of the work limiting condition or the
layoﬀ of the husband also suggest that health insurance provided by the female’s
employer has by this time become particularly valuable. This is consistent with
Blau (1998), who found that the poor health of an unemployed husband of a
working wife reduces her exit rate by 16% compared to wives of unemployed men
who are in good health. Families with a male member who has been forced out of
the work force may be shifting coverage to the female partner in the couple after
two years.85
Joint Model
The joint model of hourly wages and weekly hours of married individuals con-
tributes to knowledge of how a couple is aﬀected as a unit by dislocations. The
ideas presented by the estimation of the proportional hazard model in Table 1.25
regarding spell durations of employer-employee matches relate to the concepts re-
vealed by the estimation of this model outlined in Table 1.29, which summarizes
Tables 1.26-1.28.
Men and women with spouses who have become unemployed because of a layoﬀ
behave quite diﬀerently from each other, as is apparent from Figures 1.14-1.17. The
hours of working husbands are not signiﬁcantly altered by ﬁrm-side exits of their
wives at any time during the ensuing years while women work more. Working
husbands of laid oﬀ wives have wages that are 4.8% above the rates of employees
without displaced partners in the second year after separation in the restricted
sample, whereas wives in this subset have rates that are diminished by 2.3%.
The reductions in the hourly wage rates of the spouse of a disabled individ-
ual in Tables 1.33 and 1.34 (summarizing Tables 1.30-1.32) appear to be related
to either job changes or to temporary new positions35 as observed in Table 1.25.
For husbands whose wives experienced an episode of ill health within the previous
year, wages are around 92% of their value and hours are reduced by 5.9% when
utilizing SIPP measures in the restricted sample. Health status derived from ben-
35A job transition may occur after the spouse realizes that she needs to adapt
her work schedule to accomodate the needs of her ailing partner. For a person who
was not previously in the work force, the onset of her spouse’s disabling condition
may cause her to seek out new employment for a brief duration to temper the
short-run impact of her mate’s sudden loss of income until he recovers and is able
to return to work. Either scenario can be used to explain the results from the
hazard model.86
Table 1.26: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Heterogeneity in the Unre-
stricted Sample of Married Workers- Spousal Shocks
SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Exogenous Health Shock of Wife:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0847 *** -0.0523 ***
(0.0177) (0.0095)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0418 ** -0.0342 ***
(0.0160) (0.0093)
2+ Years Ago -0.0338 -0.0117
(0.0181) (0.0106)
Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Wife:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0278 * 0.0139
(0.0130) (0.0127)
1-2 Years Ago 0.0222 -0.0070
(0.0114) (0.0117)
2+ Years Ago 0.0388 *** -0.0018
(0.0110) (0.0115)
Exogenous Health Shock of Husband:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0591 ** -0.0285 ***
(0.0183) (0.0073)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0263 -0.0743 ***
(0.0159) (0.0040)
2+ Years Ago -0.0247 -0.0731 ***
(0.0196) (0.0061)
Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Husband:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0346 *** 0.0064
(0.0090) (0.0046)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0254 ** 0.0202 ***
(0.0089) (0.0043)
2+ Years Ago 0.0074 0.0458 ***
(0.0088) (0.0042)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3160 0.1765
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3319 0.2454
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.5103
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3550 0.3954
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2321
Number of Workers 7,671
Number of Jobs 12,398
ln-L -49,793.82
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.87
Table 1.27: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Heterogeneity in the Re-
stricted Sample of Married Workers- Spousal Shocks (SIPP Health Measures)
SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Exogenous Health Shock of Wife:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0873 *** -0.0608 ***
(0.0226) (0.0129)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0477 * -0.0499 ***
(0.0237) (0.0111)
2+ Years Ago -0.0411 -0.0032
(0.0244) (0.0151)
Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Wife:
0-1 Year Ago 0.0039 0.0237
(0.0162) (0.0154)
1-2 Years Ago 0.0468 ** -0.0022
(0.0143) (0.0143)
2+ Years Ago 0.0552 *** 0.0018
(0.0136) (0.0142)
Exogenous Health Shock of Husband:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0492 * -0.0254 **
(0.0193) (0.0085)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0163 -0.0812 ***
(0.0165) (0.0041)
2+ Years Ago -0.0111 -0.0977 ***
(0.0206) (0.0064)
Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Husband:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0227 * 0.0100 *
(0.0095) (0.0050)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0231 * 0.0244 ***
(0.0094) (0.0047)
2+ Years Ago 0.0090 0.0548 ***
(0.0092) (0.0047)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3158 0.1783
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3306 0.2450
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.5310
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3525 0.4002
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2363
Number of Workers 6,294
Number of Jobs 10,089
ln-L -42,475.01
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.88
Table 1.28: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Heterogeneity in the Re-
stricted Sample of Married Workers- Spousal Shocks (SSA Health Measures)
SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Exogenous Health Shock of Wife:
0-1 Year Ago -0.1282 * -0.1026 *
(0.0509) (0.0430)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0816 -0.0415
(0.0496) (0.0319)
2+ Years Ago -0.0172 0.0410
(0.0584) (0.0518)
Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Wife:
0-1 Year Ago 0.0046 0.0247
(0.0163) (0.0154)
1-2 Years Ago 0.0471 ** -0.0015
(0.0143) (0.0142)
2+ Years Ago 0.0556 *** 0.0024
(0.0137) (0.0142)
Exogenous Health Shock of Husband:
0-1 Year Ago -0.1990 *** -0.1521 ***
(0.0594) (0.0266)
1-2 Years Ago -0.2231 *** -0.1804 ***
(0.0594) (0.0255)
2+ Years Ago -0.0511 -0.4036 ***
(0.1122) (0.0264)
Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Husband:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0231 * 0.0104 *
(0.0095) (0.0050)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0233 * 0.0244 ***
(0.0094) (0.0047)
2+ Years Ago 0.0087 0.0540 ***
(0.0092) (0.0047)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3158 0.1783
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3304 0.2450
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.5310
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3526 0.4003
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2363
Number of Workers 6,294
Number of Jobs 10,089
ln-L -42,451.65
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.89
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eﬁts records suggest that such men work 90.2% of their weekly hours prior to their
wives’ displacements. Restricted SIPP measures show that after the initial year,
wives’ hours at work move in the opposite direction of men with spouses in a sym-
metric situation: instead of improving, their weekly hours have fallen by another 5
percentage points. Captured within these actions is the apparent rationing of the
productive hours of wives so that a portion of their time can be spent assisting in
the nursing care of their ill spouses.
Administrative measures present evidence of the strength of spousal reactions
to displacing health shocks: wages of women fall to 82% of the rates of workers
without partners dislocated due to disability and worsen within a year. The re-
actions of the wives in a couple plagued by ill health are more exaggerated than
those of their disabled partners, as seen by comparing Tables 1.27 and 1.28 with
Tables 1.31 and 1.32. The wives have weekly hours that drop to 33.2% below the
hours of workers of spouses who have consistently been well after two years. These
are the most dramatic impacts seen and are indicative of the deteriorating health
and advanced medical complications of the spouses of these employed workers.
The SIPP-based estimations have men reacting more strongly initially to their
wives’ health exits, as evidenced by the more dramatic decline of their wage rates
and weekly hours within the ﬁrst year of the episode. However, as time passes,
these male workers begin to return to their previous levels of exertion and earnings,
whereas wives with husbands who have experienced disabling shocks begin to take
more time away from their jobs to presumably care for their ailing spouses. The
model that relies upon administrative measures of well-being portrays a diﬀerent
story, as women are seen to be more reactive to the conditions that displaced their
husbands even in the initial year.95
Table 1.30: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Heterogeneity in the Unre-
stricted Sample of Married Workers- The Eﬀect of Own Shocks on Married Workers
SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Own Exogenous Health Shock of Male Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2687 *** -0.0797 ***
(0.0259) (0.0196)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1640 *** -0.0517 **
(0.0308) (0.0166)
2+ Years Ago -0.1656 *** -0.0764 ***
(0.0276) (0.0180)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Male Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0609 *** -0.0045
(0.0099) (0.0060)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1025 *** -0.0060
(0.0097) (0.0052)
2+ Years Ago -0.0431 *** 0.0187 ***
(0.0099) (0.0050)
Own Exogenous Health Shock of Female Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2031 *** -0.0970 ***
(0.0311) (0.0146)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1177 *** -0.0342 **
(0.0269) (0.0133)
2+ Years Ago -0.1119 *** 0.0695 ***
(0.0275) (0.0136)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Female Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0881 *** 0.0367 **
(0.0152) (0.0126)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0492 ** 0.0211
(0.0154) (0.0120)
2+ Years Ago -0.0294 0.0581 ***
(0.0156) (0.0124)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3159 0.1764
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3272 0.2449
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.5131
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3551 0.3955
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2301
Number of Workers 7,671
Number of Jobs 12,398
ln-L -49,680.78
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.96
Table 1.31: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Heterogeneity in the Re-
stricted Sample of Married Workers- The Eﬀect of Own Shocks on Married Workers
(SIPP Health Measures)
SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Own Exogenous Health Shock of Male Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2488 *** -0.0962 ***
(0.0270) (0.0188)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1792 *** -0.0399 **
(0.0316) (0.0155)
2+ Years Ago -0.1732 *** -0.0670 ***
(0.0282) (0.0170)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Male Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0664 *** -0.0055
(0.0102) (0.0057)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1067 *** -0.0069
(0.0099) (0.0049)
2+ Years Ago -0.0591 *** 0.0163 ***
(0.0102) (0.0048)
Own Exogenous Health Shock of Female Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2053 *** -0.0466
(0.0429) (0.0286)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0857 * -0.0402
(0.0359) (0.0250)
2+ Years Ago -0.0940 * 0.0559 *
(0.0376) (0.0250)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Female Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0969 *** 0.0383 **
(0.0167) (0.0135)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0606 *** 0.0162
(0.0170) (0.0129)
2+ Years Ago -0.0450 ** 0.0529 ***
(0.0171) (0.0133)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3105 0.1694
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3189 0.2150
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.4982
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3487 0.3888
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2334
Number of Workers 6,225
Number of Jobs 10,120
ln-L -27,631.45
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.97
Table 1.32: Joint Estimation of Wage and Hours with Heterogeneity in the Re-
stricted Sample of Married Workers- The Eﬀect of Own Shocks on Married Workers
(SSA Health Measures)
SSA Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Own Exogenous Health Shock of Male Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2030 *** -0.0859
(0.0463) (0.0588)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1265 * 0.0665
(0.0526) (0.0467)
2+ Years Ago -0.3399 *** -0.0034
(0.0627) (0.1044)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Male Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0685 *** -0.0058
(0.0102) (0.0057)
1-2 Years Ago -0.1086 *** -0.0073
(0.0099) (0.0049)
2+ Years Ago -0.0601 *** 0.0160 ***
(0.0102) (0.0048)
Own Exogenous Health Shock of Female Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2536 ** -0.0459
(0.0971) (0.0726)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0957 -0.0357
(0.1169) (0.0680)
2+ Years Ago -0.0569 0.0564
(0.1559) (0.1368)
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Female Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0952 *** 0.0389 **
(0.0168) (0.0135)
1-2 Years Ago -0.0599 *** 0.0166
(0.0171) (0.0130)
2+ Years Ago -0.0443 * 0.0532 ***
(0.0173) (0.0133)
Stdev. Residuals: σ,ση 0.3105 0.1694
Stdev. Person Eﬀects: σθ,σα 0.3219 0.2156
Corr. Person Eﬀects: ρθ,α 0.5005
Stdev. Job Match Eﬀects: σψ,σχ 0.3486 0.3888
Corr. Job Match Eﬀects: ρψ,χ 0.2338
Number of Workers 6,225
Number of Jobs 10,120
ln-L -27,668.66
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: ’*’=5%; ’**’=1%; ’***’=0.1%.98
Table 1.33: Percent Eﬀect of Own Exogenous Health and Layoﬀ Shocks on the
Hourly Wage and Weekly Hours of Married Workers in the Unrestricted Sample-
Signiﬁcant Values Only (SIPP Health Measures)
SIPP Health Measures
Hourly Wage Weekly Hours
Own Exogenous Health Shock of Male Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.2356 -0.0766
1-2 Years Ago -0.1513 -0.0504
2+ Years Ago -0.1526 -0.0736
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Male Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0591 -
1-2 Years Ago -0.0974 -
2+ Years Ago -0.0422 0.0189
Own Exogenous Health Shock of Female Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.1838 -0.0924
1-2 Years Ago -0.1110 -0.0336
2+ Years Ago -0.1059 0.0720
Own Exogenous Layoﬀ Shock of Female Worker:
0-1 Year Ago -0.0843 0.0374
1-2 Years Ago -0.0480 -
2+ Years Ago - 0.0598
Note: The percent eﬀect on the hourly wage and weekly hours of a worker is calculated by exponentiating the
estimated coeﬃcient of interest and subtracting one from this value: eδ-1.
1.6 Conclusion
This study has addressed the manner in which the impacts of displacements origi-
nating from layoﬀ or disability continue to aﬀect employees in the years subsequent
to their reemployment. Convincing evidence of the lasting shifts in the wage rates
and hours of those shocked out of employment has been presented in this paper,
further contributing to the existing research on worker dislocations.
Relative to the full population of employed individuals, high attachment work-
ers generally have more moderate shifts in their economic outcomes in the years
following exogenous exits. While both types of negative shocks place workers on
an initially lower wage trajectory, the consequences dissipate over the adjustment
period. Scars from displacement have the most lasting impact on the disabled,99
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plaguing their future work histories to a greater extent. Both the wages and hours
of this population are negatively impacted following an unanticipated exit from
the work force. Those who return to work after experiencing a layoﬀ spend an
increased amount of time at their jobs and are able to recover much of their initial
earnings losses with each successive year that passes.
Curiously, those located at the bottom of the educational hierarchy are not the
ones whose wages suﬀer most from employment shocks. The better educated are
in fact worse oﬀ monetarily following displacing events as compared to those with
only a high school diploma regardless of the source of the exit. The disparity by ed-
ucation is most pronounced in the years after an episode of ill health: as compared
to employees with an increased taste for learning, those with less schooling work
fewer hours each year while earning wage rates that are larger. These diﬀerences
may be caused by the severity of the impairments that induce job exits for those
with more than a high school diploma along with lost speciﬁc human capital.
In the gender analysis, I ﬁnd that men have persistent depressed wage rates,
whereas women initially experience more substantial monetary losses but are able
to recover by the end of the third year after a layoﬀ. The genders behave uniquely
in terms of the time they spend at work after this type of dislocation: women
immediately demonstrate large improvements in weekly hours, whereas men only
begin to work more than those with continuous employment in the third year
after the exit. The magnitude of the detrimental impact of a health shock is most
extremely manifested for males in both economic measures.
Estimates from the speciﬁcation analyzing the role of race make it diﬃcult to
draw concrete conclusions about the comparative behaviors of whites and non-
whites. This is because of the variance in the degree of the lingering impacts101
of displacements over time. Following a layoﬀ, whites consistently spend slightly
more time at work, whereas it is generally true that nonwhites do not have weekly
hours that signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those with continuous employment. An event
of poor health has greater and more persistent negative impacts for whites in both
their wages and supply of labor.
Uncovered by the spousal analyses is an awareness that those with partners
who exit their positions due to an unanticipated shock are unambiguously aﬀected
by these events. Women with husbands who have been laid oﬀ become more
attached to their positions as compared to the baseline married employee after at
least two years. Health shocks induce working spouses to also transition out of
employment in the year of the displacement. For men, this behavior continues into
the second year, while wives in the next few years are the inclined to remain with
their employer. Shifting health insurance coverage to the unaﬀected spouse may
be the motivation for some of these outcomes. Layoﬀs of husbands have a positive
eﬀect on women’s weekly hours, whereas men do not alter their hours when their
wives have been displaced. However, in the case of a health shock, men and women
similarly become less present at work by decreasing their hours relative to workers
without spouses who have experienced an impairment. The response of females
to the illnesses of their husbands is more extreme as manifested in their hours at
work than is their behavior following their own personal job separations.
Results found using measures of limiting health conditions in survey data sets
mirror those found using administrative indicators of disability within a margin
of error. The accuracy of the data routinely collected in household surveys do
appear to give reasonable results as deﬁned by the signs and orders of magnitude
of the impacts as time progresses since the date of the event. The trends exhibited102
do not appear to substantially diﬀer from beneﬁts data, although it is clear that
administrative sources capture more severe traumas. The beneﬁts records provide
informative clues about the shortcomings of survey measures of work-limiting im-
pairments: they cannot discriminate between transient and chronic conditions that
continuously plague a worker the same way that medical records can.
This study suggests the need for additional investigations into the struggles of
workers who become reemployed after recovering from a serious illness. Only by
continuing to extend the techniques established by researchers of ﬁrm-induced
displacements to include examinations of those who separated from their jobs
because of medical disability will suﬃcient knowledge of their plight be uncovered.
It will be particularly important to capture the role that transitioning to positions
in diﬀerent industries and occupations plays in mitigating the impacts of these
dislocations in future work. Furthermore, it will be revealing to explore crossovers
between these populations, as the propensity of laid oﬀ workers with minor ailments
to apply for Social Security Disability Insurance in lieu of immediately searching
for new job matches remains unaddressed.Chapter 2
Linking Human Capital to Productivity
in the U.S. Economy
2.1 Introduction
With the advent of innovative econometric techniques coupled with the increasing
availability of longitudinally-integrated employer-employee data, it has recently
become possible to explore the measure of productivity with more detailed anal-
yses. Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) spent many years estimating the
impact that changes in the composition of the labor force have upon productivity.
Researchers at the Bureau of Labor Statistics followed suit by designing a method-
ology that is consistent with the procedure introduced by Jorgenson, Gollop, and
Fraumeni and that allows for worker heterogeneity by modeling the diﬀerences in
the marginal products of workers (U. S. Department of Labor and Bureau of Labor
Statistics 1993, and Dean and Harper 1998). Abowd, Lengermann, and McKin-
ney (2002) have contributed to the studies of labor productivity by considering a
measure of human capital derived from estimates of a wage equation that includes
both ﬁxed person and ﬁrm eﬀects. This method allows for more within and across
ﬁrm heterogeneity.
As part of a joint Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of the Census project,
we desire to examine measures of productivity produced by methods developed at
the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program that can be compared
with those derived from multifactor productivity models of the BLS that are based
upon the methods of Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni. In doing so, we hope to
103104
provide an additional estimate of the eﬀects of labor composition on productivity
by using recently integrated data. This work will explore measures of human
capital that are linked to indicators of productivity in multiple states from 1990-
2002.
We begin with a review of the theory that describes the development of the
index of labor composition as outlined by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni. This
index requires knowledge of total labor volume and hours, as well as a price of labor.
In order to deﬁne this constant quality price index of labor, we subsequently present
our wage model, which focuses on the role of human capital and is based upon
the works of Becker (1964), Mincer (1974) and Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
(1999). Estimates from this ﬁxed eﬀects model are incorporated into the creation
of two separate price indices: one that is consistent with the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ methods, and a second Census-proposed alternative measure that is
based upon human capital. Cells of classiﬁcation remain the same between the
BLS and Census-proposed alternative indices, with each using categories deﬁned
by education groups and years of experience.1 Tables of the two indices of the
composition of the labor force are presented by gender and industry sectors for
each year, and results are summarized.
2.2 Labor Composition
To explore the manner in which changes in labor composition aﬀect measures of
productivity, we ﬁrst review the labor composition model. Jorgenson, Gollop, and
Fraumeni (1987) and Ho and Jorgenson (1999) present the theory behind this
1Both analyses examine the changing composition of the labor force separately
by gender and industry division.105
model, which was adopted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We begin by assuming a translog production function in which the quantity of
output or value added, Q, is generated by aggregated capital inputs, K, m types
of labor inputs,{lk}m
k=1, and the technology available at time t, At:
Q = At ∗ g(K,l1,...,lm). (2.1)
The labor inputs, lk, can be thought of as hours of work that have been disaggre-
gated by the characteristics, k, of individual workers. This representation accounts
for the heterogeneity of the labor force, as the productive value of an hour likely
varies depending on the level of education, experience, and skill that a worker has
acquired.
Taking the logarithm and then the derivative with respect to time of the
translog production function, we express it in terms of growth rates as
˙ Q
Q
=
˙ A
A
+
∂Q
∂K
˙ K
K
+
m X
k=1
∂Q
∂lk
˙ lk
lk
. (2.2)
We see from this equation that the growth rate of output,
˙ Q
Q , depends on the
growth rate of aggregate capital services,
˙ K
K, the growth rates of the m types of
labor services,
n
˙ lk
lk
om
k=1
, and the growth rate of multifactor productivity,
˙ A
A. Dis-
tinguishing between the substitution of inputs and the growth rate of productivity,
weighed by their marginal products, is necessary in deﬁning an appropriate mea-
sure of labor quality.
We assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and
that factor input markets are in competitive equilibrium. We further assume cost
minimizing behavior, so that the output elasticity of each factor equals its share
of total costs. The factor cost shares of capital and labor are respectively given by
sC =
pCK
pCK +
P
k plklk
(2.3)106
slk =
plklk
pCK +
P
k plklk
, (2.4)
where pC and plk are the prices of capital and labor services for the kth type of
labor. K is the total quantity of capital and lk =
P
i∈k Ri represents the kth
quantity of hours for the corresponding labor services. The index of the price of
labor inputs, normalized to one in 2000, is the value of labor compensation divided
by the volume index:
PL =
P
k plklk
R
.
Rearranging (2.2), we see that the growth rate of multifactor productivity can
alternatively be written as
˙ A
A
=
˙ Q
Q
− sC
˙ K
K
−
m X
k=1
slk
˙ lk
lk
. (2.5)
Additional assumptions of separability of inputs and Hicks neutral technical change
allow us to focus on aggregates of labor input as
˙ L
L
=
m X
k=1
sLk
˙ lk
lk
, (2.6)
where
sLk =
slk
sL
=
plklk P
k plklk
. (2.7)
We express the aggregate form of (2.5) as
˙ A
A
=
˙ Q
Q
− sC
˙ K
K
− sL
˙ L
L
, (2.8)
where the shares of total costs for capital and labor are sC and sL.
Following Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni, we assume that a constant of
proportionality we term the composition of the labor force, LC, transforms hours
worked, R, into ﬂows of labor services, L:
L = LC × R.107
Thus, the growth rate of labor inputs is the sum of the growth rate of total hours
and labor composition:
˙ L
L
=
L ˙ C
LC
+
˙ R
R
. (2.9)
Given our assumptions, the instantaneous growth rates can be replaced by annual
rates of change. The Tornqvist index number formula measures these as diﬀerences
in successive logarithms. Equation (2.9) informs us that the growth rate of total
hours and labor composition together sum to equal the growth rate of labor inputs.
Changes in the index of labor composition, LC, are thus deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between changes in the aggregate labor input index, L, and the unweighted sum
of the hours of all persons, R.
4lnLC = 4lnL − 4lnR = 4ln

L
R

, (2.10)
where from (2.6) we know
4lnL =
m X
k=1
1
2
[sLk(t) + sLk(t − 1)]4lnlk. (2.11)
Letting k denote the cross-classiﬁed worker types, the index of sectoral labor
input, L, can be expressed as a translog function of its individual components of
hours, lk. This Tornqvist index of sectoral volume is represented by a translog
constant quantity index of the individual labor inputs:
4lnL =
X
k
¯ sLk4lnlk. (2.12)
The weights in (2.12) are given for each industry division by the average value
share of each component, which are
¯ sLk =
1
2
[sLk(t) + sLk(t − 1)], (2.13)
These value shares are derived from data on labor compensation that are cross-
classiﬁed by cell values as described by equation (2.7). An index number time108
series is retrieved by chaining the logarithmic diﬀerences given by (2.12) and by
using the exponential function.
The changes in the index of labor composition are represented by uniting equa-
tions (2.10) and (2.12), which yields
4lnLC =
m X
k=1
¯ sLk4lnlk − 4lnR, (2.14)
where R =
P
k lk, since lk is the aggregate level of annual hours for each cell k.
From this equation, we see that labor quality is the ratio of labor volume (the
constant quality index) to hours worked, or the weighted and unweighted growth
rates of hours. This equation can be used equally well to measure both aggregate
and sectoral labor quality.
2.3 Wage Model
The Bureau of Labor Statistics implements a wage model to derive labor market
prices for cross-classiﬁed worker types rather than utilizing average earnings data.
Estimates of the prices of each relevant type of labor using the BLS methodology
are obtained from coeﬃcients from annually-ﬁtted hourly earnings functions. The
wage functions are separately estimated for men and women using categories for
seven education groups and seventy-two levels of work experience, yielding 1,008
cells.
We propose exploring the changing composition of the labor force by expanding
the wage model originally conceived by the BLS to explore a new measure of the
price of labor. We do so by placing our focus on the role of human capital, or skill.
The seminal works of Becker and Mincer deﬁne Hit to be individual i’s stock of
general human capital in time period t, which is assumed to be fully transferrable109
as a worker moves among jobs in a given labor market, f. A worker’s full-time
full-year wage rate is deﬁned within this labor market as
wit = rftHit, (2.15)
where the rental rate of human capital is rft. The production function
Hit = e
θi+X
0 exp
it βexp+ln(50×35) (2.16)
assumes that labor force experience, X
exp
it , a person-speciﬁc component, θi, and
the logarithm of annual full-year, full-time hours2 are the inputs required for the
generation of human capital.
Uniting equations (2.15) and (2.16) and taking the logarithm yields
lnwit = lnrft + θi + X
0exp
it β
exp + ln(50 × 35). (2.17)
The full-time, full-year log wage rate, or full human capital, is the earnings a
worker would receive if that person worked exactly 50×35 hours in the year. This
derivation of the standard human capital log wage function permits us to interpret
the time and location eﬀects as log prices. We also see that the logarithm of an
individual’s human capital stock is
lnHit = hit = θi + X
0exp
it β
exp + ln(50 × 35), (2.18)
and the wage function is
w = w(hit,rft). (2.19)
Note that (2.19) holds true within a competitive labor market that has no ﬁrm-
level wage heterogeneity. It is this formulation that will be used to construct our
index of human capital.
2Full-time, full-year employees work 35 hours or more each week and 50 or more
hours each year.110
Following the 1999 article of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, we detail a
methodology in which an employee’s wage rate can be decomposed into parts
that, in addition to observable characteristics, include both unmeasured person
and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. More explicitly, for each individual, i, and ﬁrm, j, in time
period t, we deﬁne
lnwijt = X
0
itβ + θi + ψj + εijt, (2.20)
where the log wage rate, lnwijt, is the natural logarithm of the real annualized wage
at the dominant ﬁrm, X0
itβ is the eﬀect of time-varying characteristics, θi is the
person ﬁxed eﬀect, ψj is the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀect, and εijt is the statistical residual. The
covariates are interacted with sex and include the following: experience quartic,
aggregate earnings; unemployment rate; full quarter, continuous quarter, and raw
quarter dummies; the logarithm of annual hours worked at dominant job; age 66-
75 and age 76-85 dummies; Heckit variables to capture selection into and out of
the sample; and left and right edge dummy variables for when data is missing on
a boundary quarter.
From this estimation, the individual eﬀect can be further decomposed into
observable and unobservable parts that do not time-vary in the following manner:
θi = αi + u
0
iηi. (2.21)
This is how we acquire coeﬃcient estimates for a male indicator variable, as well
as for the education groups for each gender. Similarly, the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀect can be
decomposed by
ψj = υj + µ
0
jνj (2.22)
to yield coeﬃcient estimates for Census Division and Metropolitan Statistical Area
for the place of work.111
Abowd, Lengermann, and McKinney (2002) implement an estimation similar to
(2.20) separately for each state. We instead estimate this equation for all states at
once. We interpret human capital, or skill as deﬁned by (2.18), which consists of the
person ﬁxed eﬀect, θi and the experience component of X0
itβ from the estimation
of (2.20) above evaluated at full-year full-time hours.
2.4 The Price of Labor
2.4.1 Adapted Bureau of Labor Statistics Price of Labor
We follow the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ methodology by estimating a wage equa-
tion (2.20). Doing so does not confound person and ﬁrm heterogeneity in the index
of labor quality, as would be the case if the price of labor were deﬁned by using
compensation directly. The Jorgenson price of the full-time hourly wage rate for
each worker type is assigned based on an adaptation of the BLS price equation:
plkt = a
0
t + X
0exp
kt β
exp + u
0educ
kt η
educ
i + (γ − 1)ln(50 × 35), (2.23)
where
a
0
t = a + ¯ Z
0
tς.
We make an adjustment so that the price of labor is not for annual earnings, but
rather is for the hourly wage rate for a full-time job holder by including the term
(γ − 1)ln(50 × 35) on the right hand side of (2.23).3 It is this equation that is
utilized in the computation of the traditional Bureau of Labor Statistics indices of
labor productivity by 1,008 cells, k, of education, work experience, and sex. It is
normalized to one in 2000 for ease of interpretation.
3The coeﬃcient on the logarithm of annual hours worked, γ, is derived from
the estimation of the wage equation (2.20).112
The intercept, a
0
t, can be interpreted as the return to all characteristics other
than education and experience, since it is an average for all persons of the same sex.
We extract from the estimation of our model using equation (2.22) the coeﬃcients
for time-varying place of work geography,4 νj. The Census Division of place of work
and an indicator of whether employment is inside a Metropolitan Statistical Area
deﬁne the geography variables. In addition to the weighted averages of the time-
varying geography characteristics, ¯ µ
0
t, aggregate yearly earnings and the yearly
unemployment rate contribute to our overall measure of ¯ Z
0
t, with the returns to
these characteristics for each gender incorporated into a
0
t.
Equation (2.21) is used to decompose the ﬁxed person eﬀect, θi, into a male in-
dicator variable and categories schooling5 to derive the education coeﬃcients, ηeduc
i ,
for each gender. The experience component and its square from our estimation of
(2.20), X
0exp
kt βexp is also incorporated into (2.23).
2.4.2 Census-Proposed Alternative Price of Labor
We use the nationally-weighted aggregate value of human capital6 from the esti-
mation of (2.20) in our alternative Beckerian price of labor. This enables us to
characterize diﬀerences within and between the industry divisions we are studying
by the level of human capital. We allow the price of labor in each period to be
deﬁned within 1,008 cells, k, of experience, education, and gender as an implicit
4This diﬀers from the original methodology of the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
which uses place of residence in deﬁning the geography variables. Veteran status
is not controlled for, nor is part-time work.
5The education groups we use are 0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, 16, and 17 or more years
of schooling.
6Since the Census data base does not as of yet consist of the universe of states,
we utilize national weights derived from industry and demographic control totals
in deriving these distributions.113
wage. We adapt the method of Lengermann (2002), deﬁning average industry
human capital as the price of labor:
plkt =
P
i∈k hit
lkt
, (2.24)
Unlike Lengermann, who divides by total employment, we use a denominator of
total hours for each cell k, lkt =
P
i∈k Rit. Using human capital in this manner
provides us with a time-invariant implicit wage.
A key distinction between the Jorgenson and Beckerian prices is that Beckerian
prices are based upon equation (2.15). This equation equates the wage rate, wit, as
the product of human capital, Hit, and its rental rate, rft. Jorgenson prices, how-
ever, are based upon concepts that relate speciﬁcally to the returns to education
and experience.
2.5 Results
Tables 2.1-2.8 present the constant quality price index of labor (pl) and the con-
stant quality index of labor (4lnL) for males and females following the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and the Census-proposed alternative methodologies. Price has
been normalized to unity in 2000 to permit the ease of interpretation across meth-
ods. Recall that the price index is deﬁned by the BLS based upon returns to
characteristics described by an estimated wage equation. The Census-proposed
alternative measure instead incorporates aggregate human capital into the price
of labor. For each industry division, gender, and year spanning 1990-2002, Tables
2.9 and 2.10 summarize total annual hours (R).
On average for men in all sectors, the volume of total annual hours decreased
between 1990 and 2002 by 5.79%. During this same timeframe, women experienced114
Table 2.1: Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Method (TFP) Constant Quality Price Index
of Labor for Males
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 0.9941 1.0065 1.0015 0.9988 0.9923 1.0034 1.0041
Construction 0.9930 0.9953 0.9925 0.9920 0.9906 0.9908 0.9910
Trans. & Utilities 1.0086 1.0041 1.0005 1.0014 0.9974 0.9972 0.9958
Wholesale Trade 1.0008 1.0041 1.0040 1.0041 1.0012 1.0004 0.9993
Retail Trade 0.9938 0.9982 0.9987 0.9994 0.9980 0.9985 0.9988
FIRE 0.9951 0.9916 0.9905 0.9928 0.9887 0.9854 0.9888
Services 0.9927 0.9916 0.9903 0.9900 0.9889 0.9896 0.9908
Durable
Manufacturing 1.0046 1.0016 0.9978 0.9997 0.9983 1.0015 0.9999
Nondurable
Manufacturing 1.0094 1.0063 1.0027 1.0048 1.0023 1.0038 0.9990
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 1.0040 1.0039 0.9951 1.0000 1.0048 0.9911
Construction 0.9914 0.9952 0.9977 1.0000 0.9971 0.9944
Trans. & Utilities 0.9955 0.9990 0.9981 1.0000 0.9961 0.9862
Wholesale Trade 0.9993 1.0027 1.0006 1.0000 0.9942 0.9866
Retail Trade 0.9985 1.0000 0.9997 1.0000 0.9969 0.9952
FIRE 0.9912 0.9985 1.0007 1.0000 0.9977 0.9939
Services 0.9917 0.9962 0.9983 1.0000 0.9971 0.9929
Durable
Manufacturing 0.9995 1.0023 1.0002 1.0000 0.9935 0.9825
Nondurable
Manufacturing 0.9979 1.0006 0.9998 1.0000 0.9944 0.9879115
Table 2.2: Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Method (TFP) Constant Quality Price Index
of Labor for Females
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 1.0346 1.0380 1.0332 1.0251 1.0163 1.0205 1.0173
Construction 1.0025 1.0048 1.0017 0.9977 0.9932 0.9937 0.9947
Trans. & Utilities 1.0165 1.0159 1.0146 1.0100 1.0034 1.0036 1.0018
Wholesale Trade 1.0110 1.0145 1.0155 1.0105 1.0056 1.0057 1.0034
Retail Trade 1.0057 1.0084 1.0083 1.0060 1.0022 1.0026 1.0025
FIRE 1.0283 1.0292 1.0277 1.0246 1.0160 1.0109 1.0096
Services 1.0112 1.0136 1.0101 1.0073 1.0026 1.0021 1.0023
Durable
Manufacturing 1.0199 1.0224 1.0188 1.0134 1.0066 1.0082 1.0045
Nondurable
Manufacturing 1.0173 1.0138 1.0088 1.0042 0.9998 1.0021 0.9990
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 1.0123 1.0113 1.0037 1.0000 0.9977 0.9882
Construction 0.9933 0.9953 0.9996 1.0000 1.0004 0.9952
Trans. & Utilities 0.9988 0.9999 1.0005 1.0000 0.9967 0.9846
Wholesale Trade 1.0001 1.0015 1.0016 1.0000 0.9962 0.9862
Retail Trade 1.0006 1.0012 1.0022 1.0000 0.9984 0.9956
FIRE 1.0055 1.0067 1.0060 1.0000 0.9959 0.9847
Services 1.0000 1.0009 1.0021 1.0000 0.9973 0.9899
Durable
Manufacturing 1.0008 1.0021 1.0017 1.0000 0.9946 0.9813
Nondurable
Manufacturing 0.9951 0.9987 1.0009 1.0000 0.9967 0.9898116
Table 2.3: Census-Proposed Alternative Constant Quality Price Index of Labor
for Males
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 0.8028 0.7873 0.8297 0.8805 0.8744 0.9358 0.9519
Construction 0.9614 0.9450 0.9563 0.9743 1.0054 1.0067 1.0030
Trans. & Utilities 0.9291 0.9227 0.9122 0.9327 0.9588 0.9783 0.9811
Wholesale Trade 0.9973 0.9771 0.9381 0.9556 0.9717 0.9793 0.9750
Retail Trade 0.9857 0.9738 0.8998 0.9267 0.9560 0.9808 0.9677
FIRE 1.0026 0.9740 0.9658 0.9941 0.9990 1.0044 1.0205
Services 0.9285 0.9235 0.9364 0.9625 0.9891 1.0094 0.9979
Durable
Manufacturing 0.9151 0.9101 0.9076 0.9349 0.9696 0.9722 0.9708
Nondurable
Manufacturing 0.8918 0.8851 0.9105 0.9341 0.9609 0.9684 0.9676
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 0.9695 0.9486 0.9572 1.0000 0.9812 0.9409
Construction 1.0210 1.0125 1.0105 1.0000 0.9743 0.9506
Trans. & Utilities 0.9965 0.9831 0.9940 1.0000 0.9637 0.9424
Wholesale Trade 0.9969 0.9882 0.9931 1.0000 0.9602 0.9483
Retail Trade 0.9816 0.9664 0.9630 1.0000 0.9611 0.9079
FIRE 1.0241 1.0191 1.0031 1.0000 0.9645 0.9483
Services 1.0145 1.0087 1.0131 1.0000 0.9556 0.9271
Durable
Manufacturing 0.9907 0.9750 0.9928 1.0000 0.9648 0.9521
Nondurable
Manufacturing 0.9874 0.9780 1.0008 1.0000 0.9702 0.9537117
Table 2.4: Census-Proposed Alternative Constant Quality Price Index of Labor
for Females
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 1.3747 0.9894 0.9462 0.9564 0.9451 0.9118 0.9330
Construction 1.0342 1.0019 0.9792 0.9606 0.9680 0.9811 0.9904
Trans. & Utilities 0.9342 0.9233 0.8963 0.9138 0.9394 0.9646 0.9798
Wholesale Trade 1.0119 1.0015 0.9531 0.9702 0.9872 1.0110 1.0040
Retail Trade 1.0832 1.0581 0.9464 0.9527 0.9736 1.0073 0.9998
FIRE 1.0456 1.0169 0.9773 0.9845 0.9867 1.0050 1.0297
Services 1.0194 0.9840 0.9707 0.9809 0.9923 1.0216 1.0193
Durable
Manufacturing 0.8955 0.8910 0.8887 0.9124 0.9520 0.9555 0.9637
Nondurable
Manufacturing 0.9068 0.9012 0.9369 0.9627 0.9856 0.9921 0.9936
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 0.9591 0.9584 0.9689 1.0000 0.9688 0.9395
Construction 1.0050 0.9895 0.9954 1.0000 0.9772 0.9396
Trans. & Utilities 0.9942 0.9813 0.9946 1.0000 0.9561 0.9308
Wholesale Trade 1.0129 0.9966 1.0000 1.0000 0.9660 0.9429
Retail Trade 1.0019 0.9812 0.9840 1.0000 0.9590 0.9078
FIRE 1.0381 1.0212 1.0099 1.0000 0.9662 0.9400
Services 1.0282 1.0097 1.0139 1.0000 0.9523 0.9139
Durable
Manufacturing 0.9814 0.9679 0.9833 1.0000 0.9572 0.9442
Nondurable
Manufacturing 1.0132 0.9931 0.9978 1.0000 0.9581 0.9411118
Table 2.5: Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Method Constant Quality Index of Labor
for Males (in Millions)
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Mining 9,985 9,605 8,050 7,438 6,950
Construction 17,924 15,785 14,965 14,990 15,633
Trans. & Utilities 76,042 75,263 72,262 72,530 72,243
Wholesale Trade 41,444 39,900 39,861 39,458 39,854
Retail Trade 96,096 92,944 101,464 104,387 105,422
FIRE 18,259 17,248 16,978 17,302 17,128
Services 153,393 144,583 152,223 157,521 157,617
Durable
Manufacturing 152,274 142,299 134,014 132,833 134,053
Nondurable
Manufacturing 66,284 59,093 57,263 58,359 57,126
Industry 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Mining 6,156 6,129 6,449 6,152 5,514
Construction 15,478 15,828 16,811 17,185 17,851
Trans. & Utilities 73,399 72,855 76,524 76,223 79,070
Wholesale Trade 40,794 40,700 42,206 42,193 42,405
Retail Trade 107,557 108,657 113,779 113,767 116,149
FIRE 16,843 17,244 18,241 18,520 18,963
Services 164,308 170,025 179,355 182,400 190,292
Durable
Manufacturing 135,740 134,853 139,154 139,164 136,508
Nondurable
Manufacturing 57,043 55,115 55,262 53,955 52,628
Industry 2000 2001 2002
Mining 5,542 5,877 5,475
Construction 18,609 18,430 17,924
Trans. & Utilities 81,108 80,730 77,175
Wholesale Trade 42,680 40,923 39,902
Retail Trade 117,371 118,787 120,232
FIRE 19,015 19,265 19,588
Services 203,576 199,483 199,314
Durable
Manufacturing 136,461 128,461 120,198
Nondurable
Manufacturing 51,894 48,932 48,175119
Table 2.6: Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Method Constant Quality Index of Labor
for Females (in Millions)
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Mining 612 733 754 705 717
Construction 2,012 1,413 1,506 1,625 1,845
Trans. & Utilities 23,789 21,063 22,027 22,333 23,248
Wholesale Trade 45,605 39,559 42,491 41,357 43,495
Retail Trade 67,569 63,915 67,652 68,471 71,950
FIRE 18,360 17,772 18,543 18,687 18,873
Services 192,504 185,556 189,469 192,857 201,718
Durable
Manufacturing 50,134 43,071 43,770 42,229 43,546
Nondurable
Manufacturing 37,135 37,293 35,651 34,372 34,275
Industry 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Mining 919 871 840 804 747
Construction 1,840 1,896 2,071 2,141 2,342
Trans. & Utilities 23,796 23,772 25,312 25,194 26,287
Wholesale Trade 43,321 43,642 45,880 45,819 45,875
Retail Trade 73,321 74,004 78,434 79,735 81,371
FIRE 18,322 18,177 19,588 20,064 20,288
Services 210,643 218,237 233,806 240,634 248,657
Durable
Manufacturing 43,569 43,210 44,574 44,266 43,942
Nondurable
Manufacturing 32,912 31,364 31,292 30,455 29,634
Industry 2000 2001 2002
Mining 782 759 745
Construction 2,501 2,504 2,432
Trans. & Utilities 27,277 26,958 24,489
Wholesale Trade 46,523 43,817 41,828
Retail Trade 82,430 82,501 82,165
FIRE 20,203 20,389 20,120
Services 261,471 261,627 259,276
Durable
Manufacturing 44,198 40,916 35,977
Nondurable
Manufacturing 28,833 26,984 25,381120
Table 2.7: Census-Proposed Alternative Constant Quality Index of Labor for Males
(in 10,000s)
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 1,102 1,052 922 867 828 751 749
Construction 11,018 9,731 9,298 9,298 9,772 9,749 10,011
Trans. & Utilities 7,311 7,209 6,797 6,791 6,768 6,885 6,850
Wholesale Trade 7,218 6,884 6,645 6,533 6,578 6,742 6,754
Retail Trade 19,568 18,684 19,704 20,204 20,366 20,847 20,933
FIRE 4,279 4,032 3,920 4,014 3,969 3,907 3,996
Services 18,188 17,236 18,564 19,248 19,353 20,177 20,877
Durable
Manufacturing 12,087 11,260 10,596 10,489 10,616 10,762 10,715
Nondurable
Manufacturing 7,629 6,821 6,705 6,844 6,732 6,741 6,558
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 789 761 701 706 744 710
Construction 10,718 10,986 11,466 11,976 11,869 11,646
Trans. & Utilities 7,240 7,207 7,510 7,745 7,713 7,454
Wholesale Trade 7,043 7,056 7,148 7,222 6,949 6,865
Retail Trade 22,036 21,851 22,182 23,058 23,258 23,399
FIRE 4,251 4,331 4,437 4,491 4,546 4,645
Services 22,234 22,664 23,794 25,430 25,050 25,058
Durable
Manufacturing 11,145 11,167 11,021 11,090 10,482 9,906
Nondurable
Manufacturing 6,627 6,497 6,385 6,327 5,997 5,932121
Table 2.8: Census-Proposed Alternative Constant Quality Index of Labor for Fe-
males (in 10,000s)
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 99 117 117 110 112 143 137
Construction 1,608 1,125 1,177 1,268 1,439 1,441 1,490
Trans. & Utilities 2,950 2,601 2,684 2,718 2,834 2,904 2,912
Wholesale Trade 3,257 2,838 2,992 2,924 3,083 3,106 3,145
Retail Trade 22,128 20,595 20,614 20,497 21,414 21,974 22,009
FIRE 6,323 6,069 6,111 6,104 6,150 5,992 5,960
Services 22,556 21,575 22,191 22,515 23,505 24,447 25,361
Durable
Manufacturing 4,446 3,816 3,947 3,846 4,004 4,013 4,012
Nondurable
Manufacturing 4,899 4,898 4,886 4,792 4,816 4,607 4,426
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 134 130 122 128 126 125
Construction 1,640 1,686 1,847 1,978 1,978 1,932
Trans. & Utilities 3,126 3,119 3,268 3,405 3,375 3,102
Wholesale Trade 3,328 3,332 3,368 3,430 3,263 3,154
Retail Trade 23,406 23,540 24,003 24,534 24,381 24,135
FIRE 6,476 6,619 6,729 6,739 6,816 6,774
Services 27,367 28,060 29,097 30,644 30,604 30,417
Durable
Manufacturing 4,182 4,172 4,158 4,214 3,925 3,517
Nondurable
Manufacturing 4,492 4,372 4,262 4,161 3,899 3,716122
Table 2.9: Industry Labor Input of Total Annual Hours for Males (in Millions)
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 1,166 1,110 951 884 833 737 735
Construction 2,011 1,782 1,701 1,704 1,782 1,769 1,814
Trans. & Utilities 9,070 9,024 8,728 8,748 8,754 8,922 8,894
Wholesale Trade 4,929 4,736 4,743 4,692 4,756 4,888 4,895
Retail Trade 11,406 10,996 12,078 12,415 12,564 12,851 13,014
FIRE 2,283 2,169 2,145 2,180 2,168 2,146 2,196
Services 18,025 17,047 18,050 18,684 18,729 19,583 20,305
Durable
Manufacturing 18,366 17,264 16,400 16,217 16,399 16,601 16,566
Nondurable
Manufacturing 7,871 7,088 6,917 7,032 6,907 6,906 6,727
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 778 747 682 684 724 684
Construction 1,936 1,982 2,062 2,155 2,141 2,086
Trans. & Utilities 9,393 9,373 9,773 10,053 10,044 9,694
Wholesale Trade 5,099 5,107 5,161 5,220 5,038 4,945
Retail Trade 13,700 13,750 14,093 14,299 14,515 14,700
FIRE 2,331 2,363 2,424 2,443 2,481 2,529
Services 21,516 21,898 22,897 24,612 24,190 24,241
Durable
Manufacturing 17,179 17,224 16,994 17,066 16,198 15,338
Nondurable
Manufacturing 6,780 6,639 6,505 6,442 6,118 6,056123
Table 2.10: Industry Labor Input of Total Annual Hours for Females (in Millions)
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 69 84 87 83 85 112 107
Construction 219 163 175 190 218 218 225
Trans. & Utilities 2,808 2,512 2,647 2,695 2,826 2,898 2,907
Wholesale Trade 5,510 4,822 5,207 5,093 5,389 5,376 5,442
Retail Trade 8,025 7,602 8,094 8,207 8,667 8,845 8,950
FIRE 2,207 2,142 2,252 2,275 2,317 2,266 2,257
Services 23,104 22,294 22,966 23,435 24,648 25,821 26,829
Durable
Manufacturing 6,038 5,246 5,378 5,218 5,418 5,422 5,411
Nondurable
Manufacturing 4,506 4,553 4,401 4,263 4,269 4,100 3,933
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 104 100 94 100 97 96
Construction 248 257 282 303 303 296
Trans. & Utilities 3,121 3,117 3,263 3,403 3,376 3,118
Wholesale Trade 5,766 5,776 5,801 5,916 5,605 5,410
Retail Trade 9,550 9,747 9,969 10,160 10,189 10,176
FIRE 2,457 2,525 2,563 2,578 2,614 2,609
Services 28,974 29,939 31,010 32,845 32,971 32,915
Durable
Manufacturing 5,623 5,603 5,581 5,646 5,273 4,736
Nondurable
Manufacturing 3,953 3,852 3,753 3,671 3,456 3,279124
an increase in the number of hours at work of 7.08% on average. The greatest
percentage reduction for each gender are as follows: a 70.53% reduction in hours
of males in the Mining industry and a 37.42% decrease in hours of females within
Nondurable Manufacturing. The largest observed increase is within Services, with
close to a 30% increase in hours between the two years.
The index of labor quality (4lnLC) for males and females utilizing each tech-
nique is summarized in Tables 11-14. As is the case with the price index, quality
is also normalized to one in 2000. This index captures the changing composition
of the labor force, deﬁned as the ratio of the volume of the labor input to the sum
of all hours worked within each sector.
In reviewing the price index of labor for males in Tables 2.1 and 2.3, it is
apparent that the Jorgensonian and Beckerian derivation of the price of labor
results in indices with disparate interpretations. The BLS method has an index of
the price of labor, normalized to one in 2000, that ranges between 0.98 and 1.01
in every year. It is the case that the Census-proposed alternative price takes on
values that more greatly deviate over the years. In 1990, the index of the price of
labor falls between 0.80 and 1.00. By 2002, this is compressed to the range covering
0.91 and 0.95. The increased sensitivity of the changing composition of the work
force that is captured by the Beckerian method is apparent when examining these
two tables in tangent.
Tables 2.2 and 2.4 similarly demonstrate that for employed women, the price
index of labor exhibits more ﬂuctuations in the Census-proposed alternative. The
normalized price of labor using the BLS methodology ranges in 1990 from 1.00-
1.03 and in 2002 from 0.98-1.00. However, the Census alternative price index of
labor indicates a shifting from 0.90-1.37 in 1990 to 0.91-0.94 in 2002. The average125
Table 2.11: Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Index of Labor Quality for Males
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 1.0578 1.0697 1.0453 1.0400 1.0302 1.0319 1.0298
Construction 1.0323 1.0260 1.0190 1.0190 1.0161 1.0134 1.0108
Trans. & Utilities 1.0392 1.0339 1.0262 1.0277 1.0229 1.0197 1.0154
Wholesale Trade 1.0284 1.0304 1.0280 1.0286 1.0249 1.0209 1.0171
Retail Trade 1.0265 1.0298 1.0235 1.0244 1.0223 1.0197 1.0172
FIRE 1.0277 1.0218 1.0171 1.0198 1.0149 1.0083 1.0087
Services 1.0289 1.0255 1.0196 1.0193 1.0175 1.0144 1.0124
Durable
Manufacturing 1.0370 1.0309 1.0220 1.0245 1.0224 1.0226 1.0181
Nondurable
Manufacturing 1.0455 1.0350 1.0278 1.0303 1.0268 1.0254 1.0171
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 1.0243 1.0177 0.9993 1.0000 1.0032 0.9883
Construction 1.0055 1.0041 1.0026 1.0000 0.9971 0.9953
Trans. & Utilities 1.0098 1.0079 1.0028 1.0000 0.9962 0.9866
Wholesale Trade 1.0124 1.0105 1.0050 1.0000 0.9934 0.9868
Retail Trade 1.0118 1.0080 1.0041 1.0000 0.9970 0.9964
FIRE 1.0053 1.0070 1.0052 1.0000 0.9977 0.9951
Services 1.0078 1.0071 1.0048 1.0000 0.9970 0.9941
Durable
Manufacturing 1.0131 1.0105 1.0046 1.0000 0.9918 0.9800
Nondurable
Manufacturing 1.0119 1.0089 1.0043 1.0000 0.9928 0.9875126
Table 2.12: Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Index of Labor Quality for Females
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 1.1284 1.1114 1.0989 1.0882 1.0786 1.0452 1.0380
Construction 1.1161 1.0537 1.0432 1.0363 1.0230 1.0218 1.0199
Trans. & Utilities 1.0572 1.0462 1.0382 1.0339 1.0264 1.0245 1.0203
Wholesale Trade 1.0527 1.0432 1.0377 1.0326 1.0264 1.0246 1.0198
Retail Trade 1.0378 1.0363 1.0303 1.0283 1.0233 1.0217 1.0192
FIRE 1.0617 1.0591 1.0511 1.0482 1.0395 1.0320 1.0281
Services 1.0468 1.0457 1.0364 1.0339 1.0281 1.0249 1.0219
Durable
Manufacturing 1.0608 1.0489 1.0397 1.0339 1.0267 1.0265 1.0202
Nondurable
Manufacturing 1.0494 1.0429 1.0315 1.0266 1.0223 1.0219 1.0152
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mining 1.0290 1.0224 1.0089 1.0000 0.9969 0.9873
Construction 1.0112 1.0083 1.0056 1.0000 0.9999 0.9944
Trans. & Utilities 1.0118 1.0083 1.0051 1.0000 0.9962 0.9797
Wholesale Trade 1.0118 1.0086 1.0056 1.0000 0.9940 0.9830
Retail Trade 1.0123 1.0083 1.0061 1.0000 0.9980 0.9952
FIRE 1.0176 1.0139 1.0101 1.0000 0.9954 0.9842
Services 1.0137 1.0097 1.0073 1.0000 0.9968 0.9895
Durable
Manufacturing 1.0126 1.0092 1.0057 1.0000 0.9912 0.9701
Nondurable
Manufacturing 1.0078 1.0065 1.0052 1.0000 0.9941 0.9855127
Table 2.13: Census-Proposed Alternative Index of Labor Quality for Males
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 0.9164 0.9198 0.9397 0.9517 0.9637 0.9881 0.9882
Construction 0.9859 0.9829 0.9838 0.9822 0.9868 0.9919 0.9934
Trans. & Utilities 1.0466 1.0373 1.0107 1.0076 1.0035 1.0015 0.9997
Wholesale Trade 1.0591 1.0513 1.0127 1.0063 0.9997 0.9970 0.9974
Retail Trade 1.0653 1.0550 1.0121 1.0096 1.0056 1.0064 0.9978
FIRE 1.0198 1.0113 0.9944 1.0016 0.9957 0.9904 0.9897
Services 0.9768 0.9788 0.9955 0.9971 1.0002 0.9973 0.9952
Durable
Manufacturing 1.0129 1.0038 0.9943 0.9954 0.9963 0.9977 0.9954
Nondurable
Manufacturing 0.9869 0.9798 0.9870 0.9909 0.9925 0.9938 0.9926
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 ρ
Mining 0.9830 0.9877 0.9969 1.0000 0.9973 1.0059 -0.9177
Construction 0.9961 0.9975 1.0007 1.0000 0.9978 1.0048 -0.8992
Trans. & Utilities 1.0004 0.9979 0.9974 1.0000 0.9966 0.9979 0.7691
Wholesale Trade 0.9982 0.9986 1.0010 1.0000 0.9969 1.0033 0.4999
Retail Trade 0.9979 0.9858 0.9764 1.0000 0.9936 0.9870 0.7546
FIRE 0.9920 0.9970 0.9959 1.0000 0.9968 0.9990 0.6382
Services 1.0002 1.0017 1.0058 1.0000 1.0023 1.0005 -0.7719
Durable
Manufacturing 0.9985 0.9977 0.9981 1.0000 0.9959 0.9939 0.5744
Nondurable
Manufacturing 0.9953 0.9964 0.9993 1.0000 0.9980 0.9973 -0.8054128
Table 2.14: Census-Proposed Alternative Index of Labor Quality for Females
Industry 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Mining 1.1115 1.0796 1.0413 1.0357 1.0328 0.9900 0.9979
Construction 1.1287 1.0608 1.0308 1.0225 1.0087 1.0116 1.0132
Trans. & Utilities 1.0505 1.0350 1.0133 1.0081 1.0025 1.0015 1.0010
Wholesale Trade 1.0201 1.0155 0.9912 0.9903 0.9870 0.9966 0.9967
Retail Trade 1.1448 1.1246 1.0552 1.0345 1.0234 1.0290 1.0185
FIRE 1.0973 1.0852 1.0385 1.0264 1.0155 1.0117 1.0104
Services 1.0466 1.0374 1.0358 1.0299 1.0222 1.0149 1.0133
Durable
Manufacturing 0.9867 0.9747 0.9833 0.9876 0.9901 0.9916 0.9934
Nondurable
Manufacturing 0.9598 0.9495 0.9796 0.9917 0.9952 0.9912 0.9926
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 ρ
Mining 1.0011 1.0055 1.0040 1.0000 1.0060 1.0067 0.8441
Construction 1.0119 1.0041 1.0030 1.0000 0.9986 0.9992 0.9762
Trans. & Utilities 1.0011 0.9998 1.0010 1.0000 0.9991 0.9941 0.8249
Wholesale Trade 0.9956 0.9949 1.0013 1.0000 1.0041 1.0056 0.1781
Retail Trade 1.0150 1.0002 0.9971 1.0000 0.9909 0.9821 0.8706
FIRE 1.0086 1.0027 1.0043 1.0000 0.9976 0.9933 0.8281
Services 1.0125 1.0046 1.0058 1.0000 0.9949 0.9905 0.9800
Durable
Manufacturing 0.9964 0.9977 0.9982 1.0000 0.9974 0.9949 -0.7456
Nondurable
Manufacturing 1.0022 1.0011 1.0016 1.0000 0.9951 0.9996 -0.8228129
decrease in the Census-proposed index across all industries from 1990 to 2002 is
0.10, while for the BLS the average decrease in the index over that time period is
0.02.
Observed shifts in the index of labor quality, the key focus of this analysis,
can be attributed two main sources: changes in total hours and in the education,
experience, and gender composition of the work force over time. Table 2.11 illus-
trates that using the BLS method, males in 1990 in every industry have an index
of quality that ranges between 1.03 and 1.06. By 2002, this has fallen to between
0.98 and 1.00. The Census-proposed alternative measure in Table 2.13 shows the
range tightening from 0.91-1.07 to 0.99-1.01. On average, labor quality fell by
0.05 between 1990 and 2002 according to BLS techniques and by 0.01 using the
alternative method.
Likewise, for women the quality index in Table 2.12 is between 1.04 and 1.13
in 1990 and between 0.97 and 1.00 in 2002 using the BLS deﬁnitions. The Census-
proposed alternative, presented in Table 2.14, indicates these ranges are 0.96-1.14
and 0.98-1.01 in 1990 and 2002, respectively. Average labor quality across all
industries fell by 0.08 over the years in the study when employing BLS techniques
and by 0.06 when using the alternative method.
Deceptively, these ﬁndings would seem to imply that the two methods may
be similar. However, a closer inspection reveals that the industries that underlie
these ranges diﬀer. Within industry correlation of the quality index (excluding
the year 2000) reveals that the likeness is not as apparent at a detailed level
of examination. In fact, values of the index for men in Mining, Construction,
Services, and Nondurable Manufacturing are highly negatively correlated. Women
in Durable and Nondurable Manufacturing have quality indices that are negatively130
correlated across the methods, but all industries other than the aforementioned and
Wholesale Trade are have highly positively correlated indices.
While aggregate hours are a function of labor composition, the total hours
output by workers in the economy remain constant in each year. This sum is
identically input into the BLS and Census-proposed alternative formulae. Thus,
the dissimilarities observed across comparable tables are mainly the result of the
price of labor. This value is used in weighting the index of the labor inputs, which
is incorporated into the deﬁnition of the index of quality.
2.6 Conclusion
Additional research is required to fully understand the depth of the impact that
the inclusion of Beckerian prices instead of Jorgensonian prices has upon the index
of the quality of labor. The models used to derive the prices of labor capture
distinctly unique aspects of the changing composition of the labor force. While
the Jorgensonian (BLS) price indicator reﬂects returns to various characteristics,
the Beckerian (Census-proposed alternative) price captures the eﬀect of industry
of human capital for each demographic group. This latter deﬁnition allows for
more variability in the indices examined.Chapter 3
Creating a Human Capital Dataset to
Explore Productivity in the U. S.
Economy
The LEHD infrastructure ﬁles utilized in generating results for 2 require much
preparation in advance of estimating a ﬁxed eﬀects wage model from which the
human capital measures are derived. This chapter outlines the data sources and
steps taken to clean these ﬁles, correct topcoded earnings, impute missing jobs,
impute the corresponding missing wage and salary income, generate a measure of
work experience, derive annual hours for each job, account for selection into and
out of the sample, and create national weights.
3.1 Input File Data Preparation
The Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program at the U. S.
Bureau of the Census currently has data through Memorandums of Understanding
with a number of partner states that include the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Cal-
ifornia, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North
Dakota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Car-
olina, Texas, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia for
varying years of coverage. These data include state Unemployment Insurance (UI)
wage records and the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), for-
131132
mally the ES-202 ﬁles. The quarters of entry for these two data types are illustrated
by Tables 3.1 and 3.2.1
The UI wage records contain information about the quarterly wages of each
covered individual employed by a ﬁrm located in that state. These are year-quarter-
person ﬁles with a State Employer Identiﬁcation Number (SEIN) associated with
each job held. Since these records are collected for UI tax purposes, a small fraction
of establishments are not covered. In particular, wages of those who are either self-
employed, Federal workers, employed by small agricultural entities, or work for
philanthropic or religious organizations are not included. Despite this, these ﬁles
provide employment and earnings information from virtually all establishments in
each state and for every worker associated with these places of business. When
converted into a year format from a year-quarter format, the UI wage record ﬁles
becomes the Employment History File (EHF) for each state.
The ES-202 ﬁles contain employer information. They include the physical loca-
tion, total quarterly wages, detailed industry code, business ownership type, and
total employment in each month of every year for each ﬁrm. The start date of each
SEIN is also contained in this ﬁle, as are predecessor SEINs for each ﬁrm. These
enable mergers and outbreaks of businesses to be observed. Unfortunately, the
SEINs are state-speciﬁc identiﬁers that do not translate across state boundaries.
As a result, employees of national companies cannot be collectively grouped. These
1The earliest coverage date used in this study is 1990. The states of Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Washington, and Wisconsin
all have data in this period. The other states enter the data as follows: California,
North Carolina, Oregon, and Pennsylvania in 1991; Florida in 1992; Montana in
1993; Minnesota in 1994; New Mexico and Texas in 1995; Kentucky, Maine, and
New Jersey in 1996; West Virginia in 1997; Delaware, Iowa, North Dakota, South
Carolina, and Virginia in 1998; Oklahoma and Vermont in 2000; Alaska in 2001;
Alabama in 2002. All data span until 2003, with the series for the states of all but
California and North Carolina continuing into 2004.133
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year-quarter-establishment ﬁles are grouped to form the Employer Characteristics
File (ECF) for each state.
These infrastructure ﬁles require data preparation in advance of estimating
a model to derive measures of human capital. Table 3.3 outlines the ﬁnal year
ranges and summarizes some of the data work performed on the base input ﬁles.2
This table is based on the metadata for the 2004 snapshot. Although thirty-one
states are available, Arkansas has only one complete year and is dropped from
the sample. Kansas has a large amount of missing data in the ﬁrst quarter of
1990, while Colorado has a large amount of missing data in the fourth quarter of
1990. Start date for those states have been pushed back one year. ECF data is
not available for some years for ID, IN, and KY. The human capital estimation
does not require ECF variables, so all available EHF years are used. The unaltered
Employment History Files for eleven states contain topcoded values, while those of
ﬁve states are aﬀected by incomplete data quarters and require jobs and earnings
to be imputed.3 Additionally, an hours imputation is necessary so that a measure
of annual hours of work can be incorporated into our model. A Heckit selection
model corrects for movements into and out of LEHD-covered states. And, ﬁnally, a
series of national weights are generated to adjust the productivity results from our
sample of states to be representative of the entire U. S. population. The human
2This table was created based on the metadata for the 2004 snapshot. Although
31 states are available, Arkansas has only 1 complete year and is dropped from
the sample. Kansas has a large amount of missing data in 1990:1, while Colorado
has a large amount of missing data in 1990:4. Start date for those states has been
pushed back one year. ECF data is not available for some years for ID, IN, and
KY. The HC estimation does not require ECF vars and all available EHF years
will be used.
3Those states with topcoded earnings are California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Maryland, Maine, North Carolina, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vir-
ginia. Incomplete data quarters are as follows: Colorado, 1993q1; Illinois, 1992q1
and 1993q1; Kansas, 1992q4; Missouri, 1994q4; and Pennsylvania, 1996q4.138
capital model itself is estimated using the set of full-year state Unemployment
Insurance wage records outlined by Table 3.4. However, the coverage restrictions
of the ES-202 described by Table 3.5 cause the ultimate covered set of states and
years that can be weighted up to national totals for the productivity analysis to
be those in Table 3.6.4
3.1.1 Correcting Topcoded Values
Many quarters of earnings data on the Employer History File (EHF) are censored,
thus compressing the distribution by eliminating a large portion of the right tail.
In order to recover this part of the distribution, we have implemented an earnings
imputation procedure. The key insight required to understand our methodology
is that the earnings percentiles for the topcoded (or censored) data that lie at
least partially below the topcode value are suﬃcient statistics for the complete
data equivalent. In the LEHD earnings data, the number of topcoded values is
relatively small, implying that we could accurately estimate very small percentiles,
but in practice deciles are suﬃcient. Using this information, we iteratively ﬁt
the two parameters (mean and standard deviation, with starting values from the
censored data) that specify a lognormal distribution by minimizing the diﬀerence
between the target and actual earnings deciles. The result is an estimate of the
mean and standard deviation of the uncensored distribution. This is done for
every year and quarter in Table 3.7 that we identify that earnings are aﬀected by
4Due to insuﬃcient sample size in 1990, the states of Colorado and Kansas
have start dates in 1991. Three years of data are required for the Human Capital
estimation model, and as a result the state of Arkansas has been dropped from the
analysis.139
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topcoding.5
To impute earnings values, we use the estimated parameters to draw from a
lognormal over the portion of the distribution that lies above the censored value.
A random number from the uniform distribution is mapped to an earnings value
using the inverse truncated normal CDF.
Methodology
We begin by assuming earnings, w, follow a lognormal distribution deﬁned by
f(w;µ,σ) =
1
x
√
2πσ
exp

−
1
2σ2 (logw − µ)
2

.
This parametric approximation provides the necessary structure, thus reducing
the number of parameters or dimensionality of the problem. This is a reasonable
distribution to use for earnings data; the distribution is bounded by 0 and ∞, with
most of its mass near the lower bound of 0. As you can see, the lognormal also
implies that z = log(w) is normally distributed. We take advantage of this fact by
always working with earnings in logs, exponentiating when necessary to transform
the log values back into dollars.
The normal distribution is completely deﬁned by two parameters; the mean,
µ, and the standard deviation, σ. The problem thus requires estimating these two
parameters using information from the observed (censored) earnings data. Given
that the data are censored, we know if a worker has quarterly earnings above a
certain amount, but we do not know the exact earnings value. The key insight is
that we can calculate most percentiles of the uncensored distribution using only
the censored data since we know over what region the actual earnings values lie
5The states of California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, North
Carolina, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia are the only states af-
fected by earnings censoring.144
Table 3.7: States with Topcoded Values
State Year Qtr Observations Obs at Max % at Max
CA 1995 3 14,902,874 6 0.00004
CA 1995 4 14,753,273 13 0.00009
CA 1997 1 14,923,350 11 0.00007
CO 1990 1 1,697,737 109 0.00642
CO 1990 2 1,697,648 28 0.00165
CO 1990 3 1,503,148 88 0.00585
CO 1990 4 1,732,591 349 0.02014
CO 1991 1 1,664,448 567 0.03407
CO 1991 2 1,753,955 703 0.04008
CO 1991 3 1,785,803 640 0.03584
CO 1991 4 1,601,246 1,592 0.09942
CO 1992 1 1,729,840 818 0.04729
CO 1992 2 1,839,364 730 0.03969
CO 1992 3 1,883,300 762 0.04046
CO 1992 4 1,852,452 2,556 0.13798
CO 1993 1 122,765 6 0.00489
CO 1993 2 1,946,200 776 0.03987
CO 1993 3 2,008,868 785 0.03908
CO 1993 4 1,929,364 2,736 0.14181
CO 1994 1 1,860,268 822 0.04419
CO 1994 2 1,973,115 800 0.04055
CO 1994 3 1,994,976 849 0.04256
CO 1994 4 1,961,804 2,289 0.11668
CO 1995 1 1,914,041 1,012 0.05287
CO 1995 2 2,022,625 893 0.04415
CO 1995 3 2,077,960 922 0.04437
CO 1995 4 2,038,503 2,429 0.11916
CO 1996 1 2,108,300 1,072 0.05085
CO 1996 2 2,243,518 1,008 0.04493
CO 1996 3 2,292,266 1,023 0.04463
CO 1996 4 2,232,101 2,632 0.11792
CO 1997 1 2,182,916 1,438 0.06588
CO 1997 2 2,283,105 1,194 0.05230
CO 1997 3 2,304,531 1,914 0.08305
CO 1997 4 2,170,188 3,108 0.14321
CO 1998 1 2,221,992 1,722 0.07750
CO 1998 2 2,344,978 1,283 0.05471
CO 1998 3 2,389,243 1,367 0.05721
CO 1998 4 2,281,911 3,582 0.15697
CO 1999 1 2,298,081 1,771 0.07706145
Table 3.7 (Continued)
State Year Qtr Observations Obs at Max % at Max
CO 1999 3 2,487,516 1,469 0.05905
CO 1999 4 2,434,380 3,753 0.15417
CO 2000 1 2,429,801 1,760 0.07243
CO 2000 2 2,567,912 1,442 0.05615
CO 2000 3 2,600,374 1,539 0.05918
CO 2000 4 2,457,220 3,343 0.13605
CO 2001 1 2,486,997 1,558 0.06265
CO 2001 2 2,601,993 1,404 0.05396
CO 2001 3 2,578,463 1,349 0.05232
CO 2001 4 2,400,287 3,038 0.12657
CO 2002 1 2,343,253 1,242 0.05300
CO 2002 2 2,417,552 1,176 0.04864
CO 2002 3 2,439,932 1,009 0.04135
CO 2002 4 2,355,963 2,565 0.10887
CO 2003 1 2,234,199 1,043 0.04668
CO 2003 2 2,317,698 945 0.04077
CO 2003 3 2,399,266 1,047 0.04364
CO 2003 4 2,354,733 2,370 0.10065
FL 1992 4 6,445,800 13,068 0.20274
FL 1993 1 6,455,516 3,602 0.05580
FL 1993 2 6,614,831 5,084 0.07686
FL 1993 3 6,608,275 4,935 0.07468
FL 1993 4 6,689,914 12,903 0.19287
FL 1994 1 6,761,016 4,497 0.06651
FL 1994 2 6,926,588 4,868 0.07028
FL 1994 3 6,870,112 5,191 0.07556
FL 1994 4 6,977,509 12,011 0.17214
FL 1995 1 6,957,884 5,645 0.08113
FL 1995 2 7,094,176 5,721 0.08064
FL 1995 3 6,933,243 5,832 0.08412
FL 1995 4 7,051,898 12,896 0.18287
FL 1996 1 7,054,409 6,634 0.09404
FL 1996 2 7,343,859 6,408 0.08726
FL 1996 3 7,243,696 6,426 0.08871
FL 1996 4 7,355,967 14,168 0.19261
FL 1997 1 7,185,339 7,555 0.10514
FL 1997 2 6,249,492 5,754 0.09207
FL 1997 3 7,055,511 28 0.00040
FL 1997 4 7,609,541 25 0.00033
FL 1998 1 7,473,461 26 0.00035
FL 1998 2 7,575,275 13 0.00017146
Table 3.7 (Continued)
State Year Qtr Observations Obs at Max % at Max
FL 1998 3 7,629,252 8 0.00010
FL 1998 4 7,750,292 15 0.00019
FL 1999 1 7,802,605 15 0.00019
FL 1999 2 7,882,227 9 0.00011
FL 1999 3 7,668,492 17 0.00022
FL 1999 4 7,910,495 12 0.00015
FL 2000 1 7,611,207 15 0.00020
FL 2000 2 7,488,100 22 0.00029
FL 2000 3 7,672,229 13 0.00017
FL 2000 4 8,093,165 16 0.00020
FL 2001 1 8,007,734 21 0.00026
FL 2001 2 8,113,807 21 0.00026
FL 2001 3 8,014,294 17 0.00021
FL 2001 4 7,928,372 17 0.00021
FL 2002 1 7,919,644 16 0.00020
FL 2002 2 7,724,490 23 0.00030
FL 2002 3 8,163,081 20 0.00025
FL 2002 4 8,207,121 18 0.00022
FL 2003 1 7,980,684 14 0.00018
FL 2003 2 7,890,302 19 0.00024
FL 2003 3 7,916,383 25 0.00032
FL 2003 4 7,948,654 17 0.00021
ID 1990 1 422,092 131 0.03104
ID 1990 2 474,230 136 0.02868
ID 1990 3 499,915 144 0.02880
ID 1990 4 467,799 441 0.09427
ID 1991 1 435,232 110 0.02527
ID 1991 2 484,692 161 0.03322
ID 1991 3 513,588 175 0.03407
ID 1991 4 482,069 418 0.08671
ID 1992 1 453,550 178 0.03925
ID 1992 2 515,986 186 0.03605
ID 1992 3 539,819 209 0.03872
ID 1992 4 505,574 553 0.10938
ID 1993 1 469,002 139 0.02964
ID 1993 2 535,127 203 0.03793
ID 1993 3 568,782 215 0.03780
ID 1993 4 540,114 572 0.10590
ID 1994 1 504,541 194 0.03845
ID 1994 2 570,318 259 0.04541
ID 1994 3 601,923 238 0.03954147
Table 3.7 (Continued)
State Year Qtr Observations Obs at Max % at Max
ID 1994 4 569,304 570 0.10012
ME 1998 4 663,667 2 0.00030
ME 1999 1 616,183 5 0.00081
ME 1999 2 684,806 9 0.00131
ME 1999 3 709,652 19 0.00268
ME 1999 4 683,237 7 0.00102
ME 2002 1 640,800 5 0.00078
ME 2002 3 717,702 5 0.00070
ME 2003 1 637,838 2 0.00031
ME 2003 2 693,564 6 0.00087
ME 2003 4 685,978 10 0.00146
MD 1985 2 2,029,675 52 0.00256
MD 1986 3 2,088,383 53 0.00254
MD 1986 4 2,081,431 6 0.00029
MD 1987 1 2,073,054 9 0.00043
MD 1987 2 2,190,971 4 0.00018
MD 1987 3 2,248,068 7 0.00031
MD 1987 4 2,186,220 12 0.00055
MD 1988 1 2,162,669 21 0.00097
MD 1988 2 2,269,048 29 0.00128
MD 1988 3 2,318,492 16 0.00069
MD 1988 4 2,239,553 18 0.00080
MD 1989 1 2,204,268 11 0.00050
MD 1989 2 2,326,443 8 0.00034
MD 1989 3 2,338,861 12 0.00051
MD 1989 4 2,279,650 43 0.00189
MD 1990 1 2,205,918 2 0.00009
MD 1990 2 2,311,521 15 0.00065
MD 1990 3 2,249,084 15 0.00067
MD 1990 4 2,212,895 69 0.00312
MD 1991 1 2,132,826 18 0.00084
MD 1991 2 2,214,753 11 0.00050
MD 1991 3 2,071,069 33 0.00159
MD 1991 4 2,022,731 25 0.00124
MD 1992 1 1,967,574 3 0.00015
MD 1992 2 2,035,540 29 0.00142
MD 1992 3 2,081,827 8 0.00038
MD 1992 4 1,979,059 6 0.00030
MD 1993 1 1,991,214 10 0.00050
MD 1993 2 2,109,027 7 0.00033
MD 1993 3 2,115,675 13 0.00061148
Table 3.7 (Continued)
State Year Qtr Observations Obs at Max % at Max
MD 1993 4 2,053,960 21 0.00102
MD 1994 1 2,023,526 6 0.00030
MD 1994 2 2,167,135 12 0.00055
MD 1994 3 2,192,939 22 0.00100
MD 1994 4 2,154,485 36 0.00167
MD 1995 1 2,150,044 46 0.00214
MD 1995 2 2,407,690 99 0.00411
MD 1995 3 2,401,372 39 0.00162
MD 1995 4 2,316,521 132 0.00570
MD 1996 1 2,288,810 53 0.00232
MD 1996 2 2,369,004 57 0.00241
MD 1996 3 2,405,932 58 0.00241
MD 1996 4 2,362,822 212 0.00897
MD 1997 1 2,242,758 365 0.01627
MD 1997 2 2,389,993 318 0.01331
MD 1997 3 2,438,340 292 0.01198
MD 1997 4 2,383,146 1,136 0.04767
MD 1998 1 2,282,330 4,851 0.21255
MD 1998 2 2,421,437 4,620 0.19080
MD 1998 3 2,374,003 4,612 0.19427
MD 1998 4 2,320,932 13,089 0.56395
MD 1999 1 2,325,360 7,843 0.33728
MD 1999 2 2,488,287 5,921 0.23795
MD 1999 3 2,535,928 4,812 0.18975
MD 1999 4 2,516,198 8,037 0.31941
MD 2000 1 2,438,060 5,353 0.21956
MD 2000 2 2,633,688 7,472 0.28371
MD 2000 3 2,653,094 5,864 0.22102
MD 2000 4 2,564,590 5,073 0.19781
MD 2001 1 2,531,321 657 0.02595
MD 2001 2 2,655,959 427 0.01608
MD 2001 3 2,689,539 422 0.01569
MD 2001 4 2,646,346 797 0.03012
MD 2002 1 2,545,726 291 0.01143
MD 2002 2 2,645,036 280 0.01059
MD 2002 3 2,666,259 161 0.00604
MD 2002 4 2,620,963 402 0.01534
MN 1998 4 2,905,130 2 0.00007
MN 1999 1 2,799,898 2 0.00007
NJ 1996 2 3,408,551 6 0.00018
NJ 1996 3 3,533,704 17 0.00048149
Table 3.7 (Continued)
State Year Qtr Observations Obs at Max % at Max
NJ 1996 4 3,485,088 40 0.00115
NJ 1997 2 3,676,737 8 0.00022
NJ 1997 3 3,813,508 13 0.00034
NJ 1997 4 3,770,354 18 0.00048
NJ 1998 1 3,725,179 19 0.00051
NJ 1998 2 3,924,851 3 0.00008
NJ 1998 3 3,895,927 15 0.00039
NJ 1998 4 3,939,352 19 0.00048
NJ 1999 1 3,817,393 24 0.00063
NJ 1999 2 4,126,251 38 0.00092
NJ 1999 3 4,258,023 50 0.00117
NJ 1999 4 4,279,123 32 0.00075
NJ 2000 1 4,215,038 59 0.00140
NJ 2000 2 4,350,474 42 0.00097
NJ 2000 3 4,571,503 23 0.00050
NJ 2000 4 4,414,847 37 0.00084
NJ 2001 1 4,350,784 77 0.00177
NJ 2001 2 4,496,840 37 0.00082
NJ 2001 3 4,587,512 25 0.00054
NJ 2001 4 4,452,433 16 0.00036
NJ 2002 1 4,302,218 25 0.00058
NJ 2002 2 4,408,494 29 0.00066
NJ 2002 3 4,482,630 4 0.00009
NJ 2002 4 4,335,786 10 0.00023
NJ 2003 1 4,099,189 5 0.00012
NJ 2003 2 4,276,168 16 0.00037
NJ 2003 3 4,340,601 14 0.00032
NJ 2003 4 4,235,165 7 0.00017
NC 1993 2 3,753,838 2 0.00005
NC 1993 3 3,861,357 2 0.00005
NC 1993 4 3,803,159 9 0.00024
NC 1994 1 3,719,746 10 0.00027
NC 1994 2 3,934,959 2 0.00005
NC 1994 4 3,931,309 3 0.00008
NC 1995 1 3,895,991 13 0.00033
NC 1995 4 4,092,612 3 0.00007
NC 1996 1 4,024,774 21 0.00052
NC 1996 2 4,244,277 2 0.00005
NC 1996 3 4,325,022 2 0.00005
NC 1996 4 4,210,213 5 0.00012
NC 1997 3 4,399,468 2 0.00005150
Table 3.7 (Continued)
State Year Qtr Observations Obs at Max % at Max
NC 1997 4 4,292,481 4 0.00009
NC 1998 2 4,456,221 5 0.00011
NC 1998 3 4,532,574 6 0.00013
NC 1998 4 4,422,544 6 0.00014
OR 1991 1 1,377,440 365 0.02650
OR 1991 3 1,525,970 391 0.02562
OR 1991 4 1,463,339 1,060 0.07244
OR 1992 1 1,382,933 520 0.03760
OR 1992 3 1,550,069 501 0.03232
OR 1993 1 1,417,711 397 0.02800
PA 1991 1 5,446,084 2,902 0.05329
PA 1991 2 5,619,095 3,030 0.05392
PA 1991 3 5,683,874 3,133 0.05512
PA 1991 4 5,559,918 7,949 0.14297
PA 1992 1 5,299,256 3,520 0.06642
PA 1992 2 5,589,013 3,524 0.06305
PA 1992 3 5,669,907 3,339 0.05889
PA 1992 4 5,585,882 10,112 0.18103
PA 1993 1 5,400,634 3,031 0.05612
PA 1993 2 5,675,938 3,462 0.06099
PA 1993 3 5,762,185 3,470 0.06022
PA 1993 4 5,706,876 9,859 0.17276
PA 1994 1 5,485,325 3,624 0.06607
PA 1994 2 5,805,650 3,534 0.06087
PA 1994 3 5,937,042 3,758 0.06330
PA 1994 4 5,848,279 9,519 0.16277
PA 1995 1 5,677,146 5,186 0.09135
PA 1995 2 5,897,346 4,425 0.07503
PA 1995 3 5,981,442 4,433 0.07411
PA 1995 4 5,878,869 10,513 0.17883
PA 1996 1 5,698,864 6,187 0.10857
PA 1996 2 5,980,121 4,960 0.08294
PA 1996 3 6,086,416 4,942 0.08120
PA 1996 4 59,763 112 0.18741
PA 1997 1 5,809,720 7,140 0.12290
PA 1997 2 6,071,395 5,486 0.09036
PA 1997 3 6,176,380 5,859 0.09486
PA 1997 4 6,103,568 13,535 0.22176
PA 1998 1 5,915,166 8,723 0.14747
PA 1998 2 6,203,775 6,858 0.11055
PA 1998 3 6,294,653 6,473 0.10283151
Table 3.7 (Continued)
State Year Qtr Observations Obs at Max % at Max
PA 1998 4 6,228,705 14,238 0.22859
PA 1999 1 5,996,041 9,693 0.16166
PA 1999 2 6,269,040 7,270 0.11597
PA 1999 3 6,350,377 7,355 0.11582
PA 1999 4 6,296,317 15,228 0.24186
PA 2000 1 6,125,450 11,334 0.18503
PA 2000 2 6,403,770 7,637 0.11926
PA 2000 3 6,473,644 7,890 0.12188
PA 2000 4 6,392,503 15,997 0.25025
PA 2001 1 6,125,999 12,746 0.20806
PA 2001 2 6,333,084 7,695 0.12150
PA 2001 3 6,313,914 7,648 0.12113
PA 2001 4 5,986,374 15,358 0.25655
PA 2002 1 6,034,055 12,282 0.20354
PA 2002 2 6,228,564 10,052 0.16139
PA 2002 3 6,349,458 7,455 0.11741
PA 2002 4 6,163,346 15,234 0.24717
PA 2003 1 5,812,014 12,672 0.21803
VA 1998 1 2,605,548 113 0.00434
VA 1998 2 3,055,041 101 0.00331
VA 1998 3 3,709,772 108 0.00291
VA 1998 4 3,646,341 239 0.00655
VA 1999 1 3,529,733 279 0.00790
VA 1999 2 3,733,353 338 0.00905
VA 2001 3 3,876,447 105 0.00271
VA 2001 4 3,733,773 229 0.00613
VA 2003 2 3,655,831 109 0.00298
VA 2003 4 3,642,362 195 0.00535152
and if the bin is wide enough we can assign them to the correct percentile. Using
these percentiles, the mean and standard deviation can then be estimated.
We use an iterative algorithm that minimizes the squared sum of the diﬀerences
between the mass in the actual deciles (0.1) and the amount predicted for a given
mean and standard deviation. Let g(z;µ,σ) represent the normal density approx-
imation of the distribution of log earnings. Then the CDF can be represented
as
G(x) =
Z x
0
g(z)dz,
where x represents a value on the support of z. We then calculate the decile
boundaries q∗
k using the censored data implicitly deﬁned by
G(q
∗
k) =
Z q∗
k
0
g(z)dz = k · 0.1
for k = 0,1,..,10. For k = 1,2,..,10 the estimated mass in each decile for a given
µ and σ is
Γ(k;µ,σ) = G(q
∗
k;µ,σ) − G(q
∗
k−1;µ,σ)
Holding the q∗
k constant, we search for the mean and standard deviation such that
each Γ(k;µ,σ) is as close as possible to 0.1.
The resulting mean b µ and standard deviation b σ are used in the ﬁnal stage to
impute an earnings value, b z, which is our ultimate goal. The truncated density
function t(z) for the normal distribution is (with zc equal to the censored earnings
value):
t(z) =
g(z|z > zc)
1 − G(zc)
,
which can be used to calculate the CDF as well
T(z) =
G(z) − G(zc)
1 − G(zc)
. (3.1)153
Equation (3.1) provides the crucial link between the truncated CDF and the CDF
for the complete earnings distribution. To get an imputed earnings value, we draw
a number between 0 and 1 using the uniform distribution. Conceptually, this
number represents a value of T(z), but we really need a value for G(z). Using
some simple algebra, we get equation ( 3.2), that maps the T(b z) draw into the
appropriate region of G(z), the uncensored earnings distribution given by
G(b z) = G(zc) + (1 − G(zc))T(b z). (3.2)
The ﬁnal step is to use the inverse CDF for the normal distribution to translate
the G(b z) value into an earnings value. Since this process is performed in logs, the
imputed earnings value is:
earn = exp(G
−1(G(b z)).
In practice, only the standard normal inverse CDF is available in SAS. The fol-
lowing equation is used to transform the standard normal values returned by the
probit function into the appropriate values for the mean b µ and standard deviation
b σ of G(z) using
G
−1 = b µ + probit(G(z))σ.
It is possible as well to get a few unreasonably large draws, so we impose a new
topcode value. Thus, what we actually do is create a uniform topcode for all of
the censored data.
One characteristic of the complete data is the very strong persistence in earnings
for a given worker, thus it is not reasonable to assume all draws are independent.
In an attempt to replicate this characteristic, we take a relatively conservative
approach of assuming earnings are correlated over time for a person working at
the same ﬁrm. For these records the draw is kept the same, but the estimated154
mean and standard deviation of earnings varies over time, thus placing them in
the same relative point on the distribution each period.
3.1.2 Imputing Missing Jobs
By examining Quality Assurance records of the Quarterly Workforce Indicators
produced by the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program at the U.S.
Census Bureau, it is straightforward to determine which states have holes in their
Unemployment Insurance wage records. When more than 10% of the ﬁrms in a
quarter are deemed to either have been born or have died, a hole is apparent in the
data. Table 3.8 shows these rates for the states with incomplete data quarters.6
Figure 3.1.2 illuminates the missing data problem by conditioning on same-SEIN
employment in bordering quarters, while Table 3.9 breaks down the frequency of
3-quarter work patterns in the missing data quarter and two comparable complete
quarters for each targeted state. States with incomplete data quarters require that
we impute jobs and also the corresponding value of earnings in these missing data
quarters. Jobs are imputed based on 3-quarter work patterns, a model which is
deﬁned below.
Basic Model
Basic probabilities are given by
π(et−1,et,et+1,mt) = Pr[(et−1,et,et+1), mt]
6Colorado, 1993q1; Illinois, 1992q1 and 1993q1; Kansas, 1992q4; Missouri,
1994q4; and Pennsylvania, 1996q4. Note that in the table, % Deaths (t-1) is
the percent of ﬁrm deaths in previous quarter; % Births (t+1) is the percent of
ﬁrm births in following quarter.155
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Table 3.8: States with Quarters of Missing Data
State Year Qtr % Deaths (t-1) % Births (t+1)
CO 1993 1 66 67
IL 1992 1 10 13
IL 1993 1 13 10
KS 1992 4 25 29
MO 1994 4 54 55
PA 1996 4 85 86
where (et−1,et,et+1) is the temporally-ordered sequence of employment status for
periods t − 1, t, and t + 1 with
(et−1,et,et+1) ∈ {(0,0,0),...,(1,1,1))}
and mt = 1 indicates missing status for et (period t). Missing at random (Rubin
1987) assuming et−1,et+1 never missing gives:
π (et,mt = 1|et−1,et+1) = π(et|et−1,et+1,mt = 1)π(mt = 1|et−1,et+1)
= π(mt = 1|et−1,et,et+1)π(et|et−1,et+1)
= π(mt = 1|et−1,et+1)π(et|et−1,et+1)
where the third line imposes MAR. Hence,
π (et|et−1,et+1,mt = 1) =
π(mt = 1|et−1,et+1)π(et|et−1,et+1)
π(mt = 1|et−1,et+1)
= π(et|et−1,et+1)
which is correctly estimated by the conditional probability in the complete-data
sample assuming that the complete-data sample is drawn from the same population
as the missing-data sample. Data not missing at random implies
π (et,mt = 1|et−1,et+1) = π(mt = 1|et−1,et,et+1)π(et|et−1,et+1)157
Table 3.9: Percentages of 3-quarter Work Patterns
Colorado: Missing Data in 1993q1
3-Quarter Work Pattern 1993q1 1992q1 1994q1
000 89.9206 88.6731 87.6826
001 2.6208 1.8375 2.0503
010 0.0453 0.6562 0.7301
011 0.1042 1.0903 1.4912
100 2.2928 1.7740 1.7671
101 4.6813 0.1602 0.1769
110 0.0597 0.9136 0.9633
111 0.2754 4.8952 5.1384
Illinois: Missing Data in 1992q1
3-Quarter Work Pattern 1992q1 1991q1 1994q1
000 86.7078 84.7153 84.5782
001 1.7486 1.9595 1.9742
010 0.5087 0.6091 0.5722
011 1.2503 1.2579 1.2410
100 1.6967 1.9863 1.9900
101 1.0608 0.2117 0.2157
110 0.9342 1.0824 1.0931
111 6.0929 8.1778 8.3357
Illinois: Missing Data in 1993q1
3-Quarter Work Pattern 1993q1 1994q1 1995q1
000 86.3884 84.5782 84.2568
001 1.9650 1.9742 2.0257
010 0.4683 0.5722 0.5796
011 1.0217 1.2410 1.3196
100 1.7887 1.9900 2.0674
101 1.4388 0.2157 0.2214
110 0.8305 1.0931 1.0799
111 6.0984 8.3357 8.4496158
Table 3.9 (Continued)
Kansas: Missing Data in 1992q4
3-Quarter Work Pattern 1992q4 1991q4 1993q4
000 87.7159 86.2121 85.7310
001 1.8077 1.7040 1.8088
010 0.4624 0.8745 0.9364
011 0.6000 1.1965 1.2208
100 2.1926 2.0834 2.1972
101 2.1435 0.1898 0.2022
110 0.7197 1.1729 1.2314
111 4.3583 6.5667 6.6722
Missouri: Missing Data in 1994q4
3-Quarter Work Pattern 1994q4 1993q4 1994q4
000 86.1844 85.1864 87.4439
001 2.1776 1.7814 1.3220
010 0.4486 0.8876 0.6630
011 0.6547 1.1802 0.9142
100 2.6216 2.1258 1.6898
101 2.2406 0.1388 0.1042
110 0.6778 1.3323 1.0678
111 4.9948 7.3675 6.7951
Pennsylvania: Missing Data in 1996q4
3-Quarter Work Pattern 1996q4 1995q4 1997q4
000 83.7589 82.2231 83.5052
001 3.0910 1.8645 1.6650
010 0.0085 0.9210 0.7859
011 0.0130 1.4144 1.2460
100 3.6562 2.2592 2.0590
101 9.3651 0.2293 0.1781
110 0.0146 1.6345 1.3714
111 0.0928 9.4540 9.1895159
and
π (et|et−1,et+1,mt) =
π (et−1,et,et+1,mt)
π (et−1,et+1,mt)
=
π(mt|et−1,et,et+1)π(et−1,et,et+1)
π (et−1,et+1,mt)
=
π(mt|et−1,et,et+1)
π (mt|et−1,et+1)
π (et−1,et,et+1)
π (et−1,et+1)
If (et−1,et,et+1) are observed for all cases in {(0,0,0),...,(1,1,1)} in the complete-
data sample, then we can estimate π (et−1,et,et+1) from that sample. The issue is
how to estimate the ratio
δ (mt|et−1,et,et+1) =
π(mt|et−1,et,et+1)
π (mt|et−1,et+1)
,
which measures the deviation of the missing-data sample from missing at random.
If all δ (mt|et−1,et,et+1) = 1, then missing at random holds for all cells of the
missing-data sample. Otherwise, by combining the complete-data and missing-
data samples, we can estimate some of the δ (mt|et−1,et,et+1).
Likelihood Function
For the complete-data sample
£ ∝
Y
et−1
Y
et
Y
et+1
π(et−1,et,et+1)
n(et−1,et,et+1),160
where n(et−1,et,et+1) are the cell counts in the complete data. For the missing-
data sample the conditional likelihood for the pair (et,mt) is
£ ∝
Y
et−1
Y
et+1
[π (et = 1|et−1,et+1,mt = 0)π (mt = 0|et−1,et+1)]
c(et−1,1,et+1,0)
[π (et = 0|et−1,et+1,mt = 0)π (mt = 0|et−1,et+1)]
c(et−1,0,et+1,0)
[(π (et = 0|et−1,et+1,mt = 1) + π (et = 1|et−1,et+1,mt = 1)) ×
π (mt = 1|et−1,et+1)]
c(et−1,0,et+1,1)
∝
Y
et−1
Y
et+1



π(mt=0|et−1,et=1,et+1)
π(mt=0|et−1,et+1)
π(et−1,et=1,et+1)
π(et−1,et+1) ×
π (mt = 0|et−1,et+1)



c(et−1,1,et+1,0)



π(mt=0|et−1,et=0,et+1)
π(mt=0|et−1,et+1)
π(et−1,et=0,et+1)
π(et−1,et+1) ×
π (mt = 0|et−1,et+1)



c(et−1,0,et+1,0)

 
 
h
π(mt=1|et−1,et=0,et+1)
π(mt=1|et−1,et+1)
π(et−1,et=0,et+1)
π(et−1,et+1) +
π(mt=1|et−1,et=1,et+1)
π(mt=1|et−1,et+1)
π(et−1,et=1,et+1)
π(et−1,et+1)
i
× π (mt = 1|et−1,et+1)

 
 
c(et−1,0,et+1,1)
∝
Y
et−1
Y
et+1



δ(mt = 0|et−1,et = 1,et+1)
π(et−1,et=1,et+1)
π(et−1,et+1) ×
π (mt = 0|et−1,et+1)



c(et−1,1,et+1,0)



δ(mt = 0|et−1,et = 0,et+1)
π(et−1,et=0,et+1)
π(et−1,et+1) ×
π (mt = 0|et−1,et+1)



c(et−1,0,et+1,0)

    
    
h
δ(mt = 1|et−1,et = 0,et+1)
π(et−1,et=0,et+1)
π(et−1,et+1) +
δ(mt = 1|et−1,et = 1,et+1)
π(et−1,et=1,et+1)
π(et−1,et+1)
i
×
π (mt = 1|et−1,et+1)

    
    
c(et−1,0,et+1,1)
where c(et−1,et,et+1,mt) are the incomplete counts in the missing-data sample.
Combining the two likelihood functions shows that there are three free parame-
ters in the missing-data likelihood function but only enough information to es-
timate two. Assuming MAR constrains all three parameters. Assuming δ(mt161
|et−1,et,et+1) = 1 for one base group permits estimation of the other δs since they
are constrained such that
π (et = 0|et−1,et+1,mt) + π (et = 1|et−1,et+1,mt) = 1
for mt = 0,1.
Bayesian Estimation
We use a Dirichlet prior on π (et−1,et,et+1,mt) , called α(et−1,et,et+1,mt). We
estimate the posterior distribution
π (et−1,et,et+1,mt|α(et−1,et,et+1,mt))
and sample from α(et−1,et,et+1,mt), inserting this value into
π (et−1,et,et+1,mt|α(et−1,et,et+1,mt)).
Next, we compute
π(et|et−1,et+1,mt = 1|α(et−1,et,et+1,mt))
and impute missing employment state et with this probability.
Simpler Likelihood
We implement a simpler likelihood function using the notation
π = Pr[et = 1|et−1,et+1]
and
ξ = Pr[mt = 0|et = 1,et−1,et+1].
The incomplete sample consists of selecting a PIK-SEIN pair for the quarter t from
the ones with the correct conﬁguration of (et−1,et+1). Then, the latent employment162
state is realized. If et = 1, then the record is retained with probability ξ. If the
latent employment state is et = 0, it is never retained. In the complete data sample,
every PIK-SEIN pair for quarter t has its employment state correctly recorded as
either 0 or 1.
Counts are deﬁned by
c = count of et = 1 in complete data, given (et−1,et+1)
n = count of PIK-SEINs in completed data, given (et−1,et+1)
x = count of et = 1 in incompleted data, given (et−1,et+1)
r = count of PIK-SEINs in incompleted data, given (et−1,et+1)
and the likelihood function is
ln£ = const + xln(πξ) + (r − x)ln(1 − πξ) + cln(π) + (n − c)ln(π).
Hence, the maximum likelihood estimators are
ˆ π =
c
n
and
ˆ ξ =
x/r
c/n
,
with ﬁrst order conditions
x
ξ
=
π (r − x)
1 − πξ
and
(x + c)
π
=
ξ (r − x)
1 − πξ
+
(n − c)
1 − π
.
So the probability required for imputing the missing employment state data is
Pr[et = 1|mt = 1] =
π (1 − ξ)
π (1 − ξ) + (1 − π)163
Because of the structure of the problem, the natural conjugate prior for pro-
portions (Dirichlet) does not work here exactly. Instead, we use the Dirichlet prior
on π and ξ. Since the complete data sample contains all the information about
the parameter π, we use the prior D(α0,α1) for (1 − π) and π, respectively, so
that π ∼ D(n − c + α0,c + α1). We draw π from this posterior using equal, small
values for α0, α1. Next, we sample from the asymptotic approximation to the
posterior of ξ, namely, ξ ∼ N

ˆ ξ,
ˆ ξ(1−ˆ ξ)
r

. Given the two draws, we evaluate
Pr[et = 1|mt = 1] once for each (et−1,et+1) group, then for every PIK-SEIN match
with et 6= 1 (the incompletely observed cases) we assign a random uniform number.
A missing data implicate is generated if the random uniform number assigned to
the PIK-SEIN match is less than the probability p = Pr[et = 1|mt = 1] for that
(et−1 ,et+1) group.
3.1.3 Imputing Missing Earnings
The corresponding values of earnings for those with imputed jobs are determined
using the method of Sequential Regression Multiple Imputation (SRMI) based on
a Kernel Density Estimator (KDE) developed by Woodcock and Benedetto (2006).
Two quarters of complete data are appended to the incomplete data quarter for
the purpose of training the model.7 Initially, a Bayesian bootstrapping method is
used to ﬁll missing earnings with values from a set of candidates within speciﬁed
by-groups. These by-groups (By) and their covariates (X) for the second stage
7All states except Illinois append 3-quarter windows from one year ahead and
one year behind the missing data quarter. Illinois has two 7-quarter windows
appended from two and three years ahead of 1993q1 to patch the two holes that
are one year apart.164
imputation are deﬁned as follows:
Groups: G1 G1 G2 G2 G3 G3 G4 G4
Type: By X By X By X By X
nojob 1t 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
nojob t1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
male 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
sic division 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
agecat 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
decile 1t 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
nonwhite 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
decile t1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
earn 1t 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
earn t1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
pikavg 1t 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
indpik 1t 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
seinavg 1t 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
indsein 1t 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
pikavg t1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
indpik t1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
seinavg t1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
indsein t1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1165
Variables that are used in this method are described below.
nojob 1t - 1 if no job was held (previous quarter), 0 otherwise
nojob t1 - 1 if no job is held (subsequent quarter), 0 otherwise
male - 1 if male, 0 if female
sic division - categorical variable for SIC division
agecat - categorical age variable
decile 1t - categorical decile variable (previous quarter)
nonwhite - 1 if nonwhite, 0 if white
decile t1 - categorical decile variable (subsequent quarter)
earn 1t - logarithm of earnings (previous quarter)
earn t1 - logarithm of earnings (subsequent quarter)
pikavg 1t - PIK average earnings across all jobs (previous quarter)
indpik 1t - 1 if pikavg 1t is 0, 0 otherwise
seinavg 1t - SEIN average earnings across all people (previous quarter)
indsein 1t - 1 if seinavg 1t is 0, 0 otherwise
pikavg t1 - PIK average earnings across all jobs (subsequent quarter)
indpik t1 - 1 if pikavg t1 is 0, 0 otherwise
seinavg t1 - SEIN average earnings across all people (subsequent quarter)
indsein t1 - 1 if seinavg t1 is 0, 0 otherwise
Earnings deciles are deﬁned by quarter for the two quarters surrounding the
missing data (decile) and 3-quarter work patterns are accounted for (nojob). The
speciﬁed age categories (agecat) are 0-16, 17-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64,
and 65+ years, because the graph of the age of employed individuals in the Cur-
rent Population Survey in Figure 3.1.3 lends itself to these bins. The following
SIC Divisions (sic division) are deﬁned: Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Man-166
ufacturing, Transportation and Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, FIRE,
Services, Public Administration, and Other. Average earnings across all jobs for
each person ( pikavg) and SEIN (seinavg) are included for the bordering quarters,
as is an indicator when these values are zero (indpik and indsein). All categorical
covariates become indicator variables in the second stage imputation. Cells with
fewer than 100 records are passed into the next grouping.
3.1.4 Improved Files and the Data Snapshot
Tables 3.10- 3.14 illustrate the eﬀectiveness of the quarterly job imputation by over-
all employment rates, while Tables 3.15- 3.19 do the same for the wage imputation.
A closer examination of the earnings imputation by deciles of the distribution are
outlined in Tables 3.20- 3.24 for the completed data, the input data, and the com-
bined data in the overall sample and by 3-quarter work patterns. Earnings statis-
tics in this last set of tables are for all data in the quarter together (ernQQ), for the
originally complete data (ernQQ c), for the completed but originally missing data
(ernQQ i). They are also broken down by 3-quarter work patterns using these cat-
egories: Work-MissingWork-Work (WMW), Work-MissingWork-NoWork (WMN),
NoWork-MissingWork-Work (NMW), and NoWork-MissingWork-NoWork (NMN).
The resulting improved EHFs are entered into the production development
environment so that the complete family of EHFs and ECFs can be constructed
for these states. The improved sets of EHFs and ECFs are integrated into the
data snapshot so that the ﬁles used for this project will remain stable during the
course of this research while the production environment continues to be regularly
updated.167
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Table 3.10: Colorado Employment Counts
Year Qtr B Old B BLS emp-month1 ES202 emp-month1
1990 1 - - 1,201,304 1,201,239
1990 2 1,157,897 1,157,897 1,216,552 1,216,408
1990 3 1,125,350 1,125,350 1,257,849 1,257,852
1990 4 638,003 638,003 1,244,986 1,244,986
1991 1 1,312,463 1,312,463 1,229,041 1,229,060
1991 2 1,343,206 1,343,206 1,235,403 1,235,007
1991 3 1,374,379 1,374,379 1,271,347 1,270,691
1991 4 1,261,220 1,261,220 1,260,622 1,260,644
1992 1 1,257,164 1,257,164 1,253,733 1,253,733
1992 2 1,410,868 1,410,868 1,276,101 1,276,101
1992 3 1,452,261 1,452,261 1,325,614 1,324,062
1992 4 1,438,682 1,438,682 1,317,370 1,317,370
1993 1 84,882 1,421,195 1,311,904 1,311,640
1993 2 96,153 1,496,831 1,344,589 1,344,589
1993 3 1,525,766 1,525,766 1,393,134 1,393,228
1993 4 1,489,845 1,489,845 1,387,399 1,387,399
1994 1 1,453,967 1,453,967 1,388,976 1,388,977
1994 2 1,485,353 1,485,353 1,420,380 1,420,380
1994 3 1,506,524 1,506,524 1,475,458 1,475,458
1994 4 1,474,157 1,474,157 1,467,445 1,467,540
1995 1 1,471,428 1,471,428 1,467,372 1,467,372
1995 2 1,516,192 1,516,192 1,491,306 1,491,306
1995 3 1,554,323 1,554,323 1,540,903 1,540,903
1995 4 1,546,770 1,546,770 1,532,673 1,532,506
1996 1 1,545,614 1,545,614 1,525,744 1,525,744
1996 2 1,679,342 1,679,342 1,552,937 1,552,937
1996 3 1,729,485 1,729,485 1,604,562 1,604,562
1996 4 1,711,476 1,711,476 1,592,111 1,592,111
1997 1 1,659,476 1,659,476 1,590,279 1,590,279
1997 2 1,679,075 1,679,075 1,624,808 1,624,829
1997 3 1,659,233 1,659,233 1,682,028 1,682,816
1997 4 1,584,054 1,584,054 1,674,335 1,674,239
1998 1 1,572,755 1,572,755 1,667,972 1,667,903
1998 2 1,672,603 1,672,603 1,695,621 1,695,236
1998 3 1,696,867 1,696,867 1,757,771 1,757,576
1998 4 1,665,780 1,665,780 1,743,551 1,743,158
1999 1 1,628,108 1,628,108 1,734,939 1,734,847
1999 2 1,734,650 1,734,650 1,770,692 1,770,692
1999 3 1,776,261 1,776,261 1,826,000 1,826,001
1999 4 1,766,513 1,766,513 1,808,507 1,807,900
2000 1 1,780,714 1,780,714 1,796,890 1,797,329
2000 2 1,875,649 1,875,649 1,835,728 1,835,665
2000 3 1,921,144 1,921,144 1,900,115 1,900,101
2000 4 1,837,789 1,837,789 1,885,632 1,885,671
2001 1 1,812,912 1,812,912 1,865,196 1,865,196
2001 2 1,957,346 1,957,346 1,875,017 1,874,831
2001 3 1,977,937 1,977,937 1,904,270 1,904,260
2001 4 1,883,623 1,883,623 1,843,969 1,843,921
2002 1 1,804,505 1,804,505 1,789,392 1,789,349
2002 2 1,861,130 1,861,130 1,810,487 1,810,419
2002 3 1,890,835 1,890,835 1,842,622 1,842,608
2002 4 1,874,523 1,874,523 1,800,873 1,800,322
2003 1 1,790,716 1,790,716 1,759,305 1,758,447
2003 2 1,797,353 1,797,353 1,759,265 1,759,386
2003 3 1,848,700 1,848,700 1,799,680 1,799,680
2003 4 1,888,618 1,888,618 1,777,371 1,777,333
2004 1 1,860,738 1,860,738 1,750,306 1,750,908169
Table 3.11: Illinois Employment Counts
Year Qtr B Old B BLS emp-month1 ES202 emp-month1
1990 1 - - 4,345,291 4,357,028
1990 2 4,409,874 4,409,874 4,413,148 4,419,893
1990 3 4,746,595 4,746,595 4,526,937 4,531,231
1990 4 4,588,349 4,588,349 4,485,882 4,495,279
1991 1 4,464,664 4,464,664 4,321,107 4,323,423
1991 2 4,466,004 4,466,004 4,366,343 4,368,524
1991 3 4,421,712 4,421,712 4,447,930 4,458,102
1991 4 4,205,686 4,205,686 4,406,956 4,428,147
1992 1 3,851,760 4,304,359 4,251,991 4,265,733
1992 2 4,025,021 4,445,188 4,327,971 4,338,444
1992 3 4,575,235 4,575,235 4,440,244 4,457,385
1992 4 4,529,907 4,529,907 4,451,135 4,462,633
1993 1 3,797,985 4,502,603 4,315,656 4,328,907
1993 2 3,902,765 4,609,002 4,420,987 4,427,366
1993 3 4,779,554 4,779,554 4,527,060 4,532,898
1993 4 4,949,507 4,949,507 4,561,584 4,562,851
1994 1 4,911,607 4,911,607 4,431,817 4,433,307
1994 2 5,001,620 5,001,620 4,558,054 4,560,440
1994 3 5,133,884 5,133,884 4,674,684 4,674,817
1994 4 5,153,319 5,153,319 4,663,230 4,666,552
1995 1 5,075,823 5,075,823 4,569,153 4,570,331
1995 2 5,172,059 5,172,059 4,670,631 4,667,744
1995 3 5,274,083 5,274,083 4,758,961 4,761,530
1995 4 5,271,528 5,271,528 4,773,732 4,773,345
1996 1 5,168,217 5,168,217 4,657,943 4,656,597
1996 2 5,249,318 5,249,318 4,734,181 4,732,396
1996 3 5,375,210 5,375,210 4,839,577 4,835,141
1996 4 5,349,673 5,349,673 4,854,173 4,849,398
1997 1 5,223,451 5,223,451 4,722,643 4,720,362
1997 2 5,354,853 5,354,853 4,840,237 4,836,835
1997 3 5,437,141 5,437,141 4,937,897 4,932,407
1997 4 5,445,737 5,445,737 4,959,198 4,957,176
1998 1 5,365,661 5,365,661 4,845,563 4,844,146
1998 2 5,443,817 5,443,817 4,948,458 4,950,038
1998 3 5,571,917 5,571,917 5,060,902 5,060,661
1998 4 5,561,516 5,561,516 5,073,756 5,071,412
1999 1 5,413,929 5,413,929 4,897,891 4,899,867
1999 2 5,558,626 5,558,626 5,025,210 5,028,338
1999 3 5,667,976 5,667,976 5,114,699 5,114,002
1999 4 5,643,039 5,643,039 5,118,835 5,118,578
2000 1 5,542,242 5,542,242 4,986,499 4,991,762
2000 2 5,587,155 5,587,155 5,112,284 5,110,886
2000 3 5,728,864 5,728,864 5,191,404 5,186,936
2000 4 5,753,793 5,753,793 5,181,136 5,176,157
2001 1 5,574,088 5,574,088 5,010,787 5,009,801
2001 2 5,649,306 5,649,306 5,087,322 5,086,596
2001 3 5,751,458 5,751,458 5,124,813 5,125,342
2001 4 5,652,080 5,652,080 5,051,630 5,053,414
2002 1 5,465,920 5,465,920 4,861,144 4,860,455
2002 2 5,548,356 5,548,356 4,930,779 4,930,476
2002 3 5,645,193 5,645,193 4,998,610 4,997,554
2002 4 5,573,864 5,573,864 4,977,700 4,974,890
2003 1 5,419,730 5,419,730 4,797,592 4,801,803
2003 2 5,424,724 5,424,724 4,859,187 4,861,631
2003 3 5,506,160 5,506,160 4,925,963 4,925,091
2003 4 5,507,480 5,507,480 4,916,868 4,919,946
2004 1 5,376,517 5,362,185 4,757,126 4,769,070170
Table 3.12: Kansas Employment Counts
Year Qtr B Old B BLS emp-month1 ES202 emp-month1
1990 1 - - 834,114 835,867
1990 2 100,230 100,230 857,323 857,588
1990 3 982,621 982,621 872,733 871,953
1990 4 989,699 989,699 865,591 867,548
1991 1 971,043 971,043 835,438 835,790
1991 2 992,905 992,905 857,163 857,440
1991 3 1,001,487 1,001,487 877,229 876,717
1991 4 992,608 992,608 873,194 873,268
1992 1 984,238 984,238 854,307 854,468
1992 2 999,789 999,789 876,209 876,093
1992 3 1,018,818 1,018,818 888,627 888,622
1992 4 689,066 1,000,629 884,517 883,722
1993 1 672,827 993,688 859,291 860,194
1993 2 979,142 979,142 888,167 888,013
1993 3 990,153 990,153 902,850 902,325
1993 4 1,011,059 1,011,059 899,463 900,141
1994 1 1,015,369 1,015,369 882,690 882,742
1994 2 1,039,207 1,039,207 910,627 911,125
1994 3 1,045,739 1,045,739 933,570 932,773
1994 4 1,050,244 1,050,244 930,074 930,240
1995 1 1,053,444 1,053,444 916,874 917,025
1995 2 1,074,725 1,074,725 940,259 940,439
1995 3 1,081,375 1,081,375 955,796 955,796
1995 4 1,072,507 1,072,507 959,085 959,086
1996 1 1,071,059 1,071,059 943,279 943,428
1996 2 1,104,789 1,104,789 973,815 973,909
1996 3 1,123,904 1,123,904 990,062 990,426
1996 4 1,114,335 1,114,335 990,054 990,026
1997 1 1,083,254 1,083,254 974,386 972,625
1997 2 1,118,071 1,118,071 1,008,793 1,009,106
1997 3 1,135,883 1,135,883 1,038,765 1,033,266
1997 4 1,136,754 1,136,754 1,031,821 1,032,162
1998 1 1,139,308 1,139,308 1,023,198 1,022,668
1998 2 1,174,344 1,174,344 1,052,537 1,054,824
1998 3 1,184,092 1,184,092 1,069,836 1,070,745
1998 4 1,158,118 1,158,118 1,069,798 1,070,863
1999 1 1,151,962 1,151,962 1,040,022 1,042,301
1999 2 1,191,008 1,191,008 1,069,003 1,069,049
1999 3 1,209,192 1,209,192 1,087,269 1,088,235
1999 4 1,201,526 1,201,526 1,078,284 1,078,963
2000 1 1,188,913 1,188,913 1,056,644 1,058,638
2000 2 1,219,972 1,219,972 1,081,298 1,083,244
2000 3 1,234,420 1,234,420 1,091,938 1,076,522
2000 4 1,221,966 1,221,966 1,091,637 1,090,651
2001 1 1,208,116 1,208,116 1,070,813 1,068,082
2001 2 1,228,214 1,228,214 1,084,222 1,087,311
2001 3 1,247,393 1,247,393 1,091,085 1,091,516
2001 4 1,229,409 1,229,409 1,080,222 1,081,404
2002 1 1,188,088 1,188,088 1,048,467 1,046,831
2002 2 1,201,385 1,201,385 1,068,652 1,068,841
2002 3 1,203,904 1,203,904 1,071,786 1,072,190
2002 4 1,197,326 1,197,326 1,061,311 1,061,172
2003 1 1,179,958 1,179,958 1,033,292 1,033,183
2003 2 1,187,140 1,187,140 1,045,763 1,046,764
2003 3 1,196,047 1,196,047 1,054,183 1,055,303
2003 4 1,186,229 1,186,229 1,054,155 1,054,322
2004 1 1,180,309 1,180,309 1,027,886 1,030,113171
Table 3.13: Missouri Employment Counts
Year Qtr B Old B BLS emp-month1 ES202 emp-month1
1990 1 - - 1,886,092 1,886,299
1990 2 2,126,347 2,126,347 1,910,483 1,921,535
1990 3 2,174,774 2,174,774 1,959,014 1,958,679
1990 4 2,151,825 2,151,825 1,946,452 1,945,168
1991 1 2,083,595 2,083,595 1,838,627 1,837,978
1991 2 2,108,942 2,108,942 1,875,522 1,870,240
1991 3 2,148,910 2,148,910 1,918,311 1,916,897
1991 4 2,136,249 2,136,249 1,911,280 1,908,826
1992 1 2,098,160 2,098,160 1,844,041 1,841,380
1992 2 2,131,764 2,131,764 1,901,119 1,899,489
1992 3 2,179,320 2,179,320 1,947,214 1,946,814
1992 4 2,162,574 2,162,574 1,942,566 1,941,849
1993 1 2,120,331 2,120,331 1,874,743 1,869,597
1993 2 2,160,063 2,160,063 1,944,275 1,943,435
1993 3 2,216,332 2,216,332 2,000,624 1,998,122
1993 4 2,212,933 2,212,933 2,001,994 2,001,140
1994 1 2,171,994 2,171,994 1,932,249 1,917,035
1994 2 2,227,358 2,227,358 2,007,518 2,007,577
1994 3 2,289,932 2,289,932 2,067,739 2,063,561
1994 4 1,560,136 2,303,435 2,070,921 2,068,520
1995 1 1,553,789 2,265,239 2,004,301 2,002,542
1995 2 2,313,899 2,313,899 2,072,659 2,071,253
1995 3 2,357,215 2,357,215 2,100,898 2,099,336
1995 4 2,350,592 2,350,592 2,096,053 2,094,249
1996 1 2,308,453 2,308,453 2,038,484 2,033,214
1996 2 2,345,056 2,345,056 2,103,209 2,110,754
1996 3 2,400,490 2,400,490 2,139,857 2,137,080
1996 4 2,392,740 2,392,740 2,142,854 2,143,357
1997 1 2,350,909 2,350,909 2,091,520 2,090,869
1997 2 2,403,346 2,403,346 2,160,292 2,160,503
1997 3 2,449,115 2,449,115 2,194,513 2,187,959
1997 4 2,440,603 2,440,603 2,199,359 2,200,060
1998 1 2,389,374 2,389,374 2,137,600 2,141,295
1998 2 2,449,098 2,449,098 2,205,826 2,206,121
1998 3 2,494,448 2,494,448 2,240,775 2,241,009
1998 4 2,485,430 2,485,430 2,233,347 2,233,111
1999 1 2,434,018 2,434,018 2,162,069 2,163,359
1999 2 2,495,262 2,495,262 2,241,019 2,250,039
1999 3 2,540,946 2,540,946 2,286,245 2,288,189
1999 4 2,516,871 2,516,871 2,270,190 2,272,687
2000 1 2,467,139 2,467,139 2,211,419 2,728,061
2000 2 2,534,217 2,534,217 2,266,477 2,285,700
2000 3 2,586,649 2,586,649 2,293,956 2,294,404
2000 4 2,560,986 2,560,986 2,286,170 2,287,241
2001 1 2,501,215 2,501,215 2,200,533 2,206,454
2001 2 2,519,320 2,519,320 2,255,096 2,257,522
2001 3 2,574,185 2,574,185 2,257,788 2,456,806
2001 4 2,542,910 2,542,910 2,234,021 2,234,992
2002 1 2,467,949 2,467,949 2,154,866 2,159,129
2002 2 2,501,904 2,501,904 2,215,943 2,225,952
2002 3 2,515,920 2,515,920 2,233,768 2,422,222
2002 4 2,528,005 2,528,005 2,229,679 2,230,539
2003 1 2,470,841 2,470,841 2,151,676 3,033,558
2003 2 2,493,877 2,493,877 2,200,666 2,202,705
2003 3 2,531,783 2,531,783 2,218,305 2,221,766
2003 4 2,510,864 2,510,864 2,216,682 2,219,901
2004 1 2,475,499 2,474,778 2,147,039 2,147,658172
Table 3.14: Pennsylvania Employment Counts
Year Qtr B Old B BLS emp-month1 ES202 emp-month1
1991 1 - - 4,236,384 4,236,387
1991 2 4,700,421 4,700,421 4,260,573 4,260,573
1991 3 4,740,728 4,740,728 4,301,906 4,301,912
1991 4 4,715,342 4,715,342 4,302,957 4,302,957
1992 1 4,557,108 4,557,108 4,184,916 4,185,342
1992 2 4,568,454 4,568,454 4,241,545 4,241,545
1992 3 4,723,189 4,723,189 4,321,835 4,324,171
1992 4 4,667,552 4,667,552 4,325,707 4,325,707
1993 1 4,591,299 4,591,299 4,213,771 4,213,793
1993 2 4,678,551 4,678,551 4,268,291 4,268,307
1993 3 4,789,488 4,789,488 4,356,371 4,356,371
1993 4 4,735,962 4,735,962 4,360,714 4,360,708
1994 1 4,692,261 4,692,261 4,223,657 4,223,657
1994 2 4,752,467 4,752,467 4,325,274 4,324,485
1994 3 4,881,056 4,881,056 4,424,191 4,424,192
1994 4 4,870,482 4,870,482 4,429,051 4,429,040
1995 1 4,812,641 4,812,641 4,313,588 4,314,170
1995 2 4,866,324 4,866,324 4,387,664 4,387,666
1995 3 4,954,273 4,954,273 4,456,120 4,456,120
1995 4 4,910,658 4,910,658 4,469,761 4,469,761
1996 1 4,814,158 4,814,158 4,308,551 4,308,551
1996 2 4,899,310 4,899,310 4,439,076 4,439,076
1996 3 5,013,767 5,013,767 4,527,102 4,527,972
1996 4 49,521 4,969,278 4,540,496 4,540,295
1997 1 48,761 4,894,815 4,446,930 4,446,855
1997 2 4,979,119 4,979,119 4,529,710 -
1997 3 5,040,479 5,040,479 4,642,906 -
1997 4 5,045,693 5,045,693 4,649,604 -
1998 1 4,996,604 4,996,604 4,556,245 4,556,949
1998 2 5,065,184 5,065,184 4,644,391 4,646,497
1998 3 5,135,585 5,135,585 4,731,739 4,734,744
1998 4 5,113,798 5,113,798 4,735,829 4,736,542
1999 1 5,012,308 5,012,308 4,623,145 4,623,304
1999 2 5,084,835 5,084,835 4,739,220 4,755,171
1999 3 5,100,130 5,100,130 4,850,143 4,826,016
1999 4 5,054,886 5,054,886 4,818,516 4,815,739
2000 1 5,048,672 5,048,672 4,723,295 4,722,007
2000 2 5,126,968 5,126,968 4,831,492 4,830,724
2000 3 5,185,512 5,185,512 4,917,413 4,916,750
2000 4 5,160,268 5,160,268 4,898,758 4,897,023
2001 1 5,091,076 5,091,076 4,790,531 4,790,728
2001 2 5,137,627 5,137,627 4,842,480 4,841,770
2001 3 5,211,680 5,211,680 4,884,529 4,883,439
2001 4 4,979,337 4,979,337 4,837,252 4,834,399
2002 1 4,877,230 4,877,230 4,700,448 4,700,410
2002 2 5,133,137 5,133,137 4,767,392 4,767,479
2002 3 5,192,404 5,192,404 4,840,014 4,838,554
2002 4 5,123,995 5,123,995 4,811,525 4,811,580
2003 1 4,952,668 4,952,668 4,671,499 4,693,887
2003 2 4,853,937 4,853,937 4,725,018 4,735,958
2003 3 5,064,154 5,064,154 4,790,105 4,801,279
2003 4 5,040,599 5,040,599 4,786,728 4,793,206
2004 1 5,019,131 4,970,430 4,655,607 4,671,384173
Table 3.15: Colorado CPI-deﬂated Wage Statistics
Year Qtr Observations Mean of CPI-deﬂated Wage Stdev of CPI-deﬂated Wage
1990 1 1,597,193 5,860 7,415
1990 2 1,609,701 5,899 7,230
1990 3 1,501,850 6,080 8,051
1990 4 1,731,769 6,490 8,475
1991 1 1,664,033 6,208 7,964
1991 2 1,753,370 6,017 8,027
1991 3 1,785,460 6,027 7,867
1991 4 1,600,908 6,698 9,908
1992 1 1,729,544 6,285 8,261
1992 2 1,838,260 6,002 8,008
1992 3 1,882,913 5,999 7,974
1992 4 1,851,487 6,687 10,573
1993 1 1,853,886 5,925 8,110
1993 2 1,945,841 5,900 7,894
1993 3 2,003,855 5,964 7,951
1993 4 1,928,883 6,614 10,580
1994 1 1,860,015 6,109 8,189
1994 2 1,972,056 5,866 8,027
1994 3 1,994,760 6,014 8,218
1994 4 1,961,362 6,462 10,182
1995 1 1,913,826 6,258 8,560
1995 2 2,022,211 5,897 8,103
1995 3 2,077,747 5,958 8,097
1995 4 2,038,057 6,521 10,077
1996 1 2,108,300 6,236 8,304
1996 2 2,243,518 5,889 8,039
1996 3 2,292,266 5,948 7,988
1996 4 2,232,101 6,524 9,844
1997 1 2,182,916 6,366 8,680
1997 2 2,283,105 6,069 8,181
1997 3 2,304,531 6,201 8,756
1997 4 2,170,188 6,889 10,296
1998 1 2,221,992 6,587 8,977
1998 2 2,344,978 6,262 8,352
1998 3 2,389,243 6,457 8,450
1998 4 2,281,911 7,265 10,787
1999 1 2,298,081 6,731 9,073
1999 2 2,436,013 6,484 8,751
1999 3 2,487,516 6,627 8,692
1999 4 2,434,380 7,387 10,890
2000 1 2,428,436 6,979 9,128
2000 2 2,567,671 6,736 8,776
2000 3 2,599,846 6,843 8,850
2000 4 2,456,836 7,574 10,597
2001 1 2,485,876 7,319 9,176
2001 2 2,600,273 7,021 8,781
2001 3 2,578,426 7,011 8,532
2001 4 2,399,061 7,665 10,043
2002 1 2,340,654 7,405 8,876
2002 2 2,417,509 7,110 8,495
2002 3 2,439,830 7,159 8,346
2002 4 2,355,944 7,729 9,701
2003 1 2,233,029 7,456 8,769
2003 2 2,315,760 7,200 8,385
2003 3 2,398,915 7,190 8,378
2003 4 2,354,303 7,702 9,517
2004 1 2,290,888 7,445 8,868174
Table 3.16: Illinois CPI-deﬂated Wage Statistics
Year Qtr Observations Mean of CPI-deﬂated Wage Stdev of CPI-deﬂated Wage
1990 1 5,242,674 7,226 18,781
1990 2 5,867,788 6,936 15,617
1990 3 5,843,202 6,787 12,673
1990 4 5,632,893 7,879 24,983
1991 1 5,404,157 7,102 15,602
1991 2 5,580,533 6,958 12,469
1991 3 5,555,525 6,738 15,160
1991 4 5,363,261 7,719 26,285
1992 1 5,287,782 7,573 19,719
1992 2 5,564,979 7,042 15,131
1992 3 5,717,146 6,919 14,001
1992 4 5,567,141 8,296 32,741
1993 1 5,457,391 7,022 18,447
1993 2 5,768,550 6,971 12,903
1993 3 6,064,169 6,827 12,835
1993 4 6,037,120 8,058 28,395
1994 1 5,841,665 7,089 14,280
1994 2 6,178,254 6,862 12,731
1994 3 6,394,892 6,920 14,562
1994 4 6,280,657 7,720 22,704
1995 1 6,099,193 7,315 17,203
1995 2 6,362,159 6,902 16,394
1995 3 6,489,806 6,791 15,973
1995 4 6,377,226 7,752 24,860
1996 1 6,162,127 7,408 21,089
1996 2 6,449,665 6,980 16,383
1996 3 6,592,554 6,829 14,004
1996 4 6,478,038 7,871 24,103
1997 1 6,264,457 7,528 21,609
1997 2 6,586,554 7,110 18,495
1997 3 6,723,170 7,047 20,953
1997 4 6,653,394 8,158 27,572
1998 1 6,413,104 7,748 25,162
1998 2 6,735,524 7,366 22,509
1998 3 6,893,246 7,210 18,795
1998 4 6,795,467 8,504 29,970
1999 1 6,536,584 7,829 26,989
1999 2 6,895,798 7,480 22,178
1999 3 7,005,208 7,423 21,337
1999 4 6,912,687 8,656 31,020
2000 1 6,688,751 8,192 29,068
2000 2 6,970,388 7,538 22,650
2000 3 7,123,455 7,589 192,398
2000 4 6,950,121 8,620 51,639
2001 1 6,669,879 8,417 37,692
2001 2 6,920,874 7,640 20,824
2001 3 6,929,237 7,556 39,514
2001 4 6,689,325 8,596 50,506
2002 1 6,431,547 8,388 26,629
2002 2 6,690,549 7,805 21,519
2002 3 6,766,547 7,602 18,199
2002 4 6,598,788 8,577 24,913
2003 1 6,303,240 8,358 25,160
2003 2 6,491,994 7,783 19,779
2003 3 6,621,216 7,668 17,786
2003 4 6,495,805 8,712 27,982
2004 1 6,240,064 8,491 29,941175
Table 3.17: Kansas CPI-deﬂated Wage Statistics
Year Qtr Observations Mean of CPI-deﬂated Wage Stdev of CPI-deﬂated Wage
1990 1 130,943 4,448 4,168
1990 2 1,223,191 5,525 7,846
1990 3 1,257,623 5,274 7,427
1990 4 1,217,234 6,016 11,034
1991 1 1,176,171 5,531 7,254
1991 2 1,240,231 5,488 7,409
1991 3 1,250,179 5,301 7,316
1991 4 1,202,793 6,067 10,844
1992 1 1,188,912 5,595 7,740
1992 2 1,251,604 5,543 7,744
1992 3 1,277,456 5,309 7,581
1992 4 1,233,094 6,181 12,688
1993 1 1,208,991 5,410 7,225
1993 2 1,290,468 5,467 7,526
1993 3 1,304,966 5,312 7,426
1993 4 1,270,387 6,109 11,582
1994 1 1,249,576 5,439 7,543
1994 2 1,329,407 5,417 7,271
1994 3 1,358,716 5,298 7,482
1994 4 1,331,276 5,864 10,186
1995 1 1,310,432 5,563 8,453
1995 2 1,375,000 5,440 7,808
1995 3 1,398,101 5,226 7,599
1995 4 1,365,224 5,966 11,117
1996 1 1,343,943 5,588 8,773
1996 2 1,416,572 5,485 7,917
1996 3 1,436,046 5,266 7,952
1996 4 1,406,657 5,990 11,881
1997 1 1,373,961 5,646 8,966
1997 2 1,464,793 5,523 7,960
1997 3 1,478,855 5,378 7,914
1997 4 1,460,321 6,197 11,259
1998 1 1,428,203 5,833 9,946
1998 2 1,518,799 5,791 10,523
1998 3 1,529,533 5,542 8,499
1998 4 1,490,549 6,430 11,452
1999 1 1,458,073 5,794 9,589
1999 2 1,531,796 5,807 8,734
1999 3 1,547,140 5,713 8,422
1999 4 1,508,880 6,618 12,780
2000 1 1,482,294 6,078 10,266
2000 2 1,556,642 5,895 9,549
2000 3 1,560,780 5,778 9,958
2000 4 1,523,058 6,421 11,933
2001 1 1,485,917 6,166 9,747
2001 2 1,554,206 5,955 8,227
2001 3 1,556,542 5,838 8,404
2001 4 1,494,737 6,491 11,319
2002 1 1,436,721 6,309 9,947
2002 2 1,495,479 6,070 8,615
2002 3 1,494,474 5,921 8,312
2002 4 1,450,253 6,571 10,933
2003 1 1,396,535 6,358 10,153
2003 2 1,453,776 6,095 8,611
2003 3 1,451,646 6,018 8,600
2003 4 1,430,594 6,651 10,902
2004 1 1,401,020 6,333 10,989176
Table 3.18: Missouri CPI-deﬂated Wage Statistics
Year Qtr Observations Mean of CPI-deﬂated Wage Stdev of CPI-deﬂated Wage
1990 1 2,510,979 6,003 8,197
1990 2 2,642,204 5,887 7,768
1990 3 2,675,469 5,677 7,686
1990 4 2,583,562 6,313 9,971
1991 1 2,468,320 5,996 17,161
1991 2 2,599,836 5,884 9,322
1991 3 2,624,528 5,715 11,444
1991 4 2,546,528 6,464 16,662
1992 1 2,473,592 6,050 10,472
1992 2 2,616,487 5,911 9,518
1992 3 2,655,969 5,708 11,047
1992 4 2,596,354 6,733 28,776
1993 1 2,512,592 5,798 9,949
1993 2 2,694,014 5,820 10,490
1993 3 2,751,028 5,655 12,407
1993 4 2,707,700 6,583 18,742
1994 1 2,632,591 5,859 12,441
1994 2 2,823,199 5,774 12,050
1994 3 2,897,411 5,735 11,221
1994 4 2,842,196 6,337 16,022
1995 1 2,768,946 6,010 12,308
1995 2 2,931,755 5,858 13,970
1995 3 2,964,441 5,663 13,703
1995 4 2,904,544 6,360 15,691
1996 1 2,812,985 6,062 15,642
1996 2 2,972,465 5,896 14,108
1996 3 3,015,580 5,652 11,711
1996 4 2,961,466 6,452 18,173
1997 1 2,879,031 6,187 17,671
1997 2 3,040,660 5,973 16,229
1997 3 3,081,542 5,817 28,299
1997 4 3,016,519 6,645 21,128
1998 1 2,923,050 6,292 20,751
1998 2 3,097,912 6,156 18,502
1998 3 3,140,067 5,953 18,632
1998 4 3,082,160 6,838 18,081
1999 1 2,974,238 6,345 23,178
1999 2 3,158,365 6,235 19,937
1999 3 3,201,329 6,065 15,525
1999 4 3,147,344 6,916 20,659
2000 1 3,070,978 6,523 18,035
2000 2 3,221,527 6,315 25,975
2000 3 3,254,984 6,122 24,820
2000 4 3,146,068 6,867 26,659
2001 1 3,051,590 6,649 16,617
2001 2 3,181,106 6,358 15,556
2001 3 3,171,347 6,213 19,815
2001 4 3,070,679 6,980 24,695
2002 1 2,954,067 6,815 21,098
2002 2 3,082,516 6,489 15,521
2002 3 3,118,309 6,302 13,898
2002 4 3,023,516 7,002 19,165
2003 1 2,924,964 6,779 47,136
2003 2 3,051,768 6,538 17,054
2003 3 3,065,367 6,401 52,779
2003 4 3,006,621 7,032 19,638
2004 1 2,917,402 6,733 19,940177
Table 3.19: Pennsylvania CPI-deﬂated Wage Statistics
Year Qtr Observations Mean of CPI-deﬂated Wage Stdev of CPI-deﬂated Wage
1991 1 5,436,604 6,514 7,989
1991 2 5,604,312 6,443 7,871
1991 3 5,667,034 6,347 7,799
1991 4 5,541,018 6,967 9,648
1992 1 5,281,990 6,637 8,252
1992 2 5,559,265 6,555 8,042
1992 3 5,630,342 6,426 7,871
1992 4 5,540,150 7,290 10,278
1993 1 5,378,681 6,384 7,878
1993 2 5,641,044 6,541 8,025
1993 3 5,714,165 6,451 7,968
1993 4 5,654,808 7,169 10,045
1994 1 5,463,931 6,518 8,227
1994 2 5,777,067 6,469 7,929
1994 3 5,902,169 6,525 8,060
1994 4 5,807,539 6,972 9,808
1995 1 5,662,638 6,672 8,650
1995 2 5,875,395 6,537 8,191
1995 3 5,949,845 6,358 8,118
1995 4 5,841,189 6,947 9,930
1996 1 5,683,172 6,680 8,910
1996 2 5,957,323 6,523 8,335
1996 3 6,054,729 6,320 8,175
1996 4 5,961,281 6,857 10,131
1997 1 5,793,285 6,737 9,052
1997 2 6,047,674 6,589 8,438
1997 3 6,142,822 6,449 8,443
1997 4 6,068,843 7,219 10,392
1998 1 5,899,513 6,830 9,369
1998 2 6,181,049 6,721 8,785
1998 3 6,261,459 6,606 8,615
1998 4 6,190,822 7,450 10,597
1999 1 5,977,942 6,805 9,482
1999 2 6,241,231 6,792 8,922
1999 3 6,310,717 6,728 8,921
1999 4 6,257,004 7,545 10,751
2000 1 6,112,002 7,100 9,882
2000 2 6,383,321 6,796 8,914
2000 3 6,400,193 6,751 8,915
2000 4 6,326,369 7,361 10,491
2001 1 6,113,799 7,195 9,936
2001 2 6,313,148 6,895 8,813
2001 3 6,279,665 6,820 8,803
2001 4 5,934,952 7,429 10,306
2002 1 6,013,969 7,305 9,861
2002 2 6,206,390 7,085 9,275
2002 3 6,315,294 6,906 8,750
2002 4 6,129,869 7,509 10,221
2003 1 5,800,028 7,360 9,982
2003 2 6,010,992 7,119 8,219
2003 3 6,158,147 6,962 8,128
2003 4 6,091,831 7,648 10,454
2004 1 5,840,711 7,361 10,258178
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3.2 Hours Imputation
The number of hours spent at work is unfortunately not provided by the UI wage
records. Instead, crosswalks between survey and administrative data provide hours
worked information for individuals with UI records who appear in the 2000 Decen-
nial Sample Census Edited File (SCEF). The goal is to specify a model for annual
hours of work (at all jobs) conditioning on year, sex, race, foreign-born, number
of jobs held, 6-quarter annual work pattern, and total labor earnings decile that
occurs in the population. These total hours are then partitioned amongst all jobs,
by percent of earnings.
For each combination of the conditioning variables, the predicted probabili-
ties times the sample count of individuals with those characteristics constitutes
the likelihood contribution to the posterior distribution. Using empirical Bayes
methods with informative priors that are based on aggregated data, the Dirichlet
prior for each group has shape parameters given by the 2000 SCEF estimate of the
proportions of usual weekly hours for sex and race, and prior sample size, which is
arbitrary.
3.2.1 Identiﬁcation
We observe a set of data {Hi,Zi,wi,mi}N
i=1, where Hi is the sum of annual hours for
individual i over all jobs j, Hi =
PJi
j=1 Hij; Zi is a set of covariates we presume are
related to annual hours; the instrument wi is person-level earnings stated in year
2000 dollars, wi =
PJi
j=1 wij; and mi equals one if the annual hours are observed
and is zero otherwise. Job j annual hours for individual i, Hij, is the actual
outcome of interest, where Hi =
PJi
j=1 Hij. To impute the missing outcomes, we185
ﬁrst need to draw from the probability
π(Hi|Zi,mi = 0) = Pr[Hi|Zi,mi = 0]
to assign annual hours to each person. Then, for each person, we distribute the
sum of annual hours to each job held in a given year.
The distribution of annual hours is never observed in the data, and so we must
begin with identifying assumptions. For the ﬁrst stage imputation of annual hours
of work, Hi, we identify π(Hi|Zi,mi = 0) by assuming that the data are missing
completely at random, or that
π(Hi|Zi,mi = 0) = π(Hi|Zi,mi = 1).
Knowledge of annual hours depends upon whether an individual has a record
of hours worked on the 2000 Decennial SCEF. Arguably, this means that the
observability of the outcome is independent of the outcome, whether missing or
observed. Given this identifying assumption, annual hours can be imputed by
drawing from the posterior predictive distribution of annual hours in the observed
data, conditional on all other information common to the two ﬁles.
In the second stage of the imputation- the assignment of hours to jobs- the out-
come Hij is dependant upon the jobs held. Again, we want to model π(Hij|Zi,mi =
0), but in this case, mi = 0 for every observation in the sample since no job-speciﬁc
hours information is provided. To identify the distribution, we assume that
π(Hij|Zi,mi = 0) = π(wij|Zi),
where wij is the wage and salary earnings of the job to which annual hours needs
to be assigned. Earnings, wij, is observed for every worker and for every job, so
this assumption completely identiﬁes the distribution of work hours across jobs.186
3.2.2 An Empirical Bayes Procedure
Now consider the general problem of learning π(Hi|Zi) given a set of data
{Hi,Zi}
N
i=1.
It will be convenient to think of the data as {Hi}
NZ
i=1, where NZ is the size of the
subsample of observed data with Q = 52×99 = 5,148 covariate cells deﬁned by Z.
The outcome of interest is Hi ∈ H, where H = {H1,...,HQ} is a discrete support.
Because of this, π(Hi|Zi) may be parameterized without loss of generality as a
multinomial distribution with parameter θ = (θ1,...,θQ).
The posterior distribution of θ follows Bayes’ rule:
π(θ|H,Z) =
π(H|θ,Z)π(θ|Z,u) R
θ π(H|θ,Z)π(θ|Z,u)dθ
.
Assuming that the observations are independent, the likelihood of the data is
π(H|θ,Z) = Π
NZ
i=1Π
Q
k=1θ
1(Hi=Hk)
k
= Π
Q
k=1θ
NZk
where NZk =
PNZ
i=1 1(Hi = Hk). That is, NZk is the count of observations with
covariates Z and outcome Hi = Hk.
The prior on θ is Dirichlet with parameter u
π(θ|Z,u) =
1
M(u)
Π
Q
k=1θ
uk−1
k ,
so we have
π(H|θ,Z)π(θ|Z,u) =
1
M(u)
Π
Q
k=1θ
NZk+uk−1
k .187
Note that
R
p π(H|p,Z)π(p|Z,u)dp must satisfy
Z
θ
π(H|θ,Z)π(θ|Z,u)dθ =
Z
θ
1
M(u)
Π
Q
k=1θ
NZk+uk−1
k dθ
=
1
M(u)
Z
θ
Π
Q
k=1θ
NZk+uk−1
k dθ
=
M(NZ + u)
M(u)
.
This gives us
π(θ|Z,H) =
1
M(NZ + u)
Π
Q
k=1θ
NZk+uk−1
k .
That is, the posterior distribution of the multinomial parameter θ is Dirichlet with
parameter v = NZ + u where NZ = (NZ1,...,NZQ).
3.2.3 Data and Imputation
The base sample for the hours imputation are the individuals who comprise the
2000 Decennial Sample Census Edited File (SCEF). The 2000 SCEF inquires about
usual weekly hours and weeks worked in the previous calendar year. From these
variables, it is possible to construct annual hours in 1999 for respondents who
worked during that time frame. Annual hours in the SCEF are recorded as the
number of hours worked per week times the number of weeks worked in 1999.
Hours per week are restricted to be an integer between 1 and 99 so the number
of possible outcomes is 99 × 52 = 5,148. Demographic information is acquired
from the ICF to be consistent with the human capital estimation. Date of birth
is converted into 1999 age, which is age as of December 31, 1998. Sex becomes
an indicator for males, and race transforms into a white variable. Foreign born
status is merged in through the Person Characteristics File, a Census extract of
the Social Security Administration’s Numident.188
These records are then linked to the1999 EHF. Only individuals who are 14-85
and who have positive annual hours in the SCEF and positive earnings in the 1999
EHF are retained in the sample of the estimation ﬁle. Variables for the number
of jobs held, a 6-quarter work pattern window, and cumulative annual earnings
are generated at the person level. A second ﬁle of person-level information for all
individuals who ever worked in 1999 who are 14-85 is used to generate deciles of the
annual earnings distribution. On the pooled linked 1999 EHF and SCEF data ﬁle,
a decile categorical variable is generated, which completes the list of conditioning
variables.
There are 14,400 diﬀerent combinations of the conditioning variables. Hence,
there are 74,131,200 possible covariate annual hours cells. The conditioning vari-
ables, Z, in our annual hours imputation included the following for each year,
1990-2003:
• male: an indicator for sex equals male
• white: an indicator for race equals white
• born us: an indicator for whether a worker was born in the United States
• nempl cat: number of jobs held in UI data in that year, maximum value is 3
• sixqwindow: the person-level 6-quarter employment history covering all jobs
during the four quarters of the current year and the quarters before and after
this year
• decile: the worker’s decile in the 1999 distribution of wage and salary income
stated in year 2000 dollars.189
Likelihood
The likelihood of the observed data requires ﬁnding the frequency count in each
of the 74,131,200 cells. The number of observations in the sample with covariates
Zk is NZk.
Prior
An interpretation of the parameters of the Dirichlet prior is that they provide the
shape of the prior distribution and the prior “sample size,” which measures our
conﬁdence in this shape. The shape parameter, u, for the annual hours imputation
is a linear combination of an empirical prior and an uninformative uniform prior.
The empirical prior comes from the frequency proportions, a, of the following set
of conditioning variables each year: white, male, and nempl cat. There are 12
categories for the prior, and a total of 61,776 cells. This is suﬃciently coarse that
each cell has non-zero frequency. To further smooth the posterior distribution, the
complete prior was Dirichlet with parameter
u = 0.99a + 0.01b,
where b is the discrete uniform distribution over the 5,148 possible hours outcomes.
Thus, the prior “sample size” is 1 (one person).
Imputation
Given covariates Z, the parameter of the Dirichlet posterior is v = NZ + u . For
each of the 14,400 combinations of the conditioning variables, Z, we draw once
from the corresponding Dirichlet posterior to get θ. For a worker-year observation
in the estimation sample with covariates Z, missing annual hours are imputed by
making a single draw, H, from a multinomial distribution with parameter θ.190
3.2.4 Hours per Job Imputation
Hours per job were estimated on the assumption that for each worker-year, there
is an unknown distribution of hours across each of the worker’s reported jobs for
that year. Here, the number of outcomes is Jit, which is the total number of jobs
held by worker i in year t. We assume that each hour is allocated to one of these
jobs according to a multinomial distribution parametrized by θit.
Likelihood
We assume that the allocation of hours across jobs is identical to the allocation of
dollars across jobs. So, we take wijt as the likelihood count for job j, where wijt
are the annual earnings in job j of worker i in year t.
Prior
Because there is no further information about the allocation of hours, we assume
a uniform prior, uit.
Imputation
For every worker-year in the sample, to impute hours for each job, we draw
once from the posterior Dirichlet with parameter vit = wit + uit. This yields
vit = (vi1t,...,viJitt) as an estimate of the distribution of hours across jobs. The
imputation of hours per job is completed by taking Hitˆ θit.where Hit is the measure
of annual hours (actual or imputed) for i in year t.
Our analysis involves processing data from several states in parallel. Since
some workers appear in several states in the same year, we take measures to en-
sure that the annual hours and hours per job imputed for a worker appearing in191
multiple states are identical. We do this by assigning each worker–year observation
a random draw from the uniform distribution that is the same in all states. This
random draw is then used to draw annual hours, and to seed the random number
generator used to impute hours for each job.
3.3 Experience Imputation
We have the ability to track accrued experience for individuals who remain in our
sample of Unemployment Insurance wage records over time. However, determining
the initial level of experience to assign to workers when they appear in the data is
a less straightforward task. One manner of doing this is to deﬁne initial experience
as potential experience based on age at ﬁrst observation. A second, more accurate
method involves taking draws from the posterior distribution of experience in ad-
ministrative earnings data to assign this value. It is the latter style of imputation
that we choose.
For persons in our UI data sample who were ever interviewed in the Survey of
Income and Program Participation or Current Population Survey, we have Sum-
mary Earnings Records (SER) available from the Social Security Administration.
The SER contain the annual earnings stream capped at the taxable maximum and
annual quarters of covered work for each individual from 1951 until the present
year, with estimates of quarters of covered work available for the period 1937-1951.
By summing these quarters of work and dividing by four, we acquire an accurate
measure of years of lifetime experience.8 This ﬁle is merged with the Census Bu-
8The initial few years of experience for older workers is imputed based upon
the year-to-year experience growth of young workers in the SER. This imputation
is necessary because older workers experience proﬁles may be incomplete due to
the initial date of available data in the SER.192
reau’s Person Characteristics File (PCF), a Census extract of the Social Security
Administration’s Numident, to acquire gender, birth location, date of birth, and
years in the United States for each record.
Experience is classiﬁed within the following cells as of December 31, 2000:
native born, sex, and age; foreign born, sex, and years in the US; and foreign born,
sex, and age. This last category is necessary for our imputation of experience for
those individuals who do not appear in the PCF and therefore have a missing birth
location.9 For them, gender and date of birth have already been imputed on our
Individual Characteristics File for the Employment History File. A Kernel Density
Estimate (KDE) smooths the values of experience for each gender, birth location,
and time type (age or years in the US) cell. The categories are: native born males,
native born females, foreign born males, foreign born females, males with missing
birth location, and females with missing birth location. Categories that are too
thin, as is the case with workers who are greatly advanced in age, are pooled.
The smoothed KDE estimate generates a density of experience, from which
a cumulative density function (CDF) is derived. A uniform random number is
assigned to those individuals requiring the experience imputation. This random
number draw is used to make the initial experience assignment for when the indi-
vidual ﬁrst appears in the Unemployment Insurance wage records. The imputed
value is based on the location of the random draw in the CDF distribution of ex-
perience. Any unreasonable draw that results in a value of initial experience that
is greater than potential experience (calculated here as age−13) is rejected and a
new draw is made.
This imputation method allows people at varying points in their lives to have
9A missing birth location on the PCF is indicative that these people are not
natives of the United States.193
diﬀerent accumulated experience. It incorporates labor force attachment behavior
and cohort eﬀects for each gender. Initial experience is assigned based on the
primary year of observed work in the UI records. If experience diﬀers systematically
for those who move out of state (and out of our sample), then we will need to adjust
for this in any models that use this imputation. The next section discusses the
manner in which this type of selection can be corrected for by using a selection
model.
3.4 Selection Models
We do not observe the complete work histories of individuals who appear in our
sample states. This fact is elucidated by Table 3.1, which illustrates the entry year
of each LEHD partner state into the data time series. Each period, some portion
of a work history is not present for workers who have yet to move into a sample
state, or who have left a sample state to seek employment elsewhere.
Selection models are estimated based on UI and decennial Census links to
correct for the two types of selection bias in every year of our time series, 1990-2004,
that result from this incomplete information. The ﬁrst model addresses workers
who exit a sample state to work in a state not in the LEHD data infrastructure
(denoted by the IO, or “In-sample to Out-of-sample,” speciﬁcation). The second
addresses employed individuals who move from an out-of-sample state into the
LEHD data infrastructure (denoted by the OI, or “Out-of-sample to In-sample,”
speciﬁcation):
e
IO
it =

    
    
1, if work in a year t sample state in period p − 1 and in a
year t out-of-sample state in period p
0, if work in a year t sample state in periods p − 1 and p194
e
OI
it =

    
    
1, if work in a year t out-of-sample state in period p and in a
year t sample state in period p + 1
0, if work in a year t out-of-sample state in periods p and p + 1
,
where t = 1990,1991,...,2003 are the years of available UI data. Period p refers to
the year 2000 Census SCEF, p − 1 refers to the 1999 UI data, and p + 1 refers to
the 2001 UI data.
The probit models take the form
e
∗
it = X
0
itβt + uit,
where the vector of covariates consist of demographic and household characteristics
described in the data section below and uit v N(0,1). The base set of individuals
for the estimation of each model is those who are in sample. In other words, those
who work in a year t sample state in p−1 for the eIO
it speciﬁcation, and those who
work in a year t sample state in p + 1 for the eOI
it speciﬁcation form the frame for
the probit. From the probit equation, estimated values of βt are obtained, which
are used to construct values of the predicted probabilities, X0
itˆ βt, for all people
with complete HCEF records. Inverse Mills ratios are calculated as
ˆ λit(X
0
itˆ βt) =

 
 
φ(X0
itˆ βt)/[1 − Φ(X0
itˆ βt)], if e∗
it > 0
φ(X0
itˆ βt)/Φ(X0
itˆ βt), otherwise
and are included in the estimation of the human capital model to correct for
selection bias.
3.4.1 Data
The primary task involves matching all workers who ever appear in the UI wage
records to the Hundred Percent Census Edited File (HCEF, or Short Form) and195
Sample Census Edited File (SCEF, or Long Form) from the 2000 decennial Census.
All who appear in these Census ﬁles respond about their relationship to the head of
household, so it is possible to generate variables for whether the household contains
a married couple,10 if it is a multiple-family household,11 the number of people who
live in the household, the number who are less than 18 years old, and the number
who are older than 65. Hispanic ethnicity and home ownership12 are also on the
HCEF and are included as controls in this imputation model.
The Individual Characteristics File (ICF) provides basic demographic informa-
tion regarding date of birth, gender, and race. Indicators for males and caucasians
are constructed, as is a missing race variable. The following age categories are
used: 16-20, 21-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, and 61 years or more. Age is static over
10The following formulae identify whether a married couple exists in the house-
hold: if father/mother ge 2 or husband/wife ge 1 or (brother/sister ge 1 and
brother-in-law/sister-in-law ge 1) or ((natural-born son/daughter ge 1 or adopted
son/daughter ge 1 or stepson/stepdaughter ge 1) and son-in-law/daughter-in-law
ge 1) or parent-in-law ge 2 or (uncle ge 1 and aunt ge 1 and cousin ge 1) or
(grandfather ge 1 and grandmother ge 1) then hh married=1. The main diﬃculty
involved in discerning these relationships involves determining whether the uncle
and aunt are married or are siblings. To best determine marital status, we required
that a cousin also be present in the household when both an aunt and uncle live
in the household. We did not attempt to determine whether each individual is
themselves married, since relationships are related through the head of household
and selecting, an an example, which brother is married to which sister-in-law when
multiple individuals are present would be impossible.
11Multiple subfamilies exist when either (1) the household head is married and
also present in the household is at least one of: father/mother, parent-in-law, son-
in-law/daughter-in-law, brother-in-law/sister-in-law, nephew/niece, grandparent,
uncle/aunt, cousin; or (2) the household head is not married and also present in
the household is at least one of: grandchild, parent-in-law, son-in-law/daughter-in-
law, brother-in-law/sister-in-law, nephew/niece, grandparent, uncle/aunt, cousin.
12Home ownership is deﬁned by an aﬃrmative answer to either the HCEF ques-
tion, “Is this house, apartment, or mobile home owned by you or someone in this
household with a mortgage or loan?” or, “Is this house, apartment, or mobile home
owned by you or someone in this household free and clear (without a mortgage or
loan)?”196
the course of the year and is the age of the individual on December 31st of the
previous year.
Additional variables are acquired from the Person Characteristics File (PCF)
in order to control for country of birth and date of entry into the United States.
The region of birth variable collapses the 367 country codes to the top 23 source
countries (employment) and the associated geographic regions (36 categories total,
including a missing location category).13 This reduces the dimensionality of the
problem for the Heckit imputation process. An indicator variable denotes those
individuals who do not match to the PCF, which gives information about when
variables are imputed on the ICF. All SCEF records match to the PCF, but this
will be used in the SRMI imputation of X0
itˆ βt values for the 26.7% of individuals in
the ICF who do not have decennial Census records. Years in the United States are
binned into these categories: less than 5 years, 5-9, 10-19, and more than 20. Date
of entry is used to generate an Immigration and Reform Control Act indicator
for non-native individuals who entered the United States between 1987 and 1991,
inclusive. Missing dates of entry are controlled for by an indicator.
The Employer History File is linked to the Employer Characteristics ﬁle so
that a compatible sample of workers can be created in the UI and decennial Cen-
sus ﬁles for the estimation of this model. UI coverage varies by state, but it is
generally the case that excluded from the EHF are workers in the armed forces,
13These regions are: (1) the United States or territory, (1) Mexico, (2) Philip-
pines, (3) India, (4) Germany, (5) Vietnam, (6) El Salvador, (7) Cuba, (8) Canada,
(9) United Kingdom, (10) China, (11) South Korea, (12) Japan, (13) Taiwan, (14)
Columbia, (15) Guatemala, (16) Poland, (17) Jamaica, (18) USSR, (19) Haiti,
(20) Dominican Republic, (21) Iran, (22) Italy, (23) Peru, (24) Former Socialist
Europe, (25) Western Europe, (26) Former Soviet Union, (27) Central Asia, (28)
South East Asia, (29) Middle East and North Africa, (30) Caribbean, (31) Central
America, (32) South America, (33) Africa, (34) Oceania, and (35) not speciﬁed or
missing.197
public administration, agriculture, forestry, ﬁsheries, self-employed not incorpo-
rated, and the public sector.14 To make a consistent sample of individuals for the
Heckit estimation, we choose to retain UI workers at establishments with private
ownership codes and in SIC divisions outside of public administration. To match
the scope of the UI wage records, the SCEF 2000 sample is restricted to employed
individuals15 whose place of work is inside the United States who are in the class
of workers who are private for proﬁt, private not-for-proﬁt, or self-employed in in-
corporated businesses and who do not work in agriculture, forestry, or ﬁsheries.16
Only those who are 16-75 on December 31 of the year prior to the year of estima-
tion are retained for the Heckit, which essentially means that from December 31,
1998 through December 31, 2000 the workers must fall into that age range. Group
quarters individuals are not used in the probit estimations.
3.4.2 Details of Selection Estimation
In-sample to Out-of-sample
Using the matched ICF-SCEF sample as a universe with the aforementioned re-
strictions imposed, the 1999 UI records from states in year t serve as a base for
this analysis with movement across state borders observed through comparisons
with the place of work variable on the 2000 SCEF. We aim to estimate movement
from working in 1999 an in-sample UI state in year t to working in the 2000 SCEF
in an out-of-sample state (deﬁned as the complement to the set of UI states in
14The SEIN ownership code should be “5” to indicate all private establishments,
and the corresponding SIC division cannot be “J,” which is public administration.
15Those who are employed, at work, or employed, with a job but not at work.
16The following decennial Census industries are excluded: 017, 018, 018, 027,
028, and 029.198
year t). Even though the frames for this analysis do not shift, the set of states
considered in-sample do vary by year. Movements from employment within an
in-sample state to employment in an out-of-sample state in year t are captured by
the probit indicator variable, eIO
it . The SCEF person weight is used in the model.
Out-of-sample to In-sample
Again using the matched ICF-SCEF sample as a universe with the aforementioned
restrictions imposed, for this estimation, the 2001 UI records from states in year
t serve as a base for this analysis with movement across state borders observed
through comparisons with the state of work variable acquired from the 2000 SCEF
data. We aim to estimate movement from working in 2000 an out-of-sample UI
state in year t to working in the 2001 UI in an in-sample state (deﬁned as the com-
plement to the set of UI states in year t). Even though the frames for this analysis
do not shift, the set of states considered in-sample do vary by year. Movements
from employment within an out-of-sample state to employment in an in-sample
state in year t are captured by the probit indicator variable, eOI
it . The SCEF per-
son weight is used in the model.
3.4.3 Imputing Missing Data
The Sequential Regression Multiple Imputation (SRMI) programs created by Wood-
cock and Benedetto (2006) are used to impute X0
itˆ βt for the 26.7% of the sample
with incomplete information because they are present in the Unemployment In-
surance wage records but have no decennial Census link.17 Using a 1% sample of
17These missing data mainly result from individuals who were either not residing
in the country or were deceased by 2000 and did not partake in the Census, but
who worked during other years in our time series in the United States.199
the complete data and all missing records, a two-sided Kernel Density Estimator
(KDE) transform is used in a continuous model to impute estimates of X0
itˆ βt for
those who are in the ICF and not in the HCEF. This is done within speciﬁed
by-groups. These by-groups (By) and their covariates (X) for the imputation are
as follows:
Groups: G1 G1 G2 G2 G3 G3 G4 G4
Type: By X By X By X By X
male 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
white 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
agecat 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
born us 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
born foreign 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
missing race 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
no pcf 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
irca 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
years us 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
years us missing 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1200
Deﬁnitions for these variables follow below:
male - 1 if male, 0 if female
white - 1 if white, 0 otherwise
agecat - categorical age variable
born us - 1 if born in the U.S., 0 otherwise
born foreign - 1 if born outside the U.S., 0 otherwise
missing race - 1 if race variable is missing, 0 otherwise
no pcf - 1 if no PCF record exists, 0 otherwise
irca - 1 if non-native and entered U.S. 1987-1991, 0 otherwise
years us - cumulative years spent in the U.S.
years us missing - 1 if years in the U.S. are missing, 0 otherwise
All categorical covariates, such as agecat, born foreign, and years us, become
indicator variables during the imputation. An Immigration and Reform Control
Act indicator, irca, for non-native individuals who entered the United States be-
tween 1987 and 1991, inclusive, is among the covariates. Missing dates of entry
and missing PCF links are controlled for by the indicators years us missing and
no pcf, respectively. Cells with fewer than 1,000 records are passed into the next
grouping.
3.5 National Weights- Industry and Demographic Control
Totals
The temporal ﬂuctuation of the set of states in our sample requires us to create
annual weights that are associated with person and job characteristics. These
weights permit our sample counts to match the corresponding totals of workers
and establishments at the national level in each year. In this manner, they enable201
our results for the subset of states for which we have data to be interpreted for
the entire United States. These weights are generated by raking LEHD data with
equivalent cells to control totals based on Census Bureau population estimates
and Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Establishment Survey estimates. These
weights have the capability of being generated for any combination of states in
our data sample. Described below are the three data sources used, followed by a
description of the creation of the weights.
3.5.1 Industry Data (1990-2002)
Industry data are from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) program. The
CES ﬁgure is deﬁned as average monthly job counts of employees in nonfarm
business payrolls over the year. The data are year by SIC division margins, with
the yearly data referencing the second quarter.
3.5.2 Demographic Data (1990-2002)
The Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey
(1990-2002) provides us with the demographic data. The universe has been re-
stricted to match the private nonfarm business sector reﬂected in the industry
data provided by the CES. Any person age 14 or older who last year reported pos-
itive wages, weeks worked, and hours per week is included except for government
workers, those who have never worked, private household workers, members of the
armed forces, and agricultural employees.18 The data are constructed as year by
18Those typically not covered by Unemployment Insurance wage records (varies
slightly by state: this is IL) are the federal civilian government, U. S. Postal Service,
military, self-employed, insurance/real estate agents working solely on commission,
railroad, judiciary, small agricultural businesses, elected state and local government202
gender by age group by education group margins. Population totals in this survey
(used to calculate the United States weights) are based on oﬃcial Census Bureau
population estimates.
The demographic data have been scaled down to the level of the industry data
so that the annual totals agree. Scaling down the CPS data proportionately for
all does not greatly aﬀect the quality of the labor ﬁgures.
3.5.3 LEHD Sample Totals
A sample count, edkt, is constructed from Unemployment Insurance data on all
states used to estimate the human capital model based on the SIC divisions that
exist in both the CES industry and ES-202 data sets.
Here, k indexes sex by age group by education group, d indexes SIC division,
and t indexes year. Employment is deﬁned as the second quarter average of total
beginning and ending employment ((B+E)/2) in order to be consistent with the
deﬁnition of employment in the industry data. These data are stratiﬁed into year
by SIC division by sex by age group by education group, with the yearly data
referencing the second quarter.
3.5.4 Final Weights
Using the consistent control totals, iterative proportional ﬁtting (IPF) on the
marginal demographic and industry data is implemented by year to obtain a control
weight, fdkt, for each year, t (1990-2002), demographic category, k, and industry
sector, d, that is ﬁtted to the known distribution of an identical sample of UI and
oﬃcials, National and Air National Guard, and underground economy. See also
http://stats.bls.gov/opub/hom/homch5 b.htm.203
ES-202 data. The ﬁnal weight used is given by
weightdkt =
fdkt
edkt
,
which is the ratio of the control total to the equivalent sample size total for
each set of characteristics. Here, k indexes sex by age group by education group
and i indexes SIC division. The number of categories for each variable of cross-
classiﬁcation are as follows: 12 years (1990-2002), 8 SIC divisions, 2 sexes, 8 age
groups, and 6 education groups. The SIC divisions to be included are: mining,
construction; manufacturing; transportation, communication, and public utilities;
wholesale trade; retail trade; ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate; and services. Age
groups are deﬁned as CPS age groups: 14-18, 19-21, 22-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54,
55-64, and 65 or more years.19 Education groups are deﬁned as: 0-8, 9-11, 12,
13-15, 16, and 17 or more years of schooling.
3.6 Human Capital Input File Summary Statistics
For the 30 states in this run, approximately 160 million persons ever held a job
between 1990 and 2003. The top three job holders have 43,911; 10,120; and 6,386
jobs during that time. Only about 15,000 individuals have more than emax=88
jobs between 1990 and 2003, which is less than one hundredth of one percent of
the sample. Roughly 1.675 billion year-person-establishment records are input,
with 2.3 billion year-person-establishment records processed. The diﬀerence is
due to individuals who work in more than one state: 81% of the sample has
worked in only one state; 15% of the sample has worked in two states; 3% of the
sample has worked in three states; the remaining individuals worked in four or
19The maximum allowable age is 85.204
more states, although few have worked in more than ten. In the ﬁnal estimation
with all restrictions imposed, 1,005,326 observations; 417,946,932 cells; 154,106,229
persons; and 9,090,173 ﬁrms are present.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
Following the completion of the data preparation of the infrastructure ﬁles, the
estimation of the Heckit selection model, and the creation of national weights,
the human capital estimates are generated. The model and methodology for the
estimation is described in detail in the preceding chapter.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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